



DANISH
FOREIGN POLICY
YEARBOOK
2016

EDITED BY NANNA HVIDT AND HANS MOURITZEN

DIIS · DANISH INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

DANISH FOREIGN POLICY YEARBOOK 2016

Edited by Nanna Hvidt and Hans Mouritzen



DIIS

Danish Institute for International Studies 2016

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Graphic design: Mark Gry Christiansen

Printed in Denmark by Gullanders Bogtrykkeri a-s

ISBN (print): 978-87-7605-803-6
ISBN (pdf): 978-87-7605-804-3
ISSN: 1397-2480

DIIS publications can be downloaded free of charge or ordered from www.diis.dk

The full text of this book can also be found electronically in EBSCO Publishing's databases.

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The *Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook* offers an overview of Danish foreign policy and Denmark's role both regionally and globally. Apart from the articles by Denmark's foreign and defence ministers, this volume includes three scholarly articles whose authors represent only themselves and their academic expertise (for their titles and affiliations, see each article).

Denmark takes a relatively unsentimental approach towards Nordic cooperation generally, looking for comparative advantages and practical benefits. Alyson Bailes analyses how these fundamentals manifested themselves when Denmark chaired Nordic processes, as it did in 2015 with the Nordic Council of Ministers, the Nordic-Baltic Eight and the Haga civil security programme. It is with sadness that we received the information that Alyson Bailes passed away in April 2016. Alyson was a great and uniquely generous intellectual force in her field, and even though she was very ill and knew that time was short, she completed the article. We shall miss her deeply.

Denmark's relationship with Turkey is characterized as increasingly pragmatic by Cecilie Stokholm Banke, at least compared to the early years of the AKP government, when the prime ministers of the two countries at the time, Fogh Rasmussen and Recep Tayyip Erdogan, clashed in public. In recent years, this value-based position towards Turkey has been replaced by a cautious and pragmatic approach.

As Carsten Staur shows, Denmark has recently adopted a more activist position in relation to the Middle East than the very cautious UN policy it otherwise adhered to in the late 1940s and 1950s. In the Danish view at that time, Israel's application for UN membership should be viewed as an element in the complex peace negotiations following the first Arab-Israeli war of 1948-49, and Denmark emphasised the need to base a political solution to the Palestinian refugee problem on the principle of the right of return.

These articles are abstracted in English and Danish at the start of chapter one. After the articles follows a selection of official documents that are considered to be characteristic of Danish foreign policy during 2015. This is supplemented by essential statistics, as well as by some of the most relevant polls on the attitudes of Danes to key foreign-policy questions. Finally, a bibliography offers a limited selection of scholarly books, articles and chapters published in English, German or French in 2015 within the field covered by the *Yearbook*.

The editors of the Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook are Director Nanna Hvidt and Dr. Hans Mouritzen. Anine Kristensen has served as the managing editor.

The editors
DIIS, Copenhagen
May 2016

Chapter I

Articles

Abstracts in English and Danish

Denmark in Nordic Cooperation: Leader, Player, Sceptic?

Alyson J K Bailes

Of the five Nordic states, Denmark has followed a singular path in several ways, including a certain distancing from ‘hard’ defence cooperation in both the EU and Nordic contexts. The reasons include an Atlanticist orientation that also reflects Copenhagen’s responsibility for Greenland and the Faroe Islands. Towards Nordic cooperation generally, Denmark takes a relatively unsentimental approach, looking for comparative advantages and practical benefits. How are these fundamentals reflected when Denmark chairs a Nordic process, as it did in 2015 with the Nordic Council of Ministers, the Nordic-Baltic Eight and the Haga civil security programme? Denmark’s declared aims that year included a critical focus on remaining blockages in Nordic cooperation, an emphasis on the Arctic, and support for the Baltic States in countering Russian public diplomacy or propaganda. The outcomes reflected progress on all the main points, even if they could not alter some basic reasons for the mixed attitudes to Denmark’s stance among the other Nordic states. Greenland and the Faroe Islands were cooperatively engaged, but in the process acquired experiences that could also be relevant to their possible eventual independence.

Blandt de fem nordiske lande er Danmark i flere henseender gået enegang, blandt andet med en vis distancering fra konkret forsvarssamarbejde i såvel EU som i nordisk sammenhæng. Dette skyldes især Danmarks stærkt atlantiske orientering, som også afspejler Københavns ansvar for Grønland og Færøerne. Generelt er Danmarks tilgang til nordisk samarbejde forholdsvis usentimental og betoner komparative fordele og praktisk nytte. Hvordan kom disse grundlæggende forhold til udtryk, da Danmark i 2015 havde flere nordiske formandskaber, nemlig for Nordisk Ministerråd, for det nordisk-baltiske samarbejde (NB8) og for nordisk beredskabssamarbejde (Haga-processen)? Danmarks erklærede mål omfattede blandt andet et kritisk fokus på tilbageværende grænsehindre for nordisk samkvem, en betoning af Arktis og støtte til de baltiske lande i forhold til eventuel russisk propaganda eller 'public diplomacy'. Resultaterne var udtryk for fremskridt på alle væsentlige punkter, om end de ikke kunne rokke ved nogle basale grunde til de øvrige nordiske landes blandede holdninger til Danmarks profil. Grønland og Færøerne blev inddraget i samarbejdet, men de fik derved også erfaringer, som kan være brugbare i tilfælde af fremtidig selvstændighed.

Danish-Turkish Relations during the AKP Government: from Value Clash to Pragmatism

Cecilie Felicia Stokholm Banke

To what extent has Denmark followed a distinct 'Turkey policy' during the period of Turkey's AKP government? Four contemporary issues in Danish-Turkish relations are analysed: the Danish position on Turkish accession to the EU; the so-called Lars Hedegaard case; the dispute over ROJ TV, which emerged simultaneously with Anders Fogh Rasmussen's candidacy for the office of NATO Secretary-General; and finally the issue of official Danish recognition of the 'Armenian genocide'. On this basis, Denmark's relationship with Turkey is characterized as increasingly pragmatic, at least compared to the early years of the AKP government, when then Prime Ministers Fogh Rasmussen and Recep Tayyip Erdogan clashed in public. The days are gone when Denmark could act as a strong defender of liberal values, notably freedom of expression. In recent years, this value-based position towards Turkey has been replaced by a cautious and pragmatic approach.

I hvilken udstrækning har Danmark haft en særlig Tyrkiet-politik i de år AKP har været ved magten i Tyrkiet? Fire konkrete sager i perioden analyseres: Danmarks

holdning til tyrkisk EU-medlemskab, Lars Hedegaard-sagen, sagen om ROJ-tv samtidig med Anders Fogh Rasmussens kandidatur til posten som NATO-generalsekretær og endelig spørgsmålet om en officiel dansk anerkendelse af overgrebet på armenierne under første verdenskrig som 'folkedrab'. På dette grundlag karakteriseres den danske Tyrkiet-politik som stadig mere pragmatisk og mindre båret af liberale værdier, i det mindste sammenlignet med de første års AKP-styre, da statsministrene Fogh Rasmussen og Recep Tayyip Erdogan krydsede klinger i fuld offentlighed. De tider er forbi, da Danmark agerede som markant forsvarer for liberale værdier, ikke mindst ytringsfrihed. I de senere år er denne værdibaserede Tyrkiet-politik blevet erstattet af en forsigtig og pragmatisk tilgang.

Ready for Membership? Denmark and Israel's Application for UN Membership in May 1949

Carsten Staur

Israel's admission as a member of the United Nations in May 1949 signalled the formal acceptance of the new country as an independent state and as an equal among its peers in the international community. As a member of the UN, Denmark was called upon to take a position on this issue. In November 1947 Denmark supported the United Nations' Partition Plan and the planned division of the British mandate into two states, one Jewish, the other Arab. Yet in May 1949 Denmark abstained on the issue of admitting Israel as a member of the UN. In between, the Danish Liberal MP Per Federspiel had been playing a rather visible role as a member of the UN Palestine Commission (1947-48), and together with foreign minister Gustav Rasmussen, he argued that Israel's application for UN membership should be viewed as an element in the complex peace negotiations following the first Arab-Israeli war of 1948-49, emphasizing the need to base a political solution to the Palestinian refugee problem on the principle of the right of return. In so doing Denmark took a more activist position in relation the Middle East than the very cautious UN policy it otherwise adhered to in the late 1940s and 1950s.

Israels optagelse som medlem af De Forenede Nationer i maj 1949 var udtryk for den formelle accept af landet som en uafhængig stat og som medlem af det internationale samfund. Som medlem af FN måtte Danmark også tage stilling til disse spørgsmål. I november 1947 støttede Danmark FN's delingsplan for Palæstina og dermed opdelingen af det britiske mandat i to stater, en jødisk og

en arabisk. Danmark undlod imidlertid at stemme ved afstemningen om Israels medlemskab af FN i maj 1949. I den mellemliggende periode havde Per Federspiel (MF, Venstre) spillet en ret så synlig rolle som medlem af FN's Palæstina-Kommission (1947-48), og efter den første arabisk-israelske krig (1948-49) forsøgte han sammen med udenrigsminister Gustav Rasmussen at argumentere for at se den israelske ansøgning om FN-medlemskab som et element i de komplekse fredsforhandlinger, ikke mindst ved at argumentere for en politisk løsning på det palæstinensiske flygtningeproblem, baseret på princippet om retten til tilbagevenden. Herigennem forsøgte Danmark sig med en mere aktivistisk linje i mellemøstpolitikken end den ellers meget forsigtige politiske stillingtagen, der generelt prægede dansk FN-politik i slutningen af 1940erne og 1950erne.

The International Situation and Danish Foreign Policy in 2015

Kristian Jensen, Minister for Foreign Affairs

In 2015, the waves of multiple crises broke on the shores of Europe. The immense increase in migrants arriving at Europe's borders is first and foremost an indicator of continued crisis in Europe's neighbourhood and beyond. Crises in the form of war and unrest of course, but also political and economic crises. It presents us with challenges on both internal and external dimensions. We must effectively tackle the 'push factors' of migration by ensuring better living conditions abroad. We must ensure proper settings for the stay of those who apply for asylum in Europe. It forces us to rethink our approach and to link internal and external policies. It demands new policies for the long term, because nothing suggests that this is a thing of the past or the present. It is a thing of the future.

Consequently, while Europe in 2015 to a large degree focused on addressing the immediate challenges posed by migration, our policies in 2016 must also apply a long-term perspective and focus on the root causes, including poverty, instability, lack of human rights and opportunities for a better life.

These are also some of the underlying factors for continued conflicts in 2015. The war in Syria has now lasted longer than the First World War. The fight against Da'esh in Iraq and Syria saw progress on many fronts, but the underlying drivers of conflict in both countries persist. The same can be said of the crisis in and around Ukraine and the more assertive Russian foreign policy. The Russian intervention in Syria did not help the Syrian people. Other protracted conflicts, for example in Yemen and Afghanistan, saw continued or even increased violence. War and unrest is not easily mitigated once it has erupted.

This is where diplomacy comes in. Diplomacy can prevent, mitigate and suppress conflict. In that sense, 2015 was also a year of new hope. The nuclear deal with Iran, the agreement on the new development goals in New

York, the agreement on climate change in Paris and the WTO agreement in Nairobi were large victories, albeit victories that will only remain so if they are followed by implementation and more of the same. Smaller victories were many, such as the developments in Colombia or the launch of EU-Tunisia trade negotiations.

In the midst of crises and setbacks, it is worth remembering that in 2015 the world continued its development towards becoming a better place. Good news was abundant. Things in decline in today's world include poverty, child mortality, gender inequality, HIV/AIDS and malaria, and children without access to education.*

In sum, 2015 was a classic year in the history of international politics: it gave way to both grave concern and immense hope.

Migration

An area of particular concern – and a hallmark of 2015 – was migration. Precise figures are still being validated, but those we already have are fully adequate to describe a migration crisis unparalleled in magnitude in recent history. At least 1.3 million people applied for asylum in Europe in 2015. Most of them arrived in Europe after dangerous journeys across the Mediterranean or through the Western Balkans.

Some migrants came here simply looking for work, a brighter future or under illusions of a limitless European welfare system as portrayed by smuggler networks. Others came here after fleeing war, death, hunger and atrocities beyond our imagination in their homelands of Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan or elsewhere.

Arguably, the challenges for these people are measured on a scale unfamiliar to post-World War II generations in Western Europe. These are challenges we can and will help refugees confront. Nonetheless, one cannot discuss the migration crisis without tackling head on the enormous challenges this development has constituted for Europe. It puts pressure on European finances, cohesion, mobility – and solidarity. Europe, its nation states and the EU have worked hard to come up with solutions over the past year, both short-term and long-term solutions. Although we came a long way in 2015, it is evident for everyone that we are not yet there. Basically, Europe will have

* See UN's Millennium Development Goals Report 2015.

to work hard on (at least) two dimensions if we are to respond properly to the challenges presented over the years to come.

Firstly, Europe has a moral, practical and political responsibility to address the very factors that feed the waves of migration we are currently facing, for the sake of migrants – current as well as potential – but also for the sake of Europeans. This is the external dimension. The only viable way to address the ‘push’ factors of migration is through policies that mitigate the root causes of migration: war, unrest, instability, poverty, disease, the hopelessness of living in broken societies. Across Europe, we are working hard to ensure that future European policies towards our neighbourhoods – and beyond – reflect these insights. This goes for both quality and quantity of policy. Denmark will continue to support long-term development in Africa and in the European neighbourhood: stability, growth and values will be our guiding principles. Denmark will continue to be one of the few countries of the world providing 0.7% of GDP in development assistance and we will continue to apply a comprehensive, result-oriented approach to maximize the effect. Denmark will also continue to be one of the countries providing the most humanitarian aid measured per capita.

Secondly, Europe will have to continue the work being done on improving the internal mechanisms and processes for dealing with migrants. The magnitude of migrants places each destination country under an immense pressure. Solutions must be sought jointly in order to avoid a domino effect of closing borders throughout Europe. If Europe fails to secure its borders and agree on common solutions, we will not only let down the migrants arriving here. We will also jeopardize the cohesion and solidarity of the European project, which admittedly has been put under severe stress over the past year.

When history books are written, migration will probably be identified as the most important foreign policy issue for Europe in 2015. It might even be a dominating theme of this century. Demographic projections tell us that the populations of our neighbourhoods, Africa and the Middle East, will multiply over the next two decades. The UN expects that there will be roughly 500 million more Africans in 2030. In Europe, the population is expected to shrink by four million. These numbers remind us that unless we succeed in supporting the rise of more stable and prosperous societies, history books may treat the migration flows of 2015 as a mere warning of what was to come. The current trend is unsustainable. Solutions must first and foremost be sought in the countries and regions from which people are fleeing.

In 2016, I will continue to convey my message that Europe has to invest in long-term comprehensive solutions. International aid and assistance should lay the ground for development. We must seek synergies between stabilization and development. Our policies should enable people and countries to lift themselves out of poverty. A case in point for the latter is liberalization of trade on the African continent and assistance to these efforts. At the same time, we can and should assist African countries in making the most of their potential. We will continue to strengthen the dialogue and cooperation with our African partners on migration challenges and pursue stability, growth and values in our foreign policy. Each is an important ingredient in breaking the vicious circle. For young people to remain closer to home and build families and businesses, they need a stable environment, a rules-based society and basic human rights as well as economic perspectives. Without thriving, export-oriented economies, the people of Africa will continue to consider making the perilous journey to European shores. Many will die en route. Getting the policies right in this area is and will continue to be a key challenge for our generation.

The fight against Da'esh: two steps forward, one step back

Also in the foreseeable future, the fight against the barbaric terrorist organization Da'esh will be a classic case of 'two steps forward and one step back'. There is no reason to conceal the fact that the eventual elimination of Da'esh is just as complex as the factors that led to its creation. This is why the global coalition has a stated goal of strategic patience as well as a comprehensive approach comprising five lines of effort across both military and civilian dimensions. Denmark remained a significant contributor to all five lines of effort throughout 2015. Danish contributions will be even more significant in 2016.

The military effort is a necessary – but certainly not sufficient – condition for eventually defeating Da'esh. The coalition achieved some military progress in 2015, although progress that is not yet irreversible. At the end of 2015 Da'esh had lost significant amounts of the territory it once controlled in Iraq and Syria. Some battles were lost, however, and others were very hard-won. While the Iraqi armed forces did secure an important victory in liberating Ramadi, it came at a high price. When the forces eventually

moved into Ramadi, after suffering many casualties, they found a devastated city heavily mined by Da'esh fighters trapped in the city for months. Denmark is supporting the demining initiatives in Ramadi already underway, but it will take time before the citizens of Ramadi can return. This serves to underline the scale of the challenge we are facing in fighting this ruthless organization.

We will get there, however. In the city of Tikrit, which was liberated in the beginning of 2015, more than 90 per cent of the population has now returned, schools are functioning and basic services are provided. This was achieved through a concerted effort of Iraqi authorities, the UN and coalitions member states, including Denmark. The story of Tikrit shows that the stabilization efforts in Iraq and Syria, which is a particular Danish priority, are just as important as the military efforts. When areas are liberated from Da'esh, we have to provide a better, safer, more effective alternative as fast as we can. This is a key factor in achieving sustainable and lasting stability.

In Syria, ending the country's protracted and violent conflict remains a precondition for defeating Da'esh. In the long run, the only way to achieve a lasting peace in Syria and end the protracted fighting will be by reaching agreement on a political solution that does not include Assad in the long run. In Iraq it will be critical for Prime Minister Abadi to succeed in advancing his political reform agenda and securing greater inclusion, especially of marginalized Sunni groups. Denying the terrorist group a future foothold in Iraq will depend on the Iraqi government being able to gain the trust of its population. Otherwise, without a reformed Iraqi government and greater Sunni participation, it will be difficult to sustain the military gains achieved in the fight against Da'esh.

The Russian military intervention in Syria has further complicated and exacerbated the conflict in Syria. While Russia claims to be fighting Da'esh, it is clear that only a minority of Russian air strikes in Syria have in fact been directed against Da'esh. An overwhelming amount of strikes has targeted units belonging to Syria's armed opposition. Although the political process on Syria has received renewed momentum after Russia's military intervention, the current prospect for achieving a lasting political solution to the conflict still seems distant.

While we saw some progress in the fight against Da'esh in Iraq and Syria, we also saw setbacks elsewhere. Da'esh and its affiliates feed on instability and unrest, and they succeeded in 2015 in establishing a foothold in vulnerable societies with protracted conflicts. Libya is perhaps the most worrisome of these. As these lines are written, the international community is closely

monitoring the situation in Libya. Steps are being taken to ensure that the international community can help Libya resist the tentacles of this barbaric organization.

Through ruthless and terrible attacks in Paris, Istanbul, Beirut and elsewhere, Da'esh also proved able and willing to target innocent civilians in the region, in Europe and beyond. In spite of such barbaric behaviour, Da'esh is still able to attract foreign fighters to its military campaigns and to inspire supporters sympathising with its ideology to carry out attacks. Unfortunately, Copenhagen experienced the latter first-hand in 2015.

This is why Da'esh must be fought with all means – not just military. In 2016, the coalition will continue its efforts to counter the propaganda of Da'esh, to hinder foreign fighters reaching the heartland of Da'esh and to cut off the organization's sources of financing. Denmark will continue to contribute to these efforts, and we will see more projects – at home and abroad – aimed at mitigating radicalization. The fight against Da'esh will be won eventually. But it will be a long one, testing our patience and determination.

Ukraine/Russia

Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea challenged the fundamental principles of global governance and international law as well as our perceptions of Russia as an actor. Russia's actions in Ukraine continue to pose a threat to the stability and security of Ukraine as well as Europe. In Crimea the human rights situation deteriorated and in parts of eastern Ukraine the security situation was fragile throughout the year. The Minsk process for a settlement of the conflict in eastern Ukraine faced serious difficulties in 2015. Due to the relentless efforts of Germany and France the process continued to be the only game in town. However, lack of effort and political will on especially the side of the Russian-supported separatists and Russia made progress slow.

Europe stood firm and stood together. The unity on sanctions against Russia proved that together – and especially when aligned with other global allies – the EU can deliver a strong response to aggression. Europe found new ways to counter Russian obstruction. Denmark and like-minded countries pushed for a more proactive countering of Russian propaganda and misperceptions about European intentions, which resulted in the establishment of a strategic communications platform in the EEAS. Denmark continued its strong support for Ukrainian reform efforts focusing on areas such as good governance, energy efficiency, civil society and media. In the end, a

stable, prosperous and democratic Ukraine is the best response to Russian aggression.

2016 will hopefully see Russia make use of the door for constructive engagement, which has remained open throughout the crisis. The world needs a constructive and engaged Russia who respects international principles.

Diplomacy still going strong

I stepped into office just before several important international agreements were concluded. To name two, the nuclear agreement with Iran and the peace agreement in Mali. Good news receives less coverage than bad news, but the two agreements, which were concluded within one month, show diplomacy at its best. Did the agreements in themselves bring stability, prosperity and democracy? No, a piece of paper cannot achieve this. However, such agreements – as varied in size and content as they may be – are an important stepping stone.

Especially the agreement between the international community and *Iran* on Iran's nuclear programme was a diplomatic landmark of 2015. Through a combination of negotiations and pressure from effective sanctions, the international community managed to dissuade Iran from pursuing its nuclear ambitions by means of a strong agreement and a vigorous implementation regime. The agreement has paved the way for renewed engagement with Iran and the Iranian people. We should not be naïve. Nor should we expect changes in Iranian conduct to take place overnight. However, the nuclear deal gives cause for cautious optimism of rapprochement and more constructive Iranian behaviour, not least in relation to the many challenges facing the region.

2015 also saw the conclusion of two historic agreements which both seek global solutions for our future and brought together all the countries of the world. The agreements are a major accomplishment for the multilateral system and for international cooperation. Together they confirm the value of a strong and active Danish engagement in seeking multilateral solutions to global challenges:

At the Paris climate conference (*COP21*) in December 2015, 195 countries adopted the first-ever universal, legally binding global climate deal. With the Paris agreement we reached a historic consensus to combat climate change and unleash actions and investment towards securing a low-carbon, resilient and sustainable future.

In September in New York the whole world endorsed the 17 *global goals for sustainable development*. This ambitious and inclusive agreement was indeed a milestone for the international community and will fundamentally change the way we pursue sustainable development towards 2030. Congratulations to my predecessor and current President of the General Assembly of the UN, Mr. Mogens Lykketoft, for his role in securing this historic agreement.

Another multilateral victory was reached in Nairobi in December within the *WTO*. We agreed a landmark deal to phase out harmful export subsidies in agriculture, supplemented by other measures beneficial to the least developed countries in particular. Liberalizing trade in information technology was another important achievement. The package agreed in Nairobi was systematically important, breathing new air into the *WTO* and showing a path forward for multilateral trade negotiations.

Peaceful and effective cooperation continued in a region of utmost importance to the Kingdom: the *Arctic*. It is essential that we safeguard and further develop the rules-based framework and institutions underpinning Arctic cooperation in the years to come.

Finally, and as an integral part of our pursuit of a strong rules-based international system, I launched the Danish candidacy for a seat in the *UN Human Rights Council* for the period 2019-2021. The Human Rights Council is a central body for the promotion, protection and respect of human rights. These are objectives that we can support more forcefully as a member of the Council. We will work hard to promote our candidacy up to the election in 2018.

A challenging year for the European Union

The handling of the migration challenges will be a defining factor for European cooperation in the future. The very tokens of European cooperation – the free circulation of people – are at stake and I was sorry to witness the reinstatement of border checks on the Øresund bridge between Denmark and Sweden, which has long been a symbol of integration across borders to the benefit of people and businesses alike. The free movement of persons is one of the core principles in the European Union. The new restrictions around Europe underlines the grave situation that the EU is facing with a potential collapse of the Schengen area.

The European economy is in its fourth year of recovery after the economic crisis. Whilst growth continues at a moderate rate, the European Union will, however, have to deal with the continued effects of the economic crisis, not least the economic challenges in Greece. An agreement on the third loan programme to Greece was reached in 2015, which needs to be fully implemented in order to secure economic stability.

In addition, the danger of a “*Brexit*”, where the United Kingdom decides to leave the EU, would lead the Union into unknown waters. Never before has a Member State decided to leave the EU. The agreement reached at the European Council in February provides a solid basis for the British Prime Minister to make his case for continued membership of the Union. The referendum in the United Kingdom is scheduled for 23 June 2016. It will undoubtedly be a defining moment in European history no matter the result.

Global affairs, national interests

Denmark may not rank among the main actors in global affairs. This does not mean, however, that there are no Danish interests at stake in global issues that might appear a little distant to Denmark at first. Looking back at 2015, a few issues are worth highlighting.

Looking at Asia, the continent continued to be at the forefront of global growth in 2015, albeit at a reduced pace, providing ample opportunities for expansion of our cooperation both economically and politically. *China* continued its rise as a global superpower, further bringing forward its Belt and Road foreign policy strategy and setting up the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank with Denmark amongst the founding members.

The developments in *Africa* remain vital for Europe and for Denmark. 2015 was a year marked by both progress and challenges with focus on the peace and stability agenda on the Sahel region and the Horn of Africa. Notable steps were taken, such as the signing of the peace agreement in Mali. Sustaining economic growth and boosting trade are other important challenges with Danish interests at stake – for example in Nigeria, the most populous country of Africa, where Denmark recently opened an embassy.

The negotiations for a comprehensive *Trans-Atlantic Trade & Investment Partnership (TTIP)* between the EU and US continued. There are many bumps on the way and complex differences to overcome, but the aim remains to reach a political agreement before the expiry of President Obama’s term of office. We cannot compromise on the quality of an agreement to give way

for a swift conclusion, but I, for one, will be cheering on the negotiators in 2016. An ambitious agreement will matter a great deal for Danish companies, consumers and workers alike.

In the area of 'high politics', *NATO* remains an organization of immense importance to Denmark. While the Turkish downing of a Russian fighter jet was a dramatic highlight of 2015, the overarching theme for the latter half of the year was the preparations for the highly important summit in Warsaw in 2016. *NATO* certainly did not become less relevant in 2015, and the summit in July will reflect this.

2016: Time to stop, think and correct the course

It should be evident to the reader by now that 2015 – and the preceding years for that matter – produced more questions than answers for the actors in international politics. Have we seen the peak of large-scale migration to Europe or just the beginning? What are the best policies to tackle this challenge? How do we ensure it will not tear Europe apart? For that matter, what could a 'Brexit' mean in that regard? What effect will Russia's campaign in Syria have on Russian foreign policy? What effect will the campaign of the global coalition to counter Da'esh have? Will it drive Da'esh out of the Levant and further into Northern Africa? Can diplomacy, which was arguably revived through several successes in 2015, prove as effective in the years to come? Can multilateralism?

But fear not, dear reader. History may have taught us that the course of international politics cannot easily be predicted. Nonetheless, clever minds are working tirelessly to make sure we stay tuned and give it our best shot.

This year, Europe will adopt a new 'Global Strategy' on its foreign policy. The outlook has changed since the last strategy in 2003 – from one of confidence in a new, better world order to one dominated by security concerns. The heinous terrorist attack on the Bataclan in Paris and the increased instability in EU's neighbouring regions are events which will no doubt leave their mark on the strategy and likely lead to an adjustment of EU foreign policy. I feel confident that three principles, which are guiding my term in this office, will also feature prominently in the strategy: security, growth and values.

In 2016 we will also see the results of the review on Danish foreign and security policy, which was launched in 2015. The Government has asked for an analysis of the most important regional and global dynamics, opportunities and challenges facing Denmark in the next 10-15 years. The review should also provide recommendations for a more comprehensive, joined-up and focused foreign and security policy. I hope it will spark debate and new ideas on how we maximize the benefit from an active Danish foreign policy. One that includes not only the Foreign Ministry and other government agencies, but also non-state actors such as cities, companies, civil society and universities in a concerted effort.

Finally, we will adopt a new strategy for development cooperation in 2016. The continuous development of even better policies for development is crucial if we are to maximize the effect of our efforts in mitigating the biggest challenges of our time. Addressing root causes of migration more effectively and supporting development of security, basic services and state structures in fragile states will be among the most important priorities of the new strategy.

To reiterate, 2015 was a classic year in the history of international politics, in the sense that it gave way to both concern and hope. Looking further into 2016, we can expect both more concern and more hope. The balance between the two, of course, is as much about rhetoric and discourse as it is about actual events. On that note, let me conclude by expressing a sincere hope that the candidates of November's presidential election in the United States – which is followed so closely by most of the world – will lead by example.

2016 ought to be more about hope than about fear. After all, in 2015, despite all the grave concerns and unfolding miseries, the world continued its slow and steady trajectory towards becoming a better place.

Denmark in a Complex Security Environment

Peter Christensen, Minister of Defence

In numerous ways, 2015 underlined that our security environment has grown increasingly complex as we were confronted with a multitude of different and difficult security challenges; Russia in the East, ISIL in the South, terrorism – also on Danish territory – and cyber threats. In addition, the humanitarian crisis in the Middle East translated into massive migration towards European borders and posed yet another challenge to Europe, to the cohesion within the EU, and to our society. 2015 also had positive developments – the efforts to combat piracy off the coast of Eastern Africa was a success.

Specific Security Challenges

Let me point to some of the key security challenges that we have encountered during 2015, and begin with Russia.

Russia

Russia seems intent to re-establish Russia as a great world power. This manifested itself through different worrisome actions. The Russian military actions in Ukraine posed and continue to pose a challenge to the European security structures. The continued Russian air activity in the Baltic Sea area and the Russian readiness exercises close to the territory of Eastern NATO allies contribute to increased uncertainty. In Syria, Russia played an unconstructive role as Russian bombings hit moderate opposition groups to the Assad-regime rather than ISIL. The Russian military engagement in Syria is the biggest build-up of Russian forces outside Russia since the end of the Cold War.

It seems right to assume that Russia will continue to remain a security challenge in our region for some time to come. Even though Russian activities and political rhetoric are real and disturbing, the way forward must nevertheless include dialogue and, where possible, cooperation. It is also clear that a strong and united NATO is a prerequisite for seeking dialogue with Russia.

Terrorism

Another challenge that continues to demand our close attention is the threat of terrorism and extremism that in 2015 materialized in numerous attacks around the world. In Europe, the attacks in Copenhagen, Paris, in the Middle East and many other places exemplified that the actions of ISIL not only have regional implications in the Middle East but have crossed the doorway to our societies.

After the deplorable terror attacks in Paris in January 2015, Denmark initiated a process to further strengthen our defence against terrorism. We have strengthened the Danish Defence Intelligence Service (DDIS) with additional resources amounting to 415 million kroner over the next four years. Furthermore, DDIS was granted new legal powers. In response to the growing threat the Danish Parliament passed a bill in December that enables the Danish Defence Intelligence Service (DDIS) to collect important information about Danish extremists and foreign fighters abroad.

Some of the additional resources will improve DDIS's ability to collect information and its ability to break encryption codes used by terrorists. Other funds are allocated to strengthening DDIS's participation in the international intelligence cooperation, especially in the field of multilateral counter-terror cooperation. On the national scene the cooperation between DDIS and its counterpart within the police has likewise been further strengthened.

The current terror threat is to a large extent fuelled by the conflict in Syria and Iraq. Thousands of Europeans, including more than 125 radicalized people from Denmark, have made their way to the conflict zones far from Denmark, many of whom have returned to Denmark. Foreign fighters can pose a serious threat to our society, our values and way of life.

Thus, the fight against terrorism in Denmark and internationally remained a top priority on the political agenda of the Danish government in 2015. The fight against terrorism and most notably ISIL will take time and there is a need for strategic patience and continued actions.

Therefore, Denmark remains strongly committed to support the coalition against ISIL. During the period from October 2014 to October 2015,

the Danish F-16 contribution carried out 547 missions corresponding to more than 5,700 flying hours. The civil and military efforts together with our coalition partners have paid off and 2015 showed signs of encouragement as ISIL lost substantial territory namely in Iraq but also, albeit to a lesser degree, in Syria. The victory in Ramadi in December 2015 is one such example.

Moving forward, Denmark will continue to contribute with approximately 120 soldiers supporting training of Iraqi security forces and an air surveillance radar with associated operators to the international coalition against ISIL, and keep both non-military and further military contributions under close consideration like the expected redeployment of the F-16 fighters.

While defeating ISIL and taking back the cities in Iraq remains an important priority, the initiation of substantial stabilization and reconciliation efforts must also be considered. The fight to prevent renewed fundamentalism after the defeat of ISIL demands our continued and close attention.

Afghanistan

2015 marked the first year of an important security transition in Afghanistan. The Afghan National Defence and Security Forces took over the full responsibility for the security in Afghanistan, and NATO's new Resolute Support Mission was launched on the 1st of January, 2015.

It continues to be a priority for Denmark, together with the international community, to maintain a focus on enabling the Afghan security forces to provide security in Afghanistan. Overall, the Afghan National Security and Defence Forces have met expectations since resuming the primary responsibility for the country's defence, although the Taliban took advantage of the reduction of international military presence. Therefore, it was an important decision that was made by the international community in December to maintain regional troop presence in the year to come. The Danish contribution to the Mission consisted at its peak in 2015 of 160 persons who carried out activities related to military training, advisory functions and support to the Afghan security forces – both defence and police forces – along with financial support and other non-military contributions.

Anti-piracy

Let me now turn to a challenge that in 2015 has evolved in a positive manner – the fight against piracy off the coast of the Horn of Africa. Within the past 5 years the registered attacks from pirates against international commercial vessels has dropped from 200 in 2011 to zero in 2015. This is a remarkable

development that was made possible through a coherent international effort in which Denmark has also taken part and contributed to the international naval operation. Denmark continues to participate actively in international counter-piracy cooperation but will as of next year, due to the positive developments, cease the naval contribution to NATO's anti-piracy operation Ocean Shield.

Cybercrimes and threats

Denmark is one of the most digitised countries in the world. Digitisation allows for rapid exchange of knowledge and services, yet at the same time is a facilitator of malicious on-line activity.

The threat from a cyber attack has for the past consecutive years been considered high on the list of threats that could hit Denmark. The threat could take shape of various types of attack ranging from espionage, cyber-crime, cyber activism to cyber terror.

In recent years cyber espionage against Denmark has increased significantly, and the methods and techniques employed by the perpetrators grow worryingly sophisticated. Espionage targeting state institutions and private companies constitutes the most serious cyber threat to Denmark and Danish interests. It is a type of espionage that is mainly conducted by state and state-sponsored groups.

The threat from cybercrime also continues to grow in magnitude and complexity and requires our constant, watchful eye. Cybercrime targets public authorities, private companies and the general population.

The threat of cyber activism and cyber terror attacks by militant groups such as ISIL is still considered limited for the time being but we need to stay alert.

Other challenges

A number of challenges in other regions have been high on the political agenda during 2015:

In the Sahel region, violent extremist groups are active across the region and have networks that spread into countries in North Africa. In Mali, a number of attacks against their national but also international security forces have taken place. Therefore, Denmark contributes to the UN peacekeeping mission – MINUSMA. Recognizing that MINUSMA plays a key role in the efforts to stabilize Mali, the Danish Parliament decided in November to enhance the Danish contribution to the mission with a C-130J tactical transport aircraft and a special operations force unit to be deployed in 2016.

The situation in Libya was in 2015 marked by political polarization and armed conflict and the lack of government and security structures has made human trafficking and organized crime in the country widespread. Libya is one of the countries that most often is used as a transit country for migrants and refugees seeking to enter Europe.

The number of migrants that have reached Europe in 2015 amounts to approximately 1 million and poses a new challenge to Europe, to the European Union structures, and also to Denmark. Nationally, the extraordinary migration crisis in 2015 also entailed that the Ministry of Defence was asked to assist the responsible Danish authorities to deal with practical challenges that they were facing, in particular in regard to housing of asylum seekers. Housing facilities were established at four of Danish Emergency Management Agency's (DEMA) centres, providing housing for approximately 2,100 people in buildings, pavilions and tents. In addition, we have supported the police by establishing two receiving centres on military grounds that are ready to receive and house approximately 2,000 people in tents, in case the need arises.

Flexibility and multilateralism – keys to facing our challenges

Faced with complex, multiple and simultaneous security challenges, the response requires a coherent and flexible use of means – political, development assistance and defence.

Defence-wise, in 2015, the Ministry of Defence and the Armed Forces continued the development of military capacities in accordance with the Danish Defence Agreement 2013-2017. The agreement aims at a continued efficient, up-to-date Defence geared to meet the complex challenges we face, for example in regard to the cyber domain.

Denmark has a well-equipped and well-trained Defence participating in international missions. The latest example has been the decision to procure 309 new armoured personnel carriers aimed to ensure that the Danish army also in future would be provided with modern and flexible platforms from which to operate. It will be necessary to look into the development of the Danish Armed Forces in the future e.g. in light of the current security situation where the trend currently points towards more robust and substantial military contributions.

In 2015, the Danish Special Operations Command was formally established providing Denmark with a strategic special force capability with increased flexibility and stamina to better address modern challenges in a complex security environment.

Besides a modern and flexible Defence, the response also requires international cooperation – multilateralism. No country, however powerful – can cope with the complex, multiple and simultaneous security challenges by itself.

Denmark stays fully committed to the international multilateral institutions and the cooperation within NATO, the UN, the EU and the Nordic Cooperation. 2015 was no different.

Denmark's active international engagement shows to our partners and allies that we are prepared to do our share.

NATO continues to be the cornerstone of Denmark's security, just as Denmark continues to be a security provider to our NATO allies. Denmark is committed to maintaining our status as a core country in the Alliance by providing substantial contributions to NATO. The Alliance is a unique forum for transatlantic dialogue on security. Solidarity between the allied nations is the root of our work and the foundation we collectively stand on.

The NATO summit in Wales in 2014 reaffirmed the Alliance commitment to collective defence. In light of the changes in the European security environment, the NATO members adopted a new action plan – the so-called Readiness Action Plan with the aim to enhance NATO's collective defence and crisis management capacity along with a reassurance of solidarity within the Alliance – in particular toward our Eastern neighbours in the Baltic countries and Poland.

The Readiness Action Plan constitutes as such NATO's response to the changes in the strategic environment and aims at both adaptation, thus strengthening the collective defence and NATO crisis management capacity, and at assurance in the sense of reassurance of NATO solidarity.

Another example of solidarity and coherence within the Alliance is the particularly rapid reaction force, the so-called Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) which can be deployed at very short notice and across a wide spectrum of NATO tasks. In 2015, the Danish government decided to contribute substantially to the VJTF and NATO Response Force in the years 2016, 2017, and 2018. Denmark will participate with a broad variety of capabilities from all services. The contributions will include a battle group – approximately 1,000 soldiers – for the British-led VJTF in 2017.

Denmark has delivered and will continue to deliver substantially within

coming years to assurance, adaption and operations. In 2016, more than 5000 Danish soldiers will participate in exercises over the year.

As part of assurance efforts, Denmark has in 2015 participated in exercises and monitoring activities with capacities from the Danish Army, Naval Command and Air Command forces. Denmark furthermore contributed with more than 1,000 soldiers from all three command forces to NATO's Exercise Trident Juncture in Spain, Italy and Portugal in the autumn. The exercise was the biggest and most ambitious NATO exercise in more than a decade: more than 36,000 troops took part in the exercise, demonstrating NATO's increased level of ambition and enhanced readiness, flexibility and interoperability. The Danish contribution included battle tanks, a frigate and a C-130 transport aircraft.

Furthermore, Denmark participated in other exercises with demining capacities, special operation forces as well as contributed to Iceland Peacetime Preparedness Mission.

Denmark also doubled our contributions to the Multinational Corps Headquarters in Stettin in Poland following the Wales summit in 2014. The Stettin Headquarters will continue to enhance its role as a hub for regional cooperation with particular responsibility for collective defence. Together with Germany and Poland we are on track to deliver an operational capable high readiness headquarters in time for the NATO summit in Warsaw in 2016. All these activities underline our strong will to be a core country in the Alliance.

In regards to the UN, we are also an active and engaged contributor to the peace-keeping missions of the organization. Contributing to UN peacekeeping missions is an important pillar in the Danish defence policies. Approximately 50 people have participated in missions and as observers in peace-keeping missions in Mali, South Sudan, the Middle East and Liberia. In 2015, a Danish officer was appointed Force Commander for the UN peace-keeping mission in Mali – MINUSMA and Denmark will continue our support to MINUSMA in 2016.

As for the EU, Denmark holds an opt-out from EU's security and defence policy which entails limitation on our participation. In European disaster response, however, we are full-fledged and active members.

In 2015, Denmark contributed with an air surveillance aircraft and staff to the operations of EU-FRONTEX in the Mediterranean, and experts from the Danish Emergency Management Agency (DEMA) and the Home Guard contributed internationally in disaster and conflict zones. Following the earthquake in Nepal in the spring, DEMA sent experts to support the

UN in coordinating the response efforts to the disaster-stricken country. Furthermore, DEMA contributed with logistical support to the UN in the Central African Republic, Myanmar and South Sudan.

In Europe, DEMA has provided support to Ukraine and assisted Hungary and Slovenia in relation to the on-going migration crisis.

With the Nordic Defence Cooperation – NORDEFECO – Denmark also plays an important role. As we close 2015, the chairmanship of NORDEFECO is passed on to Denmark. NORDEFECO offers practical ways of mutually benefitting cooperation. For example, in regards to the UN mission of MINUSMA, the Nordic countries are investigating the possibilities of a rotational contribution on air transport capacity. This would – if agreed upon – be a concrete example of the close relations and the potentials of closer collaboration on defence issues between the Nordic countries.

In the Nordic region, Denmark and Sweden in 2015, also laid the groundwork for a military agreement. The framework agreement will aim to enhance bilateral military cooperation and give enhanced access for Danish and Swedish aircraft and vessels, respectively, to fly, land, sail and dock in each other's territories in a flexible manner during peacetime. The agreement will increase the access for armed aircraft to airports in the other country, and to sail in each other's territorial waters with military vessels, in addition to increased training and exercise activity and more efficient and safe communication channels.

The agreement, which was signed in January 2016, is an example of practical and needed multinational military cooperation between Nordic countries to cope with the demanding security challenges.

In closing, let me underline that as the security environment is growing increasingly complex, it is our responsibility to adapt and act in accordance with the new reality. This is true not least for the Danish Defence and our intelligence service. A complex security environment demands flexibility and a comprehensive approach. The security challenges that have marked 2015 have far from vanished. As they spill over into 2016, our task remains to contribute through active engagement in multilateral structures. This is a prerequisite for our security at home.

Denmark in Nordic Cooperation: Leader, Player, Sceptic?

*Alyson J K Bailes**

Introduction: to be or not to be Nordic?

Denmark is in several ways an outlier among the five Nordic states, the other four being Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden. Its geographical position as an extension of the European mainland gives it a stake, like Sweden and Finland, in Baltic affairs. It also, however, makes Germany's closeness just as much a long-term existential challenge for the Danes as anything involving Russia. Denmark's modern story of using institutions for its protection also has some specific quirks, starting with joining the European Union (EU) more than twenty years earlier than any other Nordic state.¹ Despite this, it has placed more reservations on its Union membership than Sweden or Finland, with four major opt-outs dating from 1992.² One of these exempts Denmark from at least the military aspects of the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy, to which its non-NATO neighbours Sweden and Finland are strongly attached.³ The explanation lies partly in Denmark's overriding loyalty to NATO, where it caused ructions as a 'footnote' country earlier in the Cold War but since the 1990s has been one of the USA's most consistent supporters.⁴

Denmark's 'Atlanticist' strategic vision is in turn linked to the fact that it is the only Nordic state ever to have owned extensive territories beyond the European continent,⁵ and it still has sovereignty over Greenland and the Faroe Islands. Greenland is ultimately dependent on defence cover from North America and is now (following the US pull-out from Iceland in 2006) the only Nordic territory to host a US military base.⁶ By virtue of Greenland Denmark is also an important actor in Arctic affairs and, together with

* Ambassador Alyson Bailes passed away in April 2016 (see Preface).

Norway, forms part of the innermost group of five 'littoral' states within the eight-state Arctic Council.⁷ This is despite the fact that its home territory could not even be called sub-Arctic, and that mainland Danish, Faroese and Greenlandic experiences and perspectives are increasingly diverging. In the last three years, governments with a platform of demanding greater autonomy from Copenhagen have been elected in both the Faroes and Greenland.⁸

It would be odd if these singularities did not impact on Denmark's approach to Nordic Cooperation, a voluntary regional process that has developed over more than six decades to touch upon virtually every field of governance.⁹ The Danes were very active in the formative years – the early 1950s – as part of their input to shaping the region's post-war environment, where Nordic togetherness balanced and complemented the entry of the three western Nordic states into NATO. Copenhagen has not, however, led any of the more recent structural advances, such as the introduction of higher political dimensions by Norwegian and Finnish leaders in the early 1990s. It has been especially reticent about defence cooperation 'at Five', not just because of its concern to avoid weakening NATO through competition and role confusion, but also because its military-technical needs are different. This was seen famously during the Nordic attempt at joint helicopter procurement in 2001, when Denmark broke ranks to buy from a different manufacturer.¹⁰ Today, Denmark belongs to the NORDEFECO structure¹¹ that coordinates Nordic military-linked activities, but it has stayed out of the Nordic Battle Group formed by Finland, Sweden and Norway (with the Baltic States and Ireland) to serve primarily EU purposes.¹² It also participates in the 'Haga' process for Nordic civil security cooperation, but again not as a prime mover, since this process – on which more below – was first conceived and led by the Swedes with Norwegian support.¹³

What might be called the Nordic-sceptic strand in Denmark's outlook stands out the more clearly because Copenhagen has been a leader in other forms of neighbourhood cooperation. In 1992 Danish statesmen, with German support, took the initiative to create the Council of Baltic Sea States covering the Baltic States, Poland, Germany and the Russian Federation plus the five Nordic states. During the 1990s Denmark was exceptionally active in supporting the Baltic States' independence and security efforts, inspiring several Nordic-supported Baltic structures such as the Baltic Defence College. More recently, the former Danish Defence Minister Søren Gade was one of two Wise Men who authored a study arguing for further enhancing Baltic–Nordic cooperation as distinct from purely Nordic efforts.¹⁴

One might provisionally conclude that the group of five Nordic states is both too large and too small to satisfy some important Danish needs. It is too large because its other members do not share some distinctive Danish qualities and concerns. It is too small because some of the latter can only be met by broader processes of North European and Atlantic neighbourhood-building. If correct, we may expect Danish decisions on when and how to prioritize – and devote resources to – Nordic action ‘at Five’ to be based not (only) on sentiment, but on a practical calculation of comparative advantages and added value. This does not necessarily preclude launching and/or going along with new Nordic initiatives, but it would imply that Copenhagen is unlikely to back any moves that conflict with its larger strategic interests, that absorb energies better deployed elsewhere or that fail to meet basic tests of cost-effectiveness.

All this makes it intriguing to watch what happens when Denmark holds the rotating Presidency of a Nordic structure. In 2015 it was President of the Nordic Council of Ministers (NCM),¹⁵ and hence also of the Nordic/Baltic Ministers’ group (NB8), as well as chairing the Haga initiative. What priorities did it put forward, and how far did these reflect the reservations, limitations and other preferences tentatively identified in Denmark’s approach? Did they prove coherent and workable in the Nordic group’s own terms, taking into account the feelings and reactions of the other Nordic actors, including Greenland and the Faroes? What lessons might be drawn for the strengths, weaknesses and prospects of Nordic Cooperation overall?

The present text explores these questions in turn, starting with an analysis of Denmark’s stated aims in its latest presidencies. The following section discusses the outcomes, so far as they are known at the time of writing, and the relevant Nordic atmospherics, including reference to the Greenland/Faroes dimension. A final section provides brief conclusions, also including remarks on the question of the Nordic framework’s future potential.

This paper focuses on government-level processes, but a full assessment of Nordic interaction would have to look also at the sub-state and non-state dimensions – provincial, business, professional, social and cultural. It would surely highlight some important achievements not covered here, including the remarkable zone of integration that has grown up between the Copenhagen area and south-west Sweden with from the aid of the Øresund bridge. It might, however, also point out some divides and complications between Nordic neighbours that go beyond the merely governmental. A 2007 opinion poll conducted by the Nordic Council¹⁶ showed Danish citizens as being

the second-best informed (after Norway) on Nordic affairs, but the most sceptical (placed shortly after Finland and Sweden) about the value of the work of Nordic institutions. While 74% of Danish respondents thought it important for the Nordic nations to cooperate more generally, they were also distinctly more keen than other Nordics to work with the Baltic States, the USA and – less expectedly – with China.

Danish aims for 2015

The Danish NCM programme bears the alliterative title *Vækst, velfærd og værdier* ('Growth, welfare and values').¹⁷ Its introduction starts by endorsing the well-known slogan 'Sammen er vi stærke' ('Together we are strong'), and it commends the report 'Nyt Norden' ('New Norden') presented in 2014 by the NCM's Secretary-General.¹⁸ Even these first pages, however, introduce some specifically Danish notes, such as the stress on focusing Nordic work in areas that offer clear added value, the need to engage a new generation, and the mention of gaps and obstacles as well as successes in Nordic Cooperation.¹⁹ 2015 is described as a time when Nordic states have largely put the 2008 crash behind them, but in the process have made tough choices that have not left their welfare systems unscarred.

The programme identifies four specific priorities:

- Growth, with a focus on Nordic cities, effective resource use, fashion and textiles;²⁰
- Welfare: improvements through sharing knowledge, e.g. on tackling health-related inequalities;
- Values: building the Nordic 'brand', notably in developing markets;
- The Arctic: 'closer Nordic-Arctic collaboration to face the special challenges posed by climate change in the Arctic'.²¹

Compared with other recent Nordic presidencies (see Table 1), the only thing that is *prima facie* unusual about these themes is the inclusion of an external one with political overtones, namely the Arctic.²² References to promoting Nordic economic interests abroad are more routine, as seen, for example, in Iceland's proposed 'Nordic playlist'.

Table 1. A comparison of Presidency aims in the Nordic Council of Ministers²³

Norway 2012	Sweden 2013	Iceland 2014	Denmark 2015
Work and sustainable welfare	Youth unemployment	Norden's bio-resources	Growth, incl. role of cities
Green growth	Sustainable mining	Nordic Welfare Watch	Welfare by mutual learning
Knowledge and innovation	Reduced emissions	Nordic music play-list	The Nordic 'brand'
Nordic affinity	Workplace-based learning		Arctic/Nordic collaboration

Looking at the 2015 priorities in more detail, the first two reflect Denmark's established critical emphasis – grounded at home in a government–parliament agreement – on breaking down the remaining barriers, equalizing standards and filling gaps in the Nordic interface. The Danish aim is commonly defined as a 'Norden without frontiers' that should facilitate both economic growth and the handling of modern security challenges.²⁴ What this means in concrete terms was illustrated by the Danish Presidency's 'growth conference' held in April 2015 under the theme of 'Norden as Role Model'. Its background papers²⁵ included a list of fifteen non-tariff barriers within Norden, drawn up with help from trades unions and employers' groups. More broadly, Denmark's stress on this theme reflects awareness that the methods and level of transnational cooperation have moved on greatly since Nordic approaches were shaped in the 1950s. Through EU and European Economic Area (EEA) membership, all five Nordics are now covered by a web of Europe-wide rules and standards that are more precise, legally underpinned and possibly more up-to-date than the effects of traditional Nordic 'soft convergence'.²⁶ In some Danish eyes, not only does this cast the Nordic achievement in a more questionable light, it begs the question of how far separate Nordic concertation on economic, social, and other internal issues should still be an end in itself.

The Presidency's statement of Arctic aims, if novel *per se*, is undramatic in content. The third Nordic cooperation programme for Arctic affairs (2015–17) was negotiated under Icelandic leadership in 2014,²⁷ and the Danish paper proposes simply following it through, *inter alia* by Nordic action in related forums such as the Arctic Council. Two more specific proposals concern the creation of an 'Arctic Web' navigation tool to identify all shipping in the Arctic at a given time, and a project for documenting and monitoring the

biodiversity and vulnerability of Arctic seas. The supporting text links these last two ideas with a wider 'Blue Arctic' concept, whereby the Nordic states should apply their experience in responsible resource use and innovation to a range of Arctic marine issues, including fisheries and 'bio-economics' more generally. Perhaps not by accident, this links up with a theme of 'stewardship' for the Arctic seas that is a declared priority of the US Chairmanship of the Arctic Council for 2015-16.²⁸

The politics of the Danish Kingdom are also relevant here. The governments of Greenland and the Faroe Islands have the right to separate representation in both the Nordic Council and NCM, which they do in very few other contexts. By placing the Arctic openly under an NCM programme,²⁹ Copenhagen was emphasizing its willingness to integrate these nations' concerns within a wider Nordic process, as well as offering active roles for them to play. Greenland is, in fact, regularly given the floor first when Arctic issues arise in the NCM, while the Faroes – which held the chair of Nordic fisheries cooperation in 2015 – have taken responsibility for the (Nordic-funded) marine biodiversity/bio-resources programme.³⁰

For the 'NB8' dialogue between the five Nordic and three Baltic foreign ministers during 2015, Denmark's priorities included energy security, tackling Moscow's disinformation in the media, the conflict in Ukraine and the EU's Eastern Partnership.³¹ In line with Denmark's established Baltic strategy, this agenda reflected empathy and identification with Baltic leaders' own concerns and was fully compatible with the emphases of NATO policy at the time. It encouraged all the other Nordic states, including Greenland and the Faroes, to focus on supporting their small neighbours and to concert the stance of all eight nations in the EU and elsewhere.

In the Haga process of civil security cooperation, no Danish goals were published for 2015, but in practice these were largely pre-set by decisions of the 2014 Oslo Ministerial. The latter called for a joint Nordic 'module' of people and assets for civil emergency response in cold conditions to be prepared and made available to the EU and NATO, and for a joint Nordic exercise. Work was to continue towards a comprehensive concept and action plan for future Haga cooperation. As in the NCM agenda, Copenhagen specified that the Arctic should also be a theme. This was no great departure, as previous Haga work had *inter alia* covered Arctic issues and territory, and it might be seen as logically linked with the cold-weather module plan.

Outcomes and attitudes

A first balance-sheet

Public information on Presidency developments in 2015 has been assembled at www.norden2015.dk. The picture it gives reflects due progress on all the declared Danish themes. Among these, the issue of *obstacles in Nordic cooperation* – with the focus on non-tariff barriers to trade – moved into special prominence during the year, in keeping with its established importance in Denmark's own politics. It formed the subject of the joint declaration³² issued by the Prime Ministers at their 28 October meeting (in the margins of the Nordic Council, see below), starting with the trenchant words 'We want to get rid of the cross-border obstacles holding back growth in Norden' (author's translation). The statement confirmed the emphasis on commercially damaging barriers by making references to the potential single Nordic market of 26 million consumers and to the way such obstacles also deter foreign investment. It reaffirmed the central role of the existing Nordic *Grænsehindringsråd* (Border Obstacles Council) in pursuing the issue, but directed the Secretary-General of the NCM to prepare arrangements for a new intensive dialogue with private-sector and trade union organizations. Following previous Danish-led efforts such as the handling of the 'obstacles' theme at the Growth Conference in April (above), the intention here was to identify and target efforts on the most damaging problems, as well as to incite the non-state actors concerned to get their own act together better at the Nordic level. It is to be hoped that giving this initiative the authority of the Prime Ministers' group might create decisive pressure for results.

Foreign Ministry cooperation in the Nordic setting has its own ongoing menu, shaped *inter alia* by the report presented by Thorvald Stoltenberg in 2009, which focused on security-related and diplomatic initiatives.³³ Of the two declarations adopted by Nordic Foreign Ministers during their Danish-hosted meeting at Elsinore on 5 May 2015,³⁴ the first concerned one of Stoltenberg's themes, namely Nordic diplomatic cooperation in third countries. It called for further efforts to explore the possibilities of using joint premises abroad, including Nordic Cultural and Commercial Houses, greater sharing of diplomatic reports, cases for entrusting action to each other's ambassadors and further mutual representation in the areas of visa work and residence. The other declaration concerned common Nordic approaches to the upcoming UN climate talks in Paris and stressed the importance of tackling associated questions of finance.

As noted earlier, Danish policy traditions guaranteed an active and sympathetic approach to cooperation in the *Nordic-Baltic Eight* (NB8) during 2015. Specific goals were defined relatively late in 2014, which had the merit of adjusting them to the latest challenges, one of which was the issue of Russian propaganda moving to the forefront. The declaration of the NB8 Ministerial held on 6 May³⁵ focused exclusively on this issue and on the related tasks of supporting independent media and ensuring access to alternative and reliable information. Three preparatory meetings had been held on this in January-March, in Riga, Copenhagen and Vilnius, with media professionals and relevant organizations. The NB8 Ministers confirmed a mandate to go forward with work on capacity-building, providing alternative Russian-language media, considering how to counter disinformation and cooperation with the European Endowment for Democracy. Their communiqué noted parallel work on the topic of 'strategic communication' going forward in both NATO and the EU, where Denmark had also pushed the issue.

From the point of view of the Presidency and the Baltic States themselves, the main added value of these NB8 proceedings – apart from serving the general Danish desire for concrete results – lay in mobilizing the support of *all* Nordic states for these efforts and for Nordic-Baltic solidarity in the EU and NATO at a time of unusual West-Russia tensions and corresponding unease in the Baltic region. The same message was conveyed in a statement from a later meeting of the Nordic Cooperation ministers on 23 September, where the presence of representatives from Greenland, the Faroes and the Åland Islands was specifically noted. This time the conclusions mentioned plans for commercial initiatives aimed as small and medium enterprises in the Baltic States, as well as specific measures on the Russian-language media issue, including support for the Estonian Russian-language TV channel and special arrangements in the Estonian frontier settlement of Narva.

In the same context of West-Russia tensions over Ukraine, Denmark had to preside over a decision in March 2015 to reduce the activities of joint Nordic offices on Russian soil to a 'skeleton' level until further notice, without repudiating the underlying Memorandum of Understanding with the Russian Federation. This step was driven by the Russian authorities' own decision to include the St Petersburg office in their list of 'foreign agents'. It was taken with clear regret,³⁶ and the Presidency's task of achieving Nordic consensus cannot have been an easy one, given the sensitive and differentiated impact of the issue on the various nations' interests. While all five Nordic states had lined up with the US and other larger powers – in NATO and/or

the EU – on the ongoing sanctions policy against Russia, any slow-down in practical cross-border cooperation was bound to cost more for the countries closest to the dividing line.³⁷

The Danish chairmanship of *'Haga' cooperation* on social security and civil emergency management got off to a comparatively slow start, as a ministerial meeting planned for March had to be deferred due to problems over attendance. Haga's launch in 2009 had owed much to the leadership of Sweden's defence minister, Sven Tolgfors, but he was out of office by 2015, and Sweden transferred competence for the topic to the interior minister that year – perhaps helping to explain a certain loss of momentum. The importance of personality was, however, underlined again in the autumn when Peter Christensen took over as Denmark's defence minister. A ministerial meeting was quickly convened for 24 November, and – unusually – all other countries except Iceland attended at minister or state secretary level. The decisions taken³⁸ confirmed the agreement to continue preparing a 'cold conditions' intervention module for Nordic, EU or NATO use, and this became the first priority in a new (unpublished) set of goals and guidelines adopted for Haga cooperation up to 2018. It was agreed that the group of five responsible agency directors, which existed pre-Haga, should systematically prepare future Haga ministerial meetings. Most interestingly, the ministers agreed to cooperate over logistical aspects (sharing tent stocks, etc.) of the migrant crisis that is currently affecting all the Nordic countries. Introducing this highly political issue to the Haga framework was a novel step, calculated perhaps among other things to raise the public profile of a process that had so far struggled to engage attention.³⁹ Perhaps here too one may detect a Danish view that, if time must be spent on Nordic cooperation, something useful in the short term ought to come of it.

For all Nordic Presidencies, an important milestone is the annual plenary meeting of the *Nordic Council*, where they must report on progress and typically face calls for even greater efforts from the parliamentary delegates taking part. As it happened, the Council's meeting on 27-8 October in Reykjavik⁴⁰ was dominated by the relatively new issue of the refugee crisis, by then affecting all Nordic states to some degree. State traditions, practical policies and popular attitudes on this challenge have thus far diverged significantly among the five nations, and this was duly mirrored in the Council debates. When the five Prime Ministers met in the margins, however, they did their best to convey an 'agreement to disagree' by stressing the need to exchange ideas and experiences and taking common positions on some sub-issues such

as the need for peace in Syria. Other topics they discussed (beyond the ‘obstacles’ issue already covered) were the Arctic and a common approach to next steps in the UN climate talks.

Thanks in part to stepping up practical cooperation with the Nordic Council and other parliamentary groupings and offering plentiful briefings on plans and developments, Denmark’s Presidency team seem to have come out of the October meeting well. This is important because Denmark takes over the Council’s own Presidency in 2016, when the body will be led by Henrik Dam Kristensen. The latter, who is also chair of the Danish Parliament’s Defence Committee, announced plans in Reykjavik for a strong focus on improving Nordic defence cooperation in harmony with NATO⁴¹ – a theme also fitting well with Denmark’s 2016 chairmanship of NORDEFCO. Given Denmark’s previous history vis-à-vis Nordic ‘hard’ security cooperation, the choice of this theme – albeit in a parliamentary rather than governmental context – might raise some eyebrows, but in context it need not be seen as deviating from the Atlanticist line. Not only did Kristensen’s words stress the primacy of NATO, but his statement came at a time when Sweden and Finland were enhancing their own operational and planning cooperation with the Alliance,⁴² thus minimizing the risk that any Nordic defence nexus could become detached from – still less compete with – Denmark’s primary strategic home.

Greenland, the Faroe Islands and the Arctic theme

In line with initial signals sent by the Arctic emphasis, Denmark’s handling of Presidency affairs throughout 2015 aimed not only to avoid unnecessary tensions with Greenland and the Faroes, but to include these nations in practical and positive ways, and not only on Arctic issues. One of the Nordic Cooperation ministers’ meetings was held at Ilulissat in March, and get-togethers at other levels and on other specialized subjects were also scheduled in Greenland. The NCM also supported a large conference in Québec City, Canada, on 25-7 February in partnership with the Québec authorities,⁴³ designed to promote ‘new and exciting cooperation with Norden’s neighbours across the Atlantic’ (author’s translation) on issues of sustainable growth, innovation, climate, energy, education and public information.⁴⁴ High-level participants included the Premier of Québec Province and the President of Iceland.⁴⁵

In follow-up to the Ilulissat meeting, in July 2015 a decision was reached to provide joint Nordic support for an initiative being pursued by Greenlandic organizations to persuade publics in the Baltic space (including Sweden,

Finland and the Åland Islands) of the legitimacy of trading sealskins as part of the sustainable use of natural resources. The Greenlandic authorities' own announcement of this step⁴⁶ included an enthusiastic comment by the relevant official: 'The holding of the cooperation ministers' meeting at Ilulissat in March, and our active part in carrying out the Danish Presidency programme in the NCM, show that we can draw concrete political and practical advantages from our active presence in all the NCM's work' (author's translation). When Greenland's current prime minister, Kim Kielsen, visited Copenhagen in January 2016, he made a point of saying that 'The Danish presidency of the Nordic Council of Ministers was very important to Greenland ... There are many good examples of how we are good at working together under Nordic auspices, on projects that are important to us all'.⁴⁷

Compared with such still-recent upsets as Greenland's refusal to be represented through the Danish delegation at the Arctic Council's Kiruna Ministerial in 2013, this harmonious conclusion to the 2015 Presidency can be seen as a reward for Danish pragmatism, sensitivity and ability to compromise. From the point of view of Danish interests, engaging the Greenland and Faroese authorities within the framework of joint Kingdom policies and programmes serves the threefold goal of reinforcing their experience and understanding of the outside world,⁴⁸ containing possible pressures for a more 'go it alone' approach and adding weight to Denmark's own stand within the Nordic group and elsewhere. For those in the autonomous parts of the Kingdom who are set on eventual independence, however, experiences such as those gained in 2015 can also be seen as a win-win. While avoiding premature confrontations, they provide valuable practice in what for them is still 'para-diplomacy',⁴⁹ including direct access to and networking possibilities with Nordic, Baltic and other (e.g. Canadian) counterparts. They do nothing to lessen the objective differences in the different territories' situations, nor the dynamics of the independence movements that are being fed *inter alia* by such diverging trends. In 2015, the appetite of the Nuuk and Tórshavn governments for independent action was signalled, among other things, by continuing work in the West Nordic Council, made up of Iceland, Greenland and the Faroes but excluding Denmark, on a joint West Nordic approach to Arctic policy.⁵⁰

Nordic interplay

It is no secret to anyone who has living in or seriously studied Norden that the atmospherics among the five nation states are not always straightforwardly positive. The strong sense of Nordic kinship and mutual concern

confirmed by opinion polls co-exists with old historical antagonisms, notably between Sweden and Denmark, natural differences in outlook between those countries enjoying long-term independence and those that acquired sovereignty only in the twentieth century, and objective variations in geography, economic structure and security priorities, to name but a few. Even where Nordic common interests are overwhelmingly strong, as in Arctic governance and particularly in maintaining the Arctic peace, specific bones of contention can persist, such as Denmark's and Norway's continued use – also in 2015 – of an exclusive 'A5' format for addressing some key policy matters.⁵¹

Nordic Cooperation is no exception in this regard. Both in the general cooperation framework and in special fields such as 'Haga' work,⁵² officials tend to develop (possibly stereotyped) impressions of others' national characteristics that affect their expectations and their feelings about joint achievements. In this context, Denmark's approach is coloured for many Nordic colleagues not only by its ingrained Atlanticism but by its insistence on 'value for money' and 'added value' in Nordic work, resulting *inter alia* in specific Danish campaigns to cut and/or freeze Nordic Cooperation budgets. The latest round of work on a budget for 2014-16 actually began in 2012 and, perhaps fortunately for Denmark's Presidency, was completed in 2014 with the acceptance of small percentage cuts in those three years. Even so, colleagues still smarting over ensuing damage to their favourite Nordic activities might well view Denmark's call for new collective efforts in 2015 with some scepticism. More generally, the pragmatic Danish approach, which insists on comparative advantage and added value before selecting the Nordic framework over others, may jar on other nations, or groups within them, who feel a more idealistic and principled attachment. Even the use of language is important, as seen in the first pages of Denmark's 2015 Presidency programme,⁵³ where, as discussed above, the main themes are explained in terms of what is wrong with Norden rather than what could and will be put right.

Feelings aside, other Nordic nations actually have no reason to be surprised by these Danish attitudes. Not only have they been displayed in Nordic Cooperation for some time now, but a not dissimilar, critical and cost-counting approach with emphasis on national interests can be found in Danish public and political approaches to at least one other major institution – the EU. NATO seems currently exempt from such Danish reservations, but that was not the case in the 'Danish footnote' era of the past. Furthermore, the NCM's work is a political process like any other, led by

politicians who must have an eye to their own parliaments' and constituents' views, not least on the possible misuse of resources. Tellingly, Minister Carsten Hansen, who led the first part of the 2015 NCM programme, was moved to publish an article in that context explaining to the Danish people that Nordic cooperation could profit them financially.⁵⁴ He pointed out that other Nordic states currently took 21 per cent of Danish exports, and it was worth taking steps to optimize this even while seeking new markets in places like China and Brazil. He stressed his government's determination to obtain concrete results that would benefit the whole economy and society during 2015. These arguments were tailored to seeking public interest and support even from the most hard-headed Nordic sceptics in Hansen's audience.

Last but not least, the inter-Nordic dynamics of cooperation need not be seen as static, and it is not impossible for the nations involved to learn mutual lessons. It seems significant that Finland's Nordic Cooperation minister, when first presenting Finland's 2016 Presidency programme at the Nordic Council in October 2015, made one of her main messages the call for 'more substance' and effectiveness in this work.⁵⁵

In conclusion: the big picture

Denmark's approach to its Nordic Presidency and chairmanship responsibilities in 2015 can be judged overall as logical and effective, well attuned to current demands, and striking a reasonable balance between national preferences and partners' sensibilities. The priority aims of the programme were carried through in concrete and coherent ways, albeit with some shifts of emphasis during the year. Denmark's smaller 'customers' – the Baltic States on the one hand, and Greenland and the Faroes on the other – had particular reasons to be pleased with the nature of their own involvement and the substance of the issues addressed. In the case of Greenland and the Faroes, this should have helped the government's general aim of prudent and constructive handling of these nations' autonomy hopes. As regards the four other Nordic states, these were willing to sign up to new positions on Denmark's core issues and notably on the campaign to cut down Nordic 'obstacles'. They had no cause to complain about Danish management of the larger issues that intruded on and sometimes dominated the Nordic agenda during the year, namely the Russia problem and the escalating challenge of non-European refugees. If the latter eluded joint approaches and caused sharp inter-Nordic tensions at some points, at least it did not infect the consensual handling of other strategically important matters such as the Arctic.

At the same time, even such a brief survey as this one of one year's Nordic experiences brings out interesting points about inter-Nordic differences

and questions about the comparative potential of the Nordic approach. In reality, the main limitation on the latter is not imperfect unity: rather, it lies in the fact that the majority of challenges facing Nordic populations today – whether economic, security-related or human – exceed Norden's own capacity to solve them, even if the five nations were fully in agreement and willing to pay. This was clearly true of the agenda in 2015, as shown at the micro-level by the frequency with which declarations at Nordic meetings referred to connected action in the NATO, EU, UN, or other frameworks. True, in most of these settings the Nordic or Nordic/Baltic group can hope to further their regional interests by an approach concerted through NCM, NB8 or Haga channels: but here some careful judgements are needed. The efforts to prepare a joint Nordic input should not deplete the energy needed to carry it through in the wider setting. There may be cases in which an appearance of Nordic ganging-up will bring counter-productive reactions from other players. In other situations, and perhaps increasingly often, the quickest way to secure Nordic involvement and protection will be simply to come on board with what other NATO and/or EU members are planning. When all Nordics join in common positions initiated elsewhere, this also constitutes a path to Nordic unity, and arguably a shorter one than it is in the nature of traditional Nordic cooperation to provide.

Against this background, Denmark's pragmatic and sometimes critical approach to Nordic cooperation may finally be seen as a logical attempt to confront the issues of forum choice for a small Northern state in an increasingly complex world. Manoeuvring among multiple partners and protectors in both national and institutional contexts, Danish policy-makers cannot afford to neglect the potential even of processes that they are more inclined to be sceptical about, nor can they expect to be players there without occasionally taking on the burdens of leadership. Whether they, and all the other representatives of Danish life who joined in 2015's Nordic activities, got the complicated balance right on this occasion is something that only time will show.

Notes

- 1 Denmark joined in 1973, Finland and Sweden in 1995.
- 2 These cover the CSDP, Economic and Monetary Union, EU internal security cooperation and EU citizenship. Details at the EU legal service website, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:l25061ur> (last accessed 3 December 2015).

- 3 Rieker (2006).
- 4 Lunde Saxi (2010).
- 5 Sweden as well as Denmark had colonies in the imperial age ranging from the Caribbean to Africa and Asia, but these were limited to small islands and trading posts.
- 6 Thule in northern Greenland is an air base and also part of the US early warning system, with a planned role in missile defence.
- 7 On the Arctic Council, see www.arctic-council.org (last accessed 10 January 2016). The Arctic 'littoral' states (the others being Canada, the USA and Russia) are so defined because they possess sizeable land territories above the Arctic Circle. Iceland contends that it should also be included.
- 8 The reference is to the elections of 2013 and 2014 in Greenland and of September 2015 in the Faroes.
- 9 For recent reviews and assessments of Nordic Cooperation see, among others, Lunde Saxi (2011), Forsberg (2013) and Ojanen (2014).
- 10 Denmark chose the EH101 medium helicopter rather than the NH90 when the latter was adopted as a Nordic 'standard' by Finland, Norway and Sweden.
- 11 See www.nordefco.org (last accessed 10 January 2016).
- 12 Swedish Defence Forces, *Nordic Battle Group NBG 15*, at <http://www.forsvarsmakten.se/en/about/our-mission-in-sweden-and-abroad/international-activities-and-operations/nordic-battle-group/> (last accessed 3 December 2015).
- 13 Bailes and Sandö (2014).
- 14 Birkavs and Gade (2010).
- 15 The NCM is one of the two main pillars of Nordic Cooperation, together with the older, inter-parliamentary Nordic Council. The latter has a different presidency (Iceland in 2015).
- 16 Nordic Council, *Nordic citizens on Nordic cooperation*, 2007, available at <http://norden.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:702030/FULLTEXT01.pdf> (last accessed 20 November 2015).
- 17 Text available in Danish at the Danish MFA site, <http://um.dk/en/-/media/UM/Danish-site/Documents/Udenrigspolitik/Nyheder-og-publikationer/ANP2014746%20Vkst%20velfrd%20og%20vrdierweb.pdf> (last accessed 20 November 2015).
- 18 'Norden' refers to the region and community made up of the five Nordic states and their special-status territories. The full title of the report translates as 'New Norden: proposals for renewing Nordic Cooperation'; for details see <http://www.norden.org/sv/aktuellt/nyheter/nyt-norden-forslag-til-fornylse-af-det-nordiske-samarbejde> (last accessed 20 November 2015).
- 19 Cf. the handling of Nordic aspects in the programme of the new Danish Government elected in June 2015: 'Sammen for Fremtiden', 'Together for the Future', 29/6/2015, at http://www.venstre.dk/_Resources/Persistent/63002ee09c17ea437981728a5d7f2402e4c472d9/Regeringsgrundlag-2015.pdf (last accessed 19 January 2016). This document makes just two short references (p. 30 and 35 respectively) to the need to explore unused Nordic 'potential' and to remove persistent intra-Nordic barriers, on which see more below.
- 20 The focus on textiles turned out to cover both the commercial potential of new materials such as fish-skin and the conservation and re-cycling of textile resources. These issues were discussed by environment ministers in April.
- 21 From the English summary at <http://www.norden.org/en/nordic-council-of-ministers/presidency-of-the-nordic-council-of-ministers/the-danish-presidency-of-the-nordic-council-of-ministers-2015> (last accessed 20 November 2015).

- 22 For further comparison, the Finnish goals for 2016 (see <http://www.formin.fi/public/default.aspx?contentid=336730&contentlan=2&culture=en-US>, last accessed 18 January 2015) are 'water, nature and people', plus an emphasis on the Nordic role in the EU.
- 23 See Nordic Council website, <http://www.norden.org/en/nordic-council-of-ministers/presidency-of-the-nordic-council-of-ministers> (last accessed 20 November 2015)
- 24 The link to security is seen in the way that Denmark inserted this concept into the Haga process (Bailes and Sandö, *op. cit.*).
- 25 Danish Government, 'Norden som rollemodel', at <http://um.dk/da/-/media/UM/Danish-site/Documents/Udenrigspolitik/Udenrigspolitik-ny/Lande%20og%20regioner/Norden2015%20docs/Samlet%20materiale%20inkl%20program-pjece.pdf> (last accessed 20 November 2015).
- 26 On the latter concept, see Sundelius and Wiklund 2000.
- 27 Text available, including in English, at <http://norden.diva-portal.org/smash/record.jsf?pid=diva2%3A768625&cdswid=2436> (last accessed 15 November 2015).
- 28 US Department of State, *U.S. Chairmanship of the Arctic Council* (undated), at <http://www.state.gov/e/oes/ocns/opa/arc/uschair/> (last accessed 3 December 2015). There is also a resemblance between the Danes' ship-tracking proposals and the Arctic 'Blue Hub' already being operated by the EU's Joint Research Centre (JRC); see <https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/scientific-tool/blue-hub-rd-platform-maritime-surveillance-and-maritime-situational-awareness> (last accessed 3 December 2015).
- 29 The stress is on 'openly', since in practice the Nordic Foreign Ministers (and Prime Ministers) can raise Arctic issues whenever they meet. In 2015 they had an emphatic reason to do so in view of the delicate issue of Arctic cooperation with Russia following the Ukrainian crisis. In the event, this cooperation was very largely preserved throughout 2015, in line with Nordic interests and also US wishes (Bailes 2015). With one exception (see below on NCM offices in Russia), this large topic will not be further pursued in the present study, as it can hardly be attributed to Danish Presidency programming. Denmark's duty, and achievement, in handling the topic was to ensure the maintenance of Nordic consensus at each stage.
- 30 Use of marine bio-resources is also a sub-aspect of the 'growth' theme in the Danish NCM agenda. The drive to include Greenland and the Faroes is marked linguistically on page 11 of the NCM programme, which speaks of overcoming barriers to Nordic togetherness in 'Nordatlanten' ('the North Atlantic'), rather than the usual 'Norden'. This could also signal Denmark's concern not to let Nordic Cooperation become too eastward-oriented. Practical developments have included an EU-targeted conference at Brussels in March 2015, a meeting at Tórshavn (capital of the Faroes) in June and a call for grant applications for seeder projects in the 'blue economy', issued in November.
- 31 Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *NB8* (updated 1 July 2015), available at <https://www.urm.lt/default/en/foreign-policy/lithuania-in-the-region-and-the-world/regional-cooperation/nb8> (last accessed 3 December 2015).
- 32 Text at <http://www.norden.org/da/nordisk-ministerraad/de-nordiske-statsministre/deklarationer/erklaring-fra-de-nordiske-statsministre-vedroerende-graenshindringer-i-norden> (last accessed 3 December 2015)..
- 33 Stoltenberg (2009). For more on the Stoltenberg Report, see Bailes and Sandö, *op. cit.*, p. 16-20.
- 34 Both texts available at <http://um.dk/da/nyheder-fra-udenrigsministeriet/newsdisplaypage/?newsID=4428CA5B-C522-49BB-B6DF-36428995682B> (last accessed 19 January 2016).
- 35 Text available at <http://um.dk/da/nyheder-fra-udenrigsministeriet/newsdisplaypage/?newsID=F41B81E6-22DA-4287-97C1-FA626306395C> (last accessed 19 January 2016).

- 36 This comes through in the text 'Nordisk Ministerråds kontor i Skt. Petersborg afvikles på ubestemt tid', 11 March 2015, at <http://um.dk/da/-/media/UM/Danish-site/Documents/Udenrigspolitik/Udenrigspolitik-ny/Lande%20og%20regioner/Norden2015%20docs/NMR%20skt%20petersborg.pdf> (last accessed 19 January 2016).
- 37 Bailes, *op. cit.* in note 30.
- 38 See <http://www.fmn.dk/nyheder/Pages/nordiske-ministre-vil-styrke-logistikken-omkring-flytningesituationen.aspx> and <http://www.fmn.dk/nyheder/Documents/tinglev-konklusionerne-2015.pdf> (last accessed 19 January 2016).
- 39 This was also a way of counter-balancing persistent Nordic differences, including between Denmark and Sweden, on actual refugee policy and border management.
- 40 Materials on this session are assembled at <http://www.norden.org/en/nordic-council/sessions-and-meetings/sessions/67.-session-2015/news-from-the-session> (last accessed 19 January 2016).
- 41 See <http://www.norden.org/en/news-and-events/news/henrik-dam-kristensen-valgt-som-nordisk-raadspraesident-i-2016> (last accessed 19 January 2016).
- 42 For details see the NATO web-pages on relations with Finland and Sweden, at www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49594.htm and www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_52535.htm, respectively (last accessed 12 February 2016).
- 43 Part of the interest of this is that Greenlandic, Faroese and Québécois separatists have been in touch with each other for some time.
- 44 See <http://www.norden.org/da/aktuelt/nyheder/quebec-og-norden-deler-faelles-udfordringer-stort-faelles-symposium-om-baeredygtig-udvikling-i-nord> (last accessed 19 January 2016).
- 45 In a further North American initiative, the five Nordic ambassadors in Washington published a joint article on 26 May explaining Nordic approaches to the Arctic and advertising an open Twitter session on 1 June. See 'What Happens in the Arctic Does Not Stay in the Arctic', at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/amb-kare-aas/what-happens-in-the-arctic-does-not-stay_b_7445208.html (last accessed 19 January 2016). In October the Nordic Council approved a further programme of such information work and contacts with the Nordics' Arctic neighbours.
- 46 Government of Greenland (2015).
- 47 Government of Greenland (2016).
- 48 While the Danish constitution still denies any competence in foreign affairs to the Faroese and Greenland authorities, it is Danish policy to involve them in relevant external activities and to support the development of their human capacities in this area.
- 49 For an explanation of this term, see Grydehøj (2014).
- 50 Nielsson (2014).
- 51 A5 is shorthand for the five Arctic 'littoral' states (owning substantial territories above the Arctic Circle), the others being Canada, the US and Russia. Previous meetings in this form at the ministerial level drew protests from Iceland, Finland and Sweden, who see this approach as damaging the Arctic Council as well as Nordic unity. While high-level events have been avoided in recent years, the A5 acted jointly on a highly sensitive issue in 2015 by adopting a common position on new Arctic fisheries (U.S. Department of State 2015).
- 52 On inter-Nordic tensions in the Haga process, see Bailes and Sandö, *op. cit.*
- 53 See note 17 for text.
- 54 Hansen (2015).
- 55 Statement of 27 October 2015 by Anne Berner, see <http://www.norden.org/en/news-and-events/news/samarbetsministern-flaggar-foer-profilhoejning-och-mer-substans-i-det-nordiska-samarbetet> (last accessed 19 January 2016).

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Danish-Turkish Relations During the AKP Government: from Value Clash to Pragmatism

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Introduction

While interest in Turkish society has been dominated by investment and trade in the recent past, the war in Syria and the resulting refugee crisis in Europe have renewed interest in Turkey both among policy-makers and the general public. For Europe at present, Turkey seems to hold the key in how to respond to the refugee crisis. With recent developments along the Syrian border, Turkey has also taken a key position in the relationship between Russia and NATO. And while the question of the Kurds may appear to be primarily a Turkish concern, it turned international during the summer and fall of 2015, when Kurdish fighters became part of a US-led mission against IS. As Keyman and Gumuscu put it, Turkey's pivotal role as a regional power in international politics, its dynamic economy and its domestic cultural and urban transformations have become even more important in recent years (Keyman and Gumuscu 2014: vii-10). For Denmark, Turkey to a large extent means trade and investment. An innovation agreement on Danish-Turkish cooperation has been signed, and Denmark has endeavored to increase its exports to Turkey, making it attractive for Danish companies and institutions to seek partnerships on research and development. But Turkey also means stability, and as a member of NATO and close ally of the US, it is of interest to Denmark. Thus, beyond export and trade, what can be said more generally about Denmark's recent bilateral relations with Turkey? What are the main characteristics of Denmark's political attitudes towards Turkey, a country with not only a potential market for Danish exports, but also an increasingly crucial role in European politics and European security? In the following I shall try to trace Denmark's relationship with Turkey during the period of the AKP government, asking to what extent Denmark has

a distinct 'Turkey policy', and if so, how it can be characterized. I shall do so by analyzing four contemporary issues of relevance to the Danish–Turkish relationship, including the Danish position on Turkish accession to the EU, the so-called Lars Hedegaard case, the dispute over ROJ TV which emerged simultaneously with Anders Fogh Rasmussen's candidacy for the position of General Secretary of NATO, and finally the issue of official Danish recognition of the Armenian genocide. These four cases reveal key elements in the relationship between Denmark and Turkey and have been followed with considerable attention in both the media and political debates. The following analysis is based on newspaper articles, official documents and proceedings from debates in the Danish parliament, as well as secondary literature on Danish and Turkish foreign policy, all open-source. The article covers bilateral relations between Denmark and Turkey, but does not analyze the most recent developments in the relationship between Turkey and the EU, including the agreement on refugees.²

Historical background

As with most EU-related issues, the Danish attitude towards Turkey's membership of the European Union is characterized by ambivalence. As Dietrich Jung notes, Turkish membership is 'not so much an issue of bureaucratic politics but first and foremost a topic of public debate among politicians, media pundits and a number of publicly known personalities' (Jung, 2008, p. 104). Thus, continues Jung, Turkey's candidacy has a 'precarious' status in Danish politics, being directly linked to both political discourses on the EU and public debate about migration and Islam.

The 'precarious' status of Turkey in Danish politics can be traced historically to Denmark's relations with the Ottoman Empire and the image of 'the Turk' in Danish cultural life (Holm, 2010). For centuries the 'Turk' represented the 'significant other' in Danish cultural life, and Denmark's relations with the Ottoman Empire during the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were tense and at times even belligerent. The fact that Sweden often aligned itself with the Ottoman Empire and the Sultan only emphasized this image of 'the Turk' as the potential enemy, which, at times, could also include Catholics, Swedes and Germans, turning 'the significant Other', the Turk, into the personification of every threat against the small, but internationally ambitious Kingdom of Denmark. This fear of and anxiety about the Turk can be found in Ludvig Holberg's plays and in the writ-

ings of other personalities in Danish cultural life during this period. This left a general suspicion about the Turks and everything Turkish, including the new Turkish Republic that emerged from the ashes of the First World War to be proclaimed in 1923.

Thus, for decades the Danish position towards modern Turkey would be characterized by skepticism and distance, and Turkey rarely appears as a subject, in and of itself, in Danish foreign-policy analysis, underscoring its lack of relevance for Denmark until recently.³ One noteworthy exception, however, was that Turkey did figure in Denmark's foreign-policy calculations, and that was during the negotiations concerning Turkish and Greek membership in NATO in 1951. As Paul Villaume has shown, Denmark and Norway were originally the only members to oppose Turkish membership, both for security reasons and because Danish politicians and diplomats considered Turkey and Greece to be socially, economically and culturally different from the other members of the alliance by. Denmark feared that including Turkey in the alliance would increase the risk of small countries becoming involved in conflicts in the Middle East (Villaume, 1995, p. 654-59; Borring Olesen and Villaume, 2005, p. 218-220; Pelt, 2010).

This relative lack of foreign-policy interest in Turkey started to change in the mid-1970s, due to the influx of immigrants from Anatolia and because of Turkey's increased participation in international cooperation. Turkey became a member of the Council of Europe in 1949 and was a founding member of the OECD in 1961. In 1963, an association agreement was signed between the European Economic Community and Ankara, the so-called Ankara Agreement, and in 1973 Turkey joined the OSCE. In 1987, Turkey applied for full membership of the then EEC, and later, in 1995, signed a customs union agreement with the EU. In 1999, Turkey was officially recognized as a candidate for full membership, and in 2005 negotiations concerning Turkish membership began between Turkey and the EU. According to Ole Wæver, however, beginning in the mid-1980s, relations between the EEC and Turkey became increasingly problematic because of the *culturalization* of the 'European project.' While the 'European project' would be characterized by economic cooperation and pragmatism in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, during the 1980s it was stamped by ideas of a shared European culture and identity, and was, in that sense, *ideologized*. During this period, books about European identity and culture appeared, and initial steps were taken by the European Commission to develop a shared European history, resulting among other things in the recently launched initiative for a 'New Narrative for Europe.'⁴ The European project thus involved the question of

shared European identity and European values, making Turkish membership increasingly more controversial and politicized, including in Denmark (Kazan and Wæver, 1993, p. 5-6; Wæver, 1989; Østergård, 2006).

Denmark and Turkish EU membership

The Danish position towards Turkey's membership of the European Union has thus been characterized by ambivalence. In that sense, as Mouritzen notes, it is markedly different from the more positive view of Denmark's traditional British and American partners (Mouritzen, 2007: 155-65). On one hand, there is the pragmatic argument focusing on security issues and on Turkey as a booming economy with prospects for Denmark. Figures from DI (*Dansk Industri*, Confederation of Danish Industry) show an increase in Danish exports to Turkey, and Turkey is generally described as a country characterized by growth, with opportunities for Danish companies in innovation and development. In 2013 the Danish government set an official goal to increase Danish exports to Turkey by 50 percent during the period 2012 to 2016.⁵ As a result, Turkey is considered in Danish business circles to be a dynamic economy with a fast-growing private sector and rich with new opportunities for Danish industries. In 2004, the then director of the Danish Industries' Association (DI), Hans Skov Christensen, could claim that Turkey, like central and east European countries, should be invited to join the EU and that Turkish membership was the second biggest issue since the end of the Cold War (Jung, p. 109). Added to this, Turkey was also seen as representing a reservoir of labor for the EU.

However, concerns about whether Turkey would develop in a direction compatible with European standards continue to dominate the public debate. As Jung judges it, 'in the eyes of Denmark's political establishment, Turkey is an EU candidate with still questionable democratic credentials and a relatively feeble human rights record' (Jung, *ibid.*: 109). This attitude was already reflected in 2002, before the EU enlargement summit in Copenhagen, when a then leading member of the Social Democratic Party (S), Mogens Lykketoft, former Minister of Foreign Affairs, warned against Turkish membership (Jung, *ibid.*: 103; *Politiken*, 10 November 2002). The warning would resonate during the following years, and it is still raised in discussions about Turkish EU membership. While some enthusiasm was expressed for Erdogan and the first AKP government when it was installed in 2002, this more positive attitude towards Turkey has changed during recent years.

Many hopes and aspirations were attached to the AKP government because of the reforms it introduced and because the AKP appeared to represent an honest break with corruption and the previously dominant Kemalist regime. Moreover, the AK party branded itself as representing the people and thus made politics in Turkey a business for the ordinary man, marking a break with the previous regime (Boel and Møller Sørensen 2005). But these hopes have clearly faded, and the Danish position towards Turkey is at present even more ambivalent and divided between wanting Turkey as a close ally and business partner, and worrying whether Turkey meets the Copenhagen criteria as defined by the European Council in 1993. These criteria include the development of institutions to preserve democratic governance, the rule of law, human rights, respect for and protection of minorities, and the existence of a functioning market economy.

If we then look at how recent governments have positioned themselves publicly in relation to Turkey, we see a slight change towards a more pragmatic and Turkey-friendly attitude. Even if the Copenhagen criteria continue to play a crucial role in public debates and in the Parliament, there is a tendency to focus more on the benefits of close cooperation with Turkey, both from an economic perspective, as well as in relation to the contemporary situation in and around Syria. As Jung notes, Fogh Rasmussen's Liberal Conservative government (2001-2009) was in favor of Turkish membership in principle, but only if Turkey followed the Copenhagen criteria, an argument that would reappear in Danish debates on Turkey. This argument was also reflected in the foreign-policy vision presented by the government in 2003, *En Verden i Forandring*, which states that the government looks forward to 'that moment when Turkey meets the Copenhagen criteria and negotiations about accession can begin.'⁶ The Danish People's Party (DF) was and is even more skeptical. As Jung writes, DF is strictly against Turkey's membership and sees Turkey as being fundamentally different from Europe. In addition, no reforms of the Turkish legal and political system would, according to DF, bridge this cultural gap (Jung, *ibid.*: 108). Turkey is simply too culturally different, DF continues to argue in current debates. The positions of the Social Democrats (S) and the Socialist People's Party (SF) are not that different from the Liberals' and the Conservatives', though the Social Democrats tend to stress economic conditions and the fact that Turkey has to develop an open and competitive market economy. The Red Green Alliance (EL) is anyway an anti-EU party, though it rejects any religious or ethnic discrimination of EU candidates. Only the Social Liberal Party (RV) has, in recent years, expressed a positive attitude towards what Turkey might

bring to Europe by becoming a member of the EU, and is, in this sense, more aligned with the position of the Danish Industries' Association (DI). However, these more positive arguments have until recently played only a minor role in debates about Turkey and the EU.

In January 2015 the Danish People's Party (DF) proposed a decision in Parliament to have the negotiations about Turkey's EU accession suspended.⁷ The background to the proposal was the so-called Lars Hedegaard case, in which Turkey, contrary to the wishes of the Danish authorities and without informing them, released Lars Hedegaard's attacker, who had been captured in Turkey. For several months the Danish authorities had asked for information about the attacker, but Turkey continued to neglect the request, at least publicly, and the case was generally seen as a sign of Turkey's lack of respect for fundamental legal principles. As described later in this chapter, the case attracted considerable public attention and put a pressure on the Minister of Justice, Mette Frederiksen (S), and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Martin Lidegaard (RV) to respond more firmly to Turkey's unsatisfactory behavior, which they never quite succeeded in doing. Thus, for the Danish People's Party, raising the issue of suspending negotiations over Turkey's EU accession was really a way of challenging Prime Minister Helle Thorning Schmidt and her government over the issue of whether Turkey met the Copenhagen criteria.

For the Danish People's Party (DF), it was thus obvious that Turkey could not be and never would be a European country, which is also stated in the proposal presented in January 2015. Therefore, instead of continuing to make promises to Turkey and the Turkish people, according to DF it would be more honest to suspend the negotiations and have a straightforward working relationship with Turkey instead. As arguments for why negotiations should be suspended, DF mentions recent opinion polls showing a majority of voters as being against Turkey's membership, the continuous widespread discrimination of women in Turkey, and the facts that freedom of expression is not respected and that in the Hedegaard case Turkey clearly demonstrated a lack of respect for the rule of law.⁸ These are all arguments that generally point to Turkey's apparent failure to demonstrate respect for liberal values. During the debate that followed the proposal, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Martin Lidegaard (RV), agreed that the issues regarding women's rights and freedom of expression ought to be addressed and that Turkey did not yet meet the Copenhagen criteria. But Lidegaard did not accept the argument that Turkey was not a European country, clearly illustrating that things have changed since Denmark originally opposed Turkish membership of NATO. In his view, Turkey was fully entitled to apply for

membership in the EU. He also stated that Turkey was an integral part of Europe, culturally and historically, and that he considered Turkey an important partner for strategic, security and economic reasons, both for Denmark and Europe: 'Turkey is geopolitically crucial in handling the complicated challenges facing the international community in the Middle East and in the fight against terror.'⁹ Thus, Lidegaard could only reject DF's proposal, and he encouraged others to do the same.

Lidegaard's response may not be that surprising, given that both the Social Liberal Party (RV) and the Liberal Alliance share a positive stance on the EU's further enlargement. In fact, RV has so far been the only party 'which does not emphasize the need for Turkey to comply with EU conditionalities, but also comes with some positive arguments for Turkey's EU membership.'¹⁰ The spokesperson for the Liberal Party (V), Jakob Ellemann-Jensen, was a bit more harsh in his intervention, but only a bit because, while he certainly did not support the current development and was worried about Turkey's record on human rights, freedom of expression and women's rights in particular, he still found it in Denmark's interest to work for a continuously close relationship with 'our Turkish neighbor,' especially given the current situation in the Middle East and the big influx of refugees from Iraq and Syria, which could only increase 'our interest in having close cooperation with Turkey.' Ellemann-Jensen therefore found it difficult to see the use of suspending the negotiations with Turkey and rejected the proposal.

A similar position was taken by the Social Democratic Party (S), though spokesperson Morten Bødskov did emphasize that Turkey had a long way to go, and like his colleague from the Socialist People's Party (SF), Bødskov also mentioned Turkey's recent economic development, making it clear that on the economic side progress had actually been made. As Lisbeth Bech Poulsen (SF) said, 'Turkey is a big country with a high economic growth.' The country had gone through a 'heavy reform process,' which was why it was 'an important signal to send to the Muslim world that Europe wants to cooperate, not create conflict.' The spokesperson from the Liberal Alliance (LA), Merete Risager, thought that suspending the negotiations would create a risk that the Turkish population would turn their backs on 'the secularization and democratization' of the country's institutions, which would never be in Europe's interests. Thus the 'swing state' Turkey, as Risager said, should be kept on the reform track, while on the other hand Denmark should be tougher on Turkey by threatening to withdraw military support.

The debate illustrates not only what Jung has described regarding the Danish position towards Turkey's EU accession, but also the positions of

other scholars who have analyzed Denmark's relation with Turkey and the EU. As Christine Nissen writes, 'the Danish stance on Turkish EU membership was revisited in March 2014, when the Turkish President, Abdullah Gül, paid a state visit to Denmark. Here, the Danish Prime Minister, Helle Thorning, reaffirmed that Denmark supports Turkey's EU membership process, while also stressing the need for Turkey to deal with its important shortcomings in fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria, such as the principles of the rule of law, fundamental rights and freedom of expression.' Thus, according to Nissen, there is no doubt that Denmark is divided over Turkey's EU membership. Arguably, though, she says, the Thorning Schmidt-government was more pro-Turkish, as illustrated by Lidegaard's positive perception of Turkey's European identity, than the former Liberal government, which was dependent on the support of the Danish People's Party (Nissen, 2014).

As such, Turkey's wish for a boost in EU negotiations has generally been welcomed in Denmark. However, there also exists an attitude of 'fundamentals first,' as represented in EU accession chapters 23 and 24, not least because the public debate in Denmark is so concerned about the issues of freedom of expression, human rights and the rights of women and minorities in particular, as also reflected in the debate following DF's proposal that the negotiations with Turkey be halted. In that sense, the ambivalence towards Turkey's accession to the EU can be characterized as being divided between the fundamental need to retain Turkey as a close ally and cooperation partner on the one hand, and on meeting the public demand for Turkey to develop into an open democracy based on the rule of law and with respect for basic human rights on the other. Given that the need for Turkey's cooperation has only grown stronger in recent years for both economic and security reasons, we may say that Denmark at present appears to be keeping a low profile when it comes to pushing Turkey in the desired direction politically.

The Lars Hedegaard-case – or how Denmark's relations with Turkey appeared to be more important than the rule of law

On February 5, 2013 the Danish writer and journalist, Lars Hedegaard, was the target of a failed assassination attempt at his home in Copenhagen. The gunman escaped, but the incident attracted world attention because of Hedegaard's openly expressed criticism of Islam and his fierce defense of press

freedom. About a year later, in January 2014, and after intense police investigation, the attacker was located in Turkey, where the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed the Turkish authorities and requested his arrest and extradition to Denmark. At the same time, the suspect was being sought by Interpol. In April 2014 the attacker was arrested by the Turkish authorities, but the Danish authorities were not given contact with him, and in October 2014 the Danish police learned that he had been released. What followed was a minor crisis in Danish–Turkish relations. Several Danish politicians argued for a tough stand on Turkey, and both the Minister of Justice, Mette Frederiksen, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Martin Lidegaard, publicly expressed strong concerns over the failure to inform Denmark. Despite the strong words and fierce criticism of Turkish behavior, however, in reality there was very little Denmark could do, apart from bringing the incident to the attention of the EU. At least, this was how the incident appeared in news coverage.

On October 8, 2014 the Danish embassy in Ankara asked the Turkish authorities for an official explanation. On October 10, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Martin Lidegaard, called for a meeting with the Turkish ambassador in which the Minister of Justice, Mette Frederiksen, also participated. On October 11, the attacker's defense lawyer confirmed that his client had been released, apparently several weeks earlier, which led to a series of questions from Members of Parliament asking why the Danish government had not been informed and why Turkey had not cooperated with Denmark on this issue.

Whether Turkey had any obligations towards Denmark in this regard, either on the basis of the Council of Europe's convention on extradition or the Vienna Convention, was never made clear, but Lidegaard told members of the Foreign Affairs Committee during a later meeting, which Minister of Justice Mette Frederiksen also attended, that the way Turkey had handled the case was not acceptable.¹¹ This message Lidegaard also conveyed to his Turkish counterpart, Mevlut Cavusogly, who, however, could neither confirm nor deny the rumors about the suspect's release. Instead he suggested that Denmark send a delegation to Ankara to meet with Turkish intelligence and justice officials. For the Minister of Justice, Mette Frederiksen, this would not be enough: 'None of us will let this go', Frederiksen stated, confirming that neither she, nor Lidegaard, would leave the issue to government officials. This case had to have consequences, Frederiksen said.¹² For Lidegaard at this stage, relations between Denmark and Turkey had already become troubled.¹³

Nonetheless the following day, on October 17, a delegation consisting of representatives from Danish Intelligence (PET), the Ministry of Justice and Copenhagen Policy travelled to Turkey to investigate the release of Lars Hedegaard's attacker, which, in news coverage, was followed by more parliamentarians expressing concerns about Denmark's relations with Turkey. Marie Krarup of the Danish People's Party (DF) wanted Denmark to address the issue bilaterally and in international forums like NATO, stating that Denmark could not have close collaboration with a state that was disloyal.¹⁴ The Socialist People's Party (SF) wanted Denmark to express dissatisfaction with the whole process, as well as inform 'the Turks' at the ministerial level 'how unhappy we are.' And the Conservative Party (K), being slightly more vigilant, wanted the Government to make Turkey feel that this would have consequences. There is no doubt that for members of both the government and the opposition, this case had seriously damaged relations between Denmark and Turkey. Moreover, Denmark had to let Turkey know that this was unacceptable, against international agreements on extradition, and not a way a close partner should act.

However, Denmark could do little to put a pressure on Turkey. Even though the Danish People's Party (DF) suggested expelling Turkey from NATO, and the Red Green Alliance wanted Denmark to withdraw its troops from Turkey,¹⁵ Denmark had very few, if any, ways to respond, as Liberal Party member Søren Pind noted. No matter what, Denmark had to be careful not to be too ambitious in its response to Turkey, Pind said. After all, what Denmark could do was quite limited. And one should be careful not to climb too high, Pind warned.¹⁶ What followed was a more humble and pragmatic Danish government, admitting publicly that a continuous good working relationship with Turkey was more important than the prosecution of Lars Hedegaard's attacker.¹⁷

The case was then closed, leaving the public to speculate that the suspect had been part of a secret negotiation between the Turkish government and IS, through which 49 Turkish hostages were freed in exchange for 180 IS fighters.¹⁸ In April 2015, it was still difficult for Minister of Justice Mette Frederiksen to obtain more detailed information from the Turkish authorities about the release, leading other members of Parliament to state publicly that the government had made a fool of itself, while Søren Espersen of the Danish People's Party (DF) stated that the party no longer considered that Turkey qualified to apply for membership of the European Union.¹⁹ Whether the Danish government did, in fact, know about the attacker's release and whether it was carried out as part of an exchange between Turkey and IS, as

some indicated, is at this point still unclear. But the case left the impression of Denmark as a small country in which Lars Hedegaard and his supporters play a much more significant role politically than a diplomatic crisis with Denmark does in Turkey. As one observer of contemporary Turkish politics noted, in Turkey, people didn't even know about Lars Hedegaard. Compared to the contemporary security challenge facing Turkey with IS, the Kurdish question and the war in Syria, a diplomatic crisis with Denmark on this issue would hardly resonate in Ankara.²⁰

The ROJ TV and Anders Fogh Rasmussen's U-turn

The reason why the Hedegaard case was able to attract that much attention not only in Denmark, but also in the international media has to do with the Cartoon Crisis and Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen's U-turn on freedom of expression, which happened around the same time that a new General Secretary of NATO was to be appointed. In 2004 the Kurdish ROJ TV channel started to broadcast from Copenhagen. Immediately afterwards Turkey accused the TV station of being a mouthpiece for the PKK, the Kurdish militant movement fighting for an independent Kurdistan headed by Abdullah Öcalan and based in both Turkey and Iraqi Kurdistan. Although the PKK is listed as a terrorist organization by the EU, the TV station was cleared by the Danish Radio and Television Council (Radio- og Tv-nævnet) and continued to broadcast. In July 2005 the Turkish embassy in Copenhagen reported the TV station to the Copenhagen police, accusing it of violating the law on terrorism. The case was handed over to the district attorney, since it appeared to raise issues of principle and be in the public interest. But neither the district attorney nor Copenhagen Police could find enough evidence to make a case. Thus it remained unresolved for several years.

The issue concerning ROJ TV appeared during Anders Fogh Rasmussen's years in office as Prime Minister from 2001 to 2009, and from an early stage was included in Fogh's outspoken defense of freedom of expression as most explicitly demonstrated during the Cartoon Crisis (early 2006) and his firm stand on liberal values. Thus, when Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan again visited Copenhagen in November 2005 and was planned to participate in a press briefing together with Fogh, he refused when he learned that ROJ TV would be present during the briefing. Fogh therefore had to do the brief-

ing alone. When asked about the disagreement, Fogh answered that neither he nor Erdogan would compromise on the issue. 'To me this is about how democracy works,' Fogh said.²¹ And 'I have no legal basis to exclude journalists from press conferences as long as they work within the law.' For Erdogan, freedom of speech was important, 'but what is holy to me is more important. I would never abuse my freedom of speech to attack things that are holy to Mr Rasmussen.'²²

By that time several commentators described Fogh's relationship with Erdogan as being generally very bad, starting from when, as leader of the AK party in 2002 during the Danish EU presidency, Erdogan made headlines by pushing for a date for the start of negotiations over Turkey's accession to the EU. During the Cartoon Crisis, Turkey was one of the most outspoken critics of Fogh and the Danish government, which has to be seen in the light of the AKP government's branding of Turkey as a leader among Muslim nations, speaking on behalf of the Muslim world in international forums. As Pola Rojan and others have shown, Turkish foreign policy under AKP governments has been influenced by Ahmet Davutoglu's Pan-Islamist vision of Turkey as the leading country in the Middle East, also known as Neo-Ottomanism (Rojan Bagger, 2015; Kösebalaban, 2011). This vision is presented in Davutoglu's book from 2001, *Stratejik Derinlik* or 'Strategic Depth', in which Davutoglu sees Islam as the unifying factor for the countries in the region. Davutoglu's principal argument is that Turkish foreign policy lacks 'a grand strategic vision to enable it to utilize the advantages offered by the country's rich history and geographic space.'²³ From a Turkish perspective, opposing Fogh Rasmussen and his outspoken defence of liberal values publicly, as Erdogan did during the meeting in Copenhagen, only emphasized this desirable image of Turkey as the country defending Islam and Muslim values. But while Erdogan and Fogh had many clashes on public stages, Fogh had a good relationship with President Abdullah Gül. As some commentators noted at the time, Gül speaks to the Western world and values, Erdogan to the Muslim world.²⁴ And Fogh clearly preferred the first.

However, the situation changed in 2009, when Fogh started to become a candidate as NATO General Secretary. In March 2009 the Copenhagen police travelled to Turkey together with the district attorney to investigate the relationship between ROJ TV and PKK. Soon afterwards, new information about the TV station appeared.²⁵ In August 2010, when Fogh as newly appointed NATO General Secretary visited Copenhagen, the district attorney charged ROJ TV with being affiliated with terrorism, which was considered a major turning point in the case because the Danish govern-

ment had eventually given in to Turkish pressure. Documents later leaked from the US Embassy in Copenhagen showed that this was in fact the case. On May 26, 2009, the Embassy writes: ‘Danish pledges to intensify efforts against Roj-TV – among measures offered Turkey for not blocking former PM Rasmussen’s appointment as NATO secretary general – have given additional impetus to the investigation while also prompting senior officials to tread carefully, to avoid the appearance of a quid pro quo (i.e., sacrificing freedom of speech in exchange for a high-level post).’ Thus, there was a connection between Fogh’s appointment and the case against ROJ TV. As another cable stated, from February 2010, to overcome Turkish objections to the appointment, ‘Denmark had promised to clarify its legal requirements prerequisite to acceding to Turkey’s request for the closure of Roj TV, a PKK mouthpiece.’²⁶ In October 2010, the Embassy, referring to a meeting with ‘National Security Adviser’ Thomas Ahrenkiel, wrote that ‘he (Ahrenkiel, ed.) acknowledges that a decision not to prosecute would create “a big crisis” between Turkey and Denmark.’

Denmark and the Armenian genocide

The final issue of interest for bilateral relations between Denmark and Turkey is the Armenian genocide, or what are often referred to as the ‘1915 events’. For more than a decade, the question of official recognition of the persecution of Armenians in Ottoman Turkey before and during the First World War as a genocide has been an issue of concern in Danish political debates and thus also for relations between Denmark and Turkey. Unlike other EU countries, such as France and Germany, who have officially recognized the event as genocide, Denmark has not taken a stand concerning what happened to the Armenians in 1915. Several governments have explicitly taken the position of no position, expressed most explicitly in 2008 by Minister of Foreign Affairs, Per Stig Møller, who served in the Fogh administration from 2001-10 representing the Conservative Party (K): ‘The government believes that this is a historical question which should be up to historians to decide.’²⁷

The position was repeated by his follower Lene Espersen (K) in 2010,²⁸ and again by the Thorning Schmidt government (2011-15), when the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Martin Lidegaard (R), was asked about his position in the spring of 2015: ‘It is the government’s belief that it should be the historians who answer the question about what really happened and if the events of 1915 can be termed genocide.’²⁹ Even Holger K. Nielsen of the

Socialist People's Party, who served as Minister of Foreign Affairs from December 2013 to February 2014, expressed a similar view in May 2015: 'Personally I have no problems in characterizing the mass killings of Armenians a hundred years ago as a genocide. But I fail to see why this should be a question for the Parliament and government to address in official decisions.'³⁰ Again, the message was clear that this was not a matter for politicians and lawmakers to decide.

That Denmark does not have a position on whether the events in Ottoman Turkey during the First World War constitute genocide or not not only reflects the political consensus around this issue, it also shows that, on this question, Denmark is at odds with France and Germany, as well as with other members of the European Union, who officially recognize the events as genocide (including Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Greece, Italy, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland and Slovakia). Even in Sweden, in December 2010, acting against the Government's position, Parliament recognized the genocide of the Armenians and other ethnic groups during the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. For the past one or two decades, however, both the Danish People's Party (DF) and the Red Green Alliance (EL) have pushed for an official position, demonstrating that recognition of the Armenian genocide has a resonance in Danish public debates, even if it has no relevance for politicians and lawmakers.

The Armenian genocide is commemorated each year in Armenia and in several other countries around the world on 24th April. In this sense, there exists a culture of remembrance for the Armenian genocide that keeps the memory of the massacre alive, including in Denmark, where a minority of the Turkish immigrant community is of Armenian or Assyrian background. The estimated number of immigrants with an Anatolian background in Denmark is 60,000, constituting the largest immigrant community in Denmark.³¹ As a result, both the Armenian and the Kurdish questions are present in current Danish debates, adding a local Danish dimension to Turkey's current relations with its religious, ethnic and national minorities. Despite its unwillingness to be involved with the issue, Denmark did become part of the recent international dispute about how to address the events of 1915 when, during the spring of 2015, a memorial was temporarily erected in downtown Copenhagen honoring the victims, leading to controversies between the Copenhagen municipality and the Turkish embassy. This had already happened more explicitly in December 2012 because of an exhibition at the Danish Royal Library.³²

Just as France provoked a diplomatic crisis with Turkey in January 2012 when the French Senate passed a bill criminalizing the denial of officially recognized genocides, including the Armenian genocide, Denmark received international attention when, in the same year, the Royal Library organized an exhibition about the 'Armenian Genocide'.³³ The Library was criticized by the Turkish embassy and became the object of intense media coverage in both Denmark and abroad. When the Library decided to allow the Turks to present their side of the story, the decision was seen by the Armenian diaspora, as well as by several Danish parliamentarians, as kowtowing to Turkey and continuing the denial that lies at the heart of the dispute.³⁴

The row over the Royal Library's exhibition is an example of how a small country like Denmark can get caught up in other countries' conflicts over the interpretation of a specific period of history. Disagreements about the past can grow into diplomatic disputes and come to determine the signals that independent states show to the rest of the world. This has to do with the significance of the past in international relations, as noted by, among others, Ned Lebow (Lebow 2006), but it is also connected with the current situation of minorities in Turkey, which continues to be a concern among members of the EU. As US-based Turkish historian and genocide scholar Taner Akcam writes: 'Turkey's attitude towards the Armenians sends a worrying signal to the Christian minority in the region. In such an interpretation, responsibility for preserving not just Turkey's modern history, but also its Ottoman history, needs to be seen in terms of overarching questions of security, stability and democracy in a region where continued denial of past transgressions only adds to tensions between ethnic and religious groups.'³⁵ This worrying signal has only been intensified during recent years, where the war in Syria, and the increased tension between Russia and Turkey, have caused the current Turkish Prime Minister, Davutoglu, to start using heavily historicized rhetoric, making a clear comparison between the Kurdish question of today and the Armenian question before and during the First World War. Davutoglu has publicly 'reminded' Kurdish parliamentarians about what happened to Armenians in 1915 when 'collaborating with Russians.'³⁶

In her work on apologies in international politics, Jennifer Lind describes how countries that remember and atone for past violence are simultaneously signaling that they are unlikely to adopt aggressive strategies (Lind, 2008). The way a country remembers or forgets past violence leads others to have positive or negative feelings about that country. Apologies, reparations and the like, are signs of respect, Lind writes. By contrast, a country's denials, glorification or whitewashing of past atrocities signal contempt for a people,

for their country's status and for the future of the bilateral relationship (Lind, *ibid.*: 13). For decades, different Armenian diaspora groups have worked in the US for official recognition of the Armenian tragedy as genocide. Several US presidential candidates have, during their election campaigns, promised official recognition of the Armenian genocide, only to change their positions once in office. President Obama, instead of using the term genocide in his speeches, refers to the *Meds Yeghern*, the Armenian expression for *Great Catastrophe*.³⁷ Obama did, however, make a step towards easing relations between Turkey and Armenia during his first visit to Turkey in 2009, when he addressed the Turkish parliament. In his speech, Obama reminded the Turks that history unsolved can be a heavy burden, and that each country must work through its own past, shifting the focus away from his official view on to Turkey and Armenia: 'I know there are strong views in this chamber about the terrible events of 1915. While there has been a good deal of commentary about my views, this is really about how the Turkish and Armenian people deal with the past. And the way forward for the Turkish and Armenian people is a process that works through the past in a way that is honest, open and constructive.'³⁸

The US Congress has come close to ratifying a resolution that would recognize the Armenian Genocide on more than one occasion, but either pressure from Turkey or strategic interests have prevented this from happening. In 2007, when the 'Armenian Genocide Resolution' was presented to the House of Representatives, former Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski warned against not just this, but resolutions about the past in general, stating that the House of Representatives was created to pass laws, not resolutions regarding history.³⁹ Former US President Jimmy Carter expressed a similar view, claiming that 'the same issue arose ... when I was president, when President Ford was president, when President Nixon was president, probably all the way back to Harry Truman's time.' To Carter, it was not an issue about recognizing the crime committed against the Armenians. 'The world generally recognizes that many of the Armenians were killed because they were Armenians by leaders of Turkey at that time. But to resurrect that issue and brand now Turkey and the Turkish people as perpetrators of genocide, I think, exacerbates a wound that may very well hurt the relationship with Turkey which is very valuable.' And former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice considered that the passage of such a resolution would be problematic 'for everything that we are trying to do in the Middle East because we are very dependent on a good Turkish strategic ally to help with our efforts.'⁴⁰ The Resolution was reintroduced in 2010, but at a time when the Obama

administration had been working for the normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations, and yet again during the election in 2012, though it never succeeded in becoming an issue.⁴¹

When we look at the Danish example, Denmark has come close to making an official statement, but the Armenian genocide issue has been debated several times in Parliament and is generally seen as one of the concerns regarding Turkey and its accession to the EU. Thus, in connection with the marking of the centenary of 1915, the Red Green Alliance (EL) raised the issue, asking about the government's position towards 'this genocide' and also about 'the importance of respecting national, ethnic and religious minorities.'⁴² The debate that followed illustrates not only the general attitude of most members of parliament towards official recognition of the genocide, but also how the issue was seen in the context of Turkish accession to the EU, as well as a general concern about the status of minority groups.

While the Red Green Alliance (EL) wanted a clear Danish position, the majority argued, along with at least three former ministers of foreign affairs, that this question was not a matter for parliamentarians, but historians. This position was taken up by Social Democrats (S), the Social Liberal Party (SF), the Liberal Party (V) and even the spokesperson of the Danish People's Party (DF), Søren Espersen, who, during this debate, took a different stand than that taken previously by members of his party. There was no question that the events constituted genocide, but this was an issue for Turkey, not Denmark, said Espersen during his contribution to the debate.⁴³

The spokesperson for the Social Democratic Party (S), Jacob Lund, focused his contribution on the relationship between Armenia and Turkey, stating that it was in the government's clear interest that a reconciliation process takes place. But as a representative of the government, he had no intention of recognizing the events as genocide. Instead, Lund introduced a proposal – perhaps inspired by Obama's speech, and backed by the Social Liberals (RV), the Socialist People's Party (SF) and the Christian Democrats (KF) – that focused on the rights of minorities in the region and that encouraged Armenia and Turkey to work for reconciliation and a normalization of their relations.⁴⁴ Lund also denied that he had been pressured by Turkey to take this stand, and repeated the argument about how the definition of genocide ought not to be a matter for a national parliament. In the debate, Lund was backed by arguments from the Social Liberal Party (RV), the Christian Democrats (KF) and the Socialist People's Party (SF), but the Liberal Alliance (LA) did not join in. In fact, Mette Bock from LA was more explicit than any other member, stating how disgraceful it was that Turkey had not

recognized this genocide, and that it was a sign of a lack of political courage, indeed cowardice, that the Danish parliament would not openly call it a genocide, a deliberate attempt to destroy a whole people, for which Turkey had to take responsibility.

The vote on the proposal put forward by Lund was 50 in favor, 13 against, and 40 abstentions, illustrating that on this issue Denmark was not prepared to push Turkey in any regard. As in the debate about suspending the negotiations with Turkey on its EU membership the intentions were there, members agreed that a crime had taken place, and some, like Søren Pind of the Liberal Party, had no problems in using the term 'genocide'. But having the Danish Parliament interfere in another state's history was a different thing and not for law-makers and parliamentarians to deal with. It is difficult to judge whether this position was inspired by the American view or whether pressure from the Turkish embassy, both in December 2012 during the row over the exhibit on the Armenian genocide or later in the spring of 2015, when a monument was erected in downtown Copenhagen, had had an impact. But, while most found it against Danish principles to oppose the erection of a temporary monument just because Turkey disagreed, only the Red Green Alliance (EL) would have Denmark follow other European countries and officially recognize the Armenian genocide.⁴⁵ And nobody except from the Director of the Royal Library supported Turkey's wish for an exhibit displaying the official Turkish version of what happened to the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire during the First World War. As Søren Espersen of the Danish People's Party expressed: 'Without further comparison between the two events, it would be like to asking neo-Nazis to arrange an exhibition on the Holocaust.'⁴⁶

Danish–Turkish relations: between Neoliberalism and Neo-Ottomanism

In returning to the initial aim of this article, that is, tracing Denmark's relationship with Turkey during the AKP government, what general conclusions can we make? Does Denmark have an independent position towards Turkey, and, if so, how should it be described? The Danish position towards Turkey's accession to the EU was characterized by ambivalence and the tension between the need for Turkey as a close ally and the demand for political reform, including the pursuit of human rights. The need for Turkey as a close ally has

increased, at least compared to the early years of the AKP government, when Fogh and Erdogan clashed publicly over the issue. That time has passed, and while the dialogue between Denmark and Turkey could then take place between President Gül and Fogh, one of the problems facing Danish–Turkish relations may be exactly that Turkey, or Denmark for that matter, no longer has Gül to speak to the West, leaving the dialogue to President Erdogan and Prime Minister Davutoglu, each having a different communication strategy, one speaking to the Muslim world and the other focused on an internal political audience. Thus, while Denmark could act as a strong defender of liberal values, including freedom of expression, during Fogh’s tenure, and openly confront the Turkish government with what was originally a consistent stand on ROJ TV, in recent years a value-based position towards Turkey has been replaced by a cautious and pragmatic stance, as illustrated not only by Fogh’s U-turn on ROJ TV, but also by the Lars Hedegaard case. Cooperation is now more important than respect for the rule of law, an attitude that is also reflected in the recent approach within the EU, and in Germany, towards Turkey, and which may have been a general tendency in Danish and Western foreign policy more generally since 2007–8, namely a downplaying of liberal values and a kowtowing to Turkish claims. During the spring of 2016, it became apparent that the European Union and Germany would rather close a deal with Turkey on refugees than continue to press for political reforms and respect for human rights within Turkey. Denmark, however, differs in one respect from most EU countries, and that is on the issue of official recognition of the Armenian genocide. Here Denmark follows the US and the UK in leaving the question to historians and other scholars, not wanting to take an official stand. If this is a sign of contemporary Danish policy on Turkey, Denmark clearly has chosen sides.

Notes

- 1 PhD, Senior Researcher, DIIS
- 2 I owe special thanks to Hetav Rojan and Camilla Bak for assisting with newspaper research and research in *Folketingstidende* and on *Wikileaks*.
- 3 In *Dansk Udenrigspolitik Historie 1914-1945*, Turkey appears only once, on p. 43. The Ottoman Empire does not appear at all.
- 4 *The Mind and Body of Europe: A New Narrative*, <http://ec.europa.eu/debate-future-europe/new-narrative> (last accessed 26 May 2016).
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- 9 1. Beh. af beslutningsforslag nr. B 54: *Forslag til folketingsbeslutning om at indstille forhandlingerne med Tyrkiets optagelse i EU*. Folketingstidende, Tirsdag den 10. marts 2015, p. 34-39.
- 10 Jung, p. 109.
- 11 Udenrigsudvalget 2014-15, URU. Alm. del endeligt svar på sprg. 4
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Ready for Membership? Denmark and Israel's Application for Membership of the United Nations in May 1949

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Introduction

In the context of Danish-Israeli relations, it is often emphasized that Denmark was among the 33 members of the United Nations which, on November 29, 1947, voted for the Partition Plan for Palestine and thus enabled the creation of the State of Israel. Of the 56 member states at the time, ten countries abstained, thus reducing the required two-thirds majority of those present and voting to 31. This outcome was not inevitable. A few days before the meeting in the General Assembly, a vote in the preparatory Ad Hoc Committee on Palestine had shown that Israel did not have enough votes in favour. Only an intense lobbying effort by the Jewish Agency and American Jewish organizations over the ensuing weekend secured the necessary support. Every vote counted.²

However, the Partition Plan for Palestine mandated in Resolution 181 (II) was never implemented. The plan was based on the partition of the British mandate into two independent states, one Arab, the other Jewish, with Jerusalem as a 'Special International Regime' (*corpus separatum*) with free access to the holy sites. The two states were to form an economic union with a single currency.

The resolution also stipulated the establishment of a UN Palestine Commission for the purpose of managing the transition from the British mandate to the two new states, including minor border adjustments made necessary by conditions on the ground. The five members of the Commission were to be selected from countries that had voted for the Partition Plan, but that were not among the eleven members of the UN Security Council.

The United States and the United Kingdom signalled that they would welcome a Nordic member of the Commission. Volunteers did not exactly

queue up, as the task was generally seen as a politically charged balancing act. In the early years of the United Nations the three Scandinavian countries pursued a very cautious and low-profile posture, and the assignment they were asked to take on did not fit that description. The world was not an easy place in late 1947 and early 1948. The Cold War was now a reality and needed careful navigation. The situation in the Middle East was not an essential interest of Scandinavian political leaders.

Eventually, the United States approached the Danish ambassador to Washington, Henrik Kauffmann, and urged Denmark to put forward a candidate for the Palestine Commission. Overcoming the initial concerns of the Foreign Ministry, Kaufmann was successful in securing a positive response, including full endorsement from Oslo and Stockholm. The fact that the future of the British mandate was not seen as contentious from a Cold War perspective most probably also helped ensure Danish acceptance.³

In December 1947, the Danish government appointed Per Federspiel, a member of Parliament for the Liberal Party (*Venstre*). Federspiel served as a member of the Danish delegation to the UN General Assembly. The delegation was led by foreign minister Gustav Rasmussen and included three other MPs, namely Alsing Andersen (Social Democrat), Christian Amby (Conservative) and Hermod Lannung (Social Liberal, i.e. *Radikale Venstre*), working closely with Denmark's Permanent Representative to the UN, William Borberg. The representation of all the major political parties in the Danish Parliament and the delegation's consensual way of working ensured very broad political agreement behind Danish UN policy.

As noted, the government was not exactly thrilled about volunteering Federspiel as a member of the Palestine Commission, and the lack of enthusiasm was reflected in his mandate. The instructions from the Foreign Ministry were quite cautious and in line with the general reluctance to engage too much in political issues of limited direct concern to Denmark such as this. Federspiel had to 'pay attention to the fact that under the present circumstances it is considered desirable to prevent Denmark from being placed in an exposed position in this question, or incurring a greater responsibility than the other countries represented in the Commission'. This clearly indicated that he should not accept the position of Chairman of the Commission should this opportunity arise. The government's very cautious position on this issue was probably also due to the views of the Confederation of Danish Industries, the cement sector (F.L. Smidth) and the shipping industry, including A.P. Møller-Mærsk, who feared that too high a Danish

profile in this question could harm their considerable business interests in the Arab world.⁴

However, the Palestine Commission never came to fruition. The Arab side completely rejected the Partition Plan and with it the Commission's mandate. While both the United Kingdom – holding the League of Nations mandate in Palestine – and the Jewish Agency appointed representatives to work with the Commission, the Arab Higher Committee declined to appoint a representative. The British government appeared cooperative with the Palestine Commission, but in reality it did not want the Commission to succeed in its mission of building bridges between the British mandate and the planned two successor states. This became evident when the British government blocked the Commission from visiting the mandate area prior to May 15, 1948, the date when the British planned to end their administrative and security functions and withdraw completely from Palestine.

From the adoption of the Partition Plan in November 1947 to the British withdrawal in May 1948 tension in the area increased, the political conflict intensified, and the world witnessed ever more frequent clashes between Jewish and Palestinian population groups. The Palestine Commission saw no other solution than to seek the deployment of an international force of 'adequate strength' to ensure implementation of the Plan. This question, however, was a matter under the purview of the Security Council, and here there was no appetite to authorize such a military force.

An open conflict in Palestine clearly seemed the most likely scenario once the British mandate expired on 15 May, and on March 19, 1948, the US Ambassador to the UN, Warren Austin, told the Security Council that it was facing 'chaos, heavy fighting and much loss of life in Palestine'. The only option he saw was a temporary 'UN trusteeship of Palestine' under the auspices of the UN Trusteeship Council. This idea, however, did not meet with the support of either of the parties to the conflict nor the other members of the Security Council. An alternative US proposal for a joint US-French-British military force in Palestine was also rejected by both France and the United Kingdom.⁵

On May 14, 1948 – the day before the British mandate expired – war came about. On that day David Ben-Gurion proclaimed the birth of the State of Israel. The new state was immediately recognized by the United States and two days later also by the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, a joint Arab military force attacked the fledgling State of Israel, and the first Arab-Israeli war became a reality. The General Assembly acted swiftly and appointed a UN mediator to the conflict, Count Folke Bernadotte of Sweden; it also decided to suspend the work of the Palestine Commission.

In his final report to the Foreign Ministry on the work of the Commission, Per Federspiel noted that the General Assembly had expressed its appreciation for the Commission's efforts. This, however, was a poor consolation for its members, who saw the same General Assembly 'recognize its complete impotence against the forces which were released as a direct consequence of the resolution of 29 November, and which the world at large proved quite unable to control.'⁶

Just four months later, in September 1948, Folke Bernadotte was assassinated in Jerusalem by the Stern Gang (Lehi), a Jewish terrorist group. Even though the group and its leadership, which included the later Israeli Prime Minister Yitzak Shamir, was in political opposition to the Ben-Gurion government, the Israeli investigation into the killing was limited and half-hearted, and in the end no one was held accountable for the murder.⁷

Three months after Bernadotte's assassination, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 194 (III) of December 11, 1948, set up a Conciliation Commission of three members (the United States, France and Turkey) and tasked it to continue the mediation process and to prepare a proposal for an international regime in Jerusalem, including the protection of the holy sites. Article 11 of this resolution contained the provision that those Arab refugees who wanted to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so 'at the earliest practicable date'. The resolution also made it clear that compensation should be paid in accordance with international principles to those Arab refugees who chose not to return, as well as to those who had suffered losses.⁸

The Conciliation Commission for Palestine met with the Arab countries and Israel in the spring of 1949. Its second progress report of April 1949 focused on the refugee issue. It concluded that there might be refugees who did not wish to return, just as it stressed that the refugee issue could only be solved together with other political issues, especially the delineation of the border.⁹

In the first months of 1949 – from January to April – the new UN mediator Ralph Bunche, who had replaced Folke Bernadotte, succeeded in facilitating ceasefire agreements between Israel and Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan and eventually also Syria. As a result of the war, the State of Israel encompassed not only the area set out in the Partition Plan of 1947, but also half of the area originally intended for the independent Arab state in Palestine. A total of 78 pct. of the British mandate thus went to Israel, while Egypt took over the responsibility for the Gaza Strip and Jordan the responsibility for the West Bank and East Jerusalem. Consequently, the first Arab-Israeli war ended without the creation of a Palestinian state.

Israel's first application for UN membership

Only a few days after the declaration of the State of Israel, the question of Denmark's *de facto* recognition of the new state was raised by the Conservative Party in the Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Policy. However, the United Kingdom, Denmark's closest political ally, successfully urged the Danish government to delay a decision until the situation on the ground became clear.

That Denmark would recognize the new State of Israel was never in doubt. That this would happen around the same time that the United Kingdom eventually did so was intimated by Per Federspiel to the Israeli UN Representative Abba Eban shortly before the opening of the Third UN General Assembly in Paris in September 1948. At that time Federspiel expected that recognition would be coordinated between the three Scandinavian countries – Denmark, Norway and Sweden. But the Swedish foreign minister, Östen Undén, chose to go it alone and announced Sweden's recognition of Israel in his statement to the General Assembly on October 19, 1948. Norway and Denmark waited until after the British recognition on January 30, 1949. Denmark recognized Israel on February 2, 1949, and Norway two days later.¹⁰

Not surprisingly the State of Israel wanted to become a member of the United Nations as soon as possible. Over the years, an application for UN membership and the establishment of a Permanent Mission to the UN have been among the very first steps any new country would take after declaring or otherwise achieving independence. These moves provide the stamp of international recognition and are visible evidence that a country has joined the 'community of nations'. In Israel's case the issue was obviously more complex. The 51 countries that founded the United Nations in San Francisco on June 24, 1945, were all among the 'victors' in World War II. The fact that Denmark was recognized as belonging to this group was only due to the diplomatic prowess and influence of its ambassador in Washington, Henrik Kauffmann.¹¹

In the years following its establishment in June 1945, only a handful of countries joined the United Nations as new member states: in 1946 only Afghanistan, Thailand, Iceland and Sweden. Pakistan (after the partition of India) and Yemen followed in 1947, and Burma (Myanmar) in 1948. The procedure for the admission of new members stipulates that requests for membership must first be considered by the Security Council, where any of

the five permanent members can impose a veto, which puts an end to the process. If the Security Council accepts an application for membership, it will submit a recommendation to the General Assembly, which then decides formally on the request.

After the admission of Burma in 1948 a number of countries were still in line to become members of the United Nations: Albania, Bulgaria, Ceylon (Sri Lanka), Finland, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Korea (i.e. the Republic of Korea), Mongolia, Nepal, Portugal, Romania, Hungary and Austria. The decision to welcome all these countries – or some of them – was blocked by disagreements in the Security Council on the political impact of these potential new members on the overall East-West balance in the organization. Back in San Francisco, the Soviet Union had already voiced its concerns over this balance, and the issue was resolved only by giving the Soviets two additional votes in the form of independent UN membership for Ukraine and Belarus, otherwise integral parts of the Soviet Union. The disagreement in the Security Council led to ritual debates in the General Assembly, where Australia championed enlargement of membership for Western-oriented candidate countries, while the Soviet Union supported its client states in eastern Europe.¹²

According to Article 4 of the UN Charter, the organization is open to membership by ‘all peace-loving states’ which accept their obligations under the Charter and ‘are able and willing to carry out these obligations’.

Against this background it was rightly foreseen that Israel would apply for UN membership fairly quickly after the creation of the new state. As early as March 1948 Per Federspiel was already assuming this in his correspondence with foreign minister Gustav Rasmussen. That this issue would be a complicating factor in work of the Palestine Commission was clear: ‘Presumably this independent state will seek admission to the United Nations, and this will be a tough test for the conscience of quite a number of people’, Federspiel wrote. And Gustav Rasmussen replied that, ‘One must experience the peculiar fact that the Soviet Union will be the only true friend of persecuted Judaism’.¹³

As expected, Israel applied for membership of the United Nations on May 15, 1948 – the day after its Declaration of Independence and the beginning of the first Arab-Israeli war. Initially, the application was politely ignored by the Security Council and put on hold until the outcome of the military conflict between Israel and the neighbouring Arab countries became clear. The application was resubmitted on the anniversary of the adoption of the Partition Plan in November 1948 and was brought to a vote in the

Security Council on December 17 of that year, where it fell flat. This was not because of a veto from any of the permanent members; on the contrary, both the United States and the Soviet Union voted in favour, as did Argentina, Columbia and Ukraine. As the only Arab member of the Security Council, Syria predictably voted against. The determining factor was the five countries abstaining: Belgium, Canada and the three other permanent members: the United Kingdom, France and China (which then and until 1971 meant Taiwan). For these five countries, the reason for abstaining was primarily the ongoing military conflict.¹⁴

The five abstentions meant that the application did not achieve the required qualified majority (7 out of 11 members) for the Security Council to recommend to the General Assembly that Israel should be admitted as a new member of the United Nations.

It is worth noting that at that time both the United States and the Soviet Union were already strongly supporting Israel's admission to the United Nations. This was in spite of increased political tensions between the two countries after the Soviet-backed coup in Czechoslovakia of February 1948.

Whereas America's support was to a large degree the result of the targeted political lobbying by international Jewish leaders like Chaim Weizmann, pressure from influential domestic Jewish groups and President Truman's own personal sympathy for the State of Israel, the Soviet Union's support was probably more unexpected. The Soviet Union had remained quite passive on this issue until May 14, 1947, when their UN Ambassador, Andrei Gromyko, expressed his strong support for the idea of a partition of the British mandate and for 'the aspirations of the Jews to establish their own state'. There were probably several reasons behind this position. Undoubtedly the Soviet Union could identify with the horrors experienced by Jewish communities all over Europe during the war and to some degree saw the new state as a reflection of the victorious struggle against fascism. On top of this, the Soviet Union most probably also viewed the establishment of Israel – which at that point looked likely to become a socialist state – as a potential bridgehead in the Middle East. And finally, the idea of embarrassing the British on their home turf in the Middle East was not entirely unwelcome either.

The Soviet support for Israel was not only verbal: it was the Soviet Union and its allies who provided the necessary votes in favour of Israel in the UN. The same countries also provided the necessary weapons to Israel during its War of Independence, mostly shipped from Czechoslovakia. The open Soviet support for the State of Israel lasted until the early 1950s, when sympathies gradually shifted to the Arab side of the conflict.¹⁵

The debate in the General Assembly in May 1949

On February 24, 1949, following the ceasefire agreement with Egypt, Israel once again applied for membership, this time relying on the expectation that the agreement with Egypt would be followed by similar agreements with the other neighbouring Arab states. The existence of the State of Israel would then be a *fait accompli*. On March 4, 1949, the Security Council considered the request for membership, and this time it was agreed – with 9 votes in favour, 1 against (Egypt) and 1 abstention (United Kingdom) – to recommend to the General Assembly that Israel be admitted as a new member of United Nations. On March 9, Cuba as President of the Security Council wrote the Secretary-General a letter with the standard formulation that the Council considered Israel to be ‘a peace-loving state ... able and willing to carry out the obligations contained in the Charter’. The issue was now before the 58 Member States of the General Assembly.¹⁶

The following analysis is an attempt to identify the most important elements in the General Assembly’s debate for and against Israel’s admission. The analysis is primarily based on very detailed summaries of the discussions that took place in the *ad hoc* Committee established to deal with the issue. The Committee met from May, 5 to 9, 1949, prior to the vote in the General Assembly on May 11, 1949. All Member States were represented in the Committee, and Israel was invited to participate in its deliberations in order to answer any questions that might be raised.¹⁷

First of all, the Committee discussed the very basis for the Israeli application. The Arab countries did not agree that Israel was a ‘peace-loving’ nation as required by the UN Charter. Some of these members argued this in very powerful rhetorical terms, pointing to Israeli actions that had led to the displacement of hundreds of thousands of Arabs from Palestine. They also applied the argument that Israel had not been established in accordance with Resolution 181 (II) of November 29, 1947 and that the country had not complied with Resolution 194 (III); consequently Israel could not be said to be ‘able and willing’ to comply with its obligations under the Charter, as set out in Article 4. Acknowledging that this view was not supported by the majority, Lebanon especially argued for a postponement of the vote, at least until the fourth General Assembly in the fall of 1949. There was no obvious reason, it was argued, to give Israeli membership priority over the pending applications from Italy, Ireland or Portugal.

The majority of UN member states disagreed with the Arab point of view. Using the argument that the Security Council had already found Israel to be 'peace-loving', some even argued that the General Assembly just had to follow suit, while others pointed out that the General Assembly had its own role to play in examining applications for membership.

The key substantive policy issues that permeated the discussions were the status of Jerusalem, the question of the Palestinian refugees, the delineation of the border after the war and the assassination of Folke Bernadotte.

The status of Jerusalem

After the armistice, the military situation on the ground had left Jerusalem a *de facto* divided city, with a 'green line' separating the Israeli-controlled area (West Jerusalem and Mount Scopus) from the areas controlled by Jordan (East Jerusalem). The Arab countries accused Israel of violating the status of Jerusalem and of constituting a threat to the Christian and Muslim communities in the city. They now expressed a willingness in principle to accept the internationalization of the whole of Jerusalem, the same key element in Resolution 181 (II), which they had previously rejected. A good deal in this new Arab position was purely tactical.

Israel countered by pointing out that it was the Arab member states that had opposed Resolution 181 (II) and thus the initial proposal for the internationalization of Jerusalem. Developments since then had led Israel to take a more 'realistic approach' to the issue, after which the Jewish areas of Jerusalem had been incorporated into the State of Israel. The key was the holy sites, and here Israel indicated its willingness to accept international protection and control, including with regard to holy places outside Jerusalem such as Nazareth, but only as part of a comprehensive peace agreement.

The issues of refugees and borders

The first Arab-Israeli war had led to the displacement of 700-750,000 Arab men, women and children, who had fled or been expelled from their homes in what was to become the State of Israel. This vast displacement forms the basis of the Arab perception of the war as the 'catastrophe' (an-Nakba), while the Israelis characterize it as the Revolutionary War or the War of Independence. The Arab representatives argued that it would be wrong to admit Israel as a member of the UN until the country had at least accepted the principle of the right of return of the refugees to the places from which they had been displaced. Meanwhile, Israel seemed to move in the opposite direction by expropriating Arab land and property and moving Jewish immigrants into territories previously populated by Arabs.

For Israel the refugee issue was a direct consequence of the Arab war against itself. Because the problem's particular origins, it would be difficult to accept a solution without a lasting peace and without the establishment of normal peaceful contacts between the countries involved. The question of how many of the Arab refugees were willing and able to return would have to be included in the peace negotiations, as would the issue of the final demarcation of the borders between the affected countries. Basically, the Israeli message was that it would not rule out receiving 'a limited number of Arab refugees', but that the vast majority of the Palestinian refugees had to be resettled 'in Arab states'.

With regard to the final demarcation of Israel's borders, the discussion was dominated by the fact that the new State of Israel also included parts of the former British mandate which in the Partition Plan had been designated parts of the envisaged Arab state. To accept this as a *fait accompli* as a result of the war constituted – as Charles Malik of Lebanon put it – a 'blank cheque' for Israel to define its borders as it saw fit. It would mean that the United Nations had accepted 'the right of conquest'.

The Israeli view of the border issue was that reality no longer reflected the Partition Plan of 1947, which at the time had been rejected by the Arab side. Therefore, it would be necessary to adapt the borders (the key word was 'adjustment'), and the natural starting point for this would be the ceasefire lines of early 1949, not the lines in the Partition Plan. In the end, the final borders obviously had to be negotiated directly between the governments concerned.

The assassination of Folke Bernadotte

The Arab representatives underlined – as was well documented at the time – that it was a Zionist group that had killed UN peace mediator Folke Bernadotte and the French colonel André Serot, who was with him in the car when the murder took place. They also stressed that Israel had not taken any serious steps to investigate the murder or to prosecute the perpetrators.

Israel stated that it had prepared a report to the Security Council on the matter and described the murder as a 'despicable political assassination'. It was recognized that there were armed Jewish groups operating in 'open defiance of the authority of the Israeli government', and the latter regretted that the authorities had not yet been able to identify the culprits. However, this was not an issue that had any relevance to the issue of Israel's UN membership.

Altogether the discussions in the *ad hoc* Committee clearly demonstrated that the parties – Israel on one side and the Arab countries on the other (no-

tably Egypt, Lebanon, Syria and Iraq were active in the debate) – were very far apart on these issues.

The core question was whether such political disagreements should determine the position of other member states on the issue of Israeli membership of the United Nations. A number of countries argued for the 'principle of universality', on the basis of which all countries would be understood to fulfil the formal requirements of Article 4, 1 of the Charter, thus enabling all countries to join the United Nations in order for the organization to be a truly global and universal organization. This was, of course, not yet the situation in 1949, where the losing side in World War II was still blackballed from membership.¹⁸

The narrowest argument for Israeli membership was the American position: the question of peace between Israel and its neighbours was a separate political issue. What the UN General Assembly had to decide was whether Israel was living up to the requirements of the UN Charter. This question had been considered by the Security Council and decided positively, and on this basis Israel should become a member of the United Nations.

The vote in the *ad hoc* Committee took place on 9 May. Lebanon's proposal for a stay of proceedings was rejected by 25 votes against, with 19 in favour (including Denmark) and 12 abstentions. The proposed admittance of Israel as a member of the United Nations was then adopted by the Committee with 33 votes in favour, 11 against and 13 abstentions (including Denmark). Siam (Thailand) was absent.

The draft resolution – eventually Resolution 273 (III) – was then submitted to the Plenary of the General Assembly, where it was adopted on May 11, 1949, with 37 votes in favour, 12 against and 9 abstentions. Apart from Denmark, the United Kingdom, Belgium, Brazil, El Salvador, Greece, Siam and Sweden also abstained.

Following adoption of the Resolution, Israel took its seat in the Assembly Hall – placed in alphabetical order between Iraq and Lebanon. Israel's foreign minister Sharett thanked the other members for their decision. Israel would reach out to all peace-loving nations, including neighbouring Arab countries. There were no problems that could not be resolved by negotiations, as had already been indicated by the recently signed ceasefire agreements with Israel's neighbours. However, Sharett also stressed that the situation was different from what it had been when the Partition Plan was adopted in November 1947. There were 'new realities' to be faced, but the parties should be able to agree on these as well. For Israel's UN ambassador, Abba Eban, this was the day on which the status of the Jewish people in history was changed irreversibly.¹⁹

The Danish abstention

How did Denmark see the question of Israeli membership of the United Nations?

Denmark had voted in favour of the UN Partition Plan in November 1947, providing one of the critical votes that were meant to enable the creation of the State of Israel, alongside an Arab state in the former British mandate of Palestine. One and a half years later, in May 1949, Denmark abstained on the question of Israeli membership of the UN. How did that come about? And what were the political considerations behind the vote?

The world was not an easy place when Federspiel was appointed to the Palestine Commission in December 1947. And it didn't become any easier during 1948: the Cold War became colder, as witnessed by the communist coup in Czechoslovakia in February and the crisis in Berlin and the American airlift in 1948-49. For Denmark this translated into the Easter crisis of March 1948, caused by rumours of a Soviet offensive against Denmark, the ensuing discussions of a Scandinavian defence union in 1948-49 and eventually membership of the North Atlantic Alliance in April 1949, together with Norway, but without Sweden.

As noted earlier, Denmark's UN policy at the time was cautious and seeking not to draw any attention to itself or to alienate any of the major global players. How to translate this overriding concern into day-to-day policy positions was decided consensually by the members on the Danish delegation to the UN General Assembly. When it came to Israeli membership, the key decision-makers were foreign minister Gustav Rasmussen and Per Federspiel.

Gustav Rasmussen had a background in the conservative student movement and after graduation had joined the foreign service as a career diplomat. His diplomatic career had peaked during the war, when he served in London as deputy representative of 'free Denmark' and developed close contacts with the Danish exile community, not least Wilhelm Christmas-Møller, who became foreign minister in the short-lived Liberation Government right after the war. It was Christmas-Møller who identified Rasmussen as his potential successor in the Liberal government of 1945-47, as the Liberal party did not have a strong candidate of its own as foreign minister. Rasmussen continued in the same position in the Labour government of 1947-50.

Per Federspiel had received part of his education in the United Kingdom and was a prominent corporate lawyer with a strong international profile. During the war he had been among the political leaders of the Danish resist-

ance and, unlike Rasmussen Federspiel, became a politician and served as Member of Parliament from 1947-50 and again from 1957-73.²⁰

In many ways, and not only as former colleagues in government, the two were political equals, and Rasmussen clearly accepted Federspiel's expertise as former member of the Palestine Commission. Members of the Liberal Party were in general not very sympathetic towards Gustav Rasmussen, who was perceived as having contributed to the fall of their Prime Minister Knud Kristensen on the Schleswig issue and whose change of heart – and government – in November 1947 was not easily forgiven. There is no evidence, however, to suggest that this had an impact on the collaboration between Rasmussen and Federspiel in relation to Israel's application for UN membership.²¹

How the collaboration between the two played out and what impacted their analysis and prompted the Danish abstention in the General Assembly can be extracted from Federspiel's statements to the *ad hoc* Committee and documents available in the Foreign Ministry archives.²²

The topic of Israeli membership of the United Nations was from the very beginning seen as a highly complicated political issue. When it reached the General Assembly in early May 1949, Denmark therefore supported a Pakistani proposal to have a thorough and full discussion in an *ad hoc* Committee before a decision was taken. Other UN members argued that – as in previous votes on the membership for candidate countries like Sweden and Iceland – the recommendation of the Security Council should go straight to a vote in the General Assembly. This was not a position supported by Denmark. In a memo to the prime minister in late April, Gustav Rasmussen stated that the issue of Israel's admission was something special, as this was the first time the UN had had to deal with the admission of a member state confronted with 'opposition from neighbouring states'. Nor was he oblivious to the fact that discussions in the Committee 'could help to shed light on a number of points where it would be important to get clarification'. He specifically mentioned the main issues referred to above: the status of Jerusalem, the refugee question and the assassination of Folke Bernadotte.²³

Rasmussen made the same points in the Foreign Policy Committee of Parliament on May 11, 1949, when he explained the Danish position: Denmark had wanted the issue considered by a Committee 'as there was no consensus on whether Israel was ready for admission. The question of Jerusalem was still not resolved; the same applied to the problem of the Arab refugees. In addition to this, Count Bernadotte's killers had not been found – a point the Swedes strongly emphasize'.²⁴

During the debate in the UN *ad hoc* Committee, Federspiel stressed that Denmark was in favour of universality, and that any decision on membership had to be based on Article 4 of the Charter. At the same time, Denmark did not support a narrow or reductionist argument as inherent in the American position. From the Danish point of view, Israel's admission to the UN was in essence a political issue related to the other problems in the Arab-Israeli conflict.²⁵

This obviously led to a consideration of potential political trade-offs by linking the issue of Israeli membership to other relevant political issues. That was the reason why Denmark – together with the Arab members and only a few other Western members – voted in favour of the Lebanese proposal to postpone a decision on Israeli membership until the fourth General Assembly in the autumn of 1949. This would make it possible to make Israel's UN membership an element in the planned comprehensive discussion of Middle East issues.

On the *refugee question*, Federspiel's main point was made in a discussion with Abba Eban in the Committee on May 6. Federspiel asked Eban straight out whether Israel would comply with Resolution 194 (III), paragraph 11, which as previously referred to, gave the right of return to those Arab refugees who wanted to return. Eban first tried to evade the question: it was a complex issue, which would only become relevant after a peace agreement, as well as in light of the available practical options to deal with possible returnees. A return to Israel was only one of the available options.

Federspiel underlined that, in the way it was formulated, Resolution 194 defined Arab refugees as individuals with an individual right of return. He therefore did not understand why Eban now said that this issue should be the subject of negotiations between Israel and neighbouring Arab countries. And if it was not a question of individual rights, was the position then in conformity with Article 1, 2 of the Charter, which referred to the principle of equal rights and self-determination? Eban, who was usually not short of words – his concluding statement to the Committee took two and a half hours to deliver – asked for time to consider this last point. Next day he came back with the clear position that Article 1, 2 referred to peoples and nations, not to individuals. Eban again stressed that the solution to the refugee problem had to be found in a broader context, including the resettlement of Arab refugees in all countries in the Middle East.

In his main statement in the *ad hoc* Committee on May 9, Federspiel pointed out that a clarification of how Israel would deal with the issue of the future resettlement and rehabilitation of the Arab refugees was essential in

assessing Israel as a peace-loving state. Here, he said, the Committee was not fully satisfied with the Israeli response.

The Danish position was that it would not necessarily be the best solution for all the refugees to return home. But this should not prevent Israel from accepting the *principle* that individual human rights, including the right of return, also applied to the Arab refugees. The key point was to acknowledge the legal status of the refugees and Israel's legal obligation to compensate those who had lost their land and property.

Federspiel emphasized that the issue of *Jerusalem* was of 'universal spiritual interest' and that it therefore transcended what the parties (i.e. Israel and Jordan, who were currently dividing the city) could decide upon. There were Christian interests in the city, which also had to be taken into account in relation to the future status of Jerusalem.

With respect to *the assassination of Bernadotte*, it appears from the minutes that Denmark had explicitly worked to make this a centrepiece of the committee's discussion; during the debate, Denmark was thus directly credited for this initiative.

Federspiel made it clear that Israel's recent statement to the Security Council on the issue had not convinced member states that there had been a thorough investigation. The same position was stated by Sweden and Norway, and it should be kept in mind that Folke Bernadotte was a genuine hero in all of Scandinavia, not least due to his key role in the evacuation of Danish and Norwegian prisoners from German concentration camps in the final phase of the war (the white buses). His murder was therefore an event which governments and people all over Scandinavia genuinely abhorred.

In his closing argument, Federspiel turned the discussion of Article 4 almost 180 degrees. It was not just a matter of the individual country applying for membership. One should also expect that the UN itself should live up to the commitments under Article 4 and that the organization as such would seek to carefully weigh all relevant considerations. Denmark would at present neither vote for nor against the Israeli application for membership. From the Danish perspective, Israel should have waited until *after* the conclusion of peace negotiations before applying. Therefore its admission should be deferred until peace had been signed between Israel and its neighbours.

Against this background, Denmark would therefore vote in favour of the Lebanese proposal to postpone the decision, but with the clear understanding that it did not support the position that Resolution 181 (II) was still in force, as stated in the Lebanese draft resolution. Should the Lebanese

proposal be defeated (as it was), Denmark would abstain in the final vote on Israeli membership.²⁶

The Danish position, articulated in the deliberations of the *ad hoc* Committee, was clear: Denmark supported a postponement of the decision on Israel's membership of the UN in order to include the issue in a comprehensive political solution to the conflict. It had explicit concerns over voting in favour of Israel's admission in a situation where Israel would not recognize – not even in principle – that the Arab refugees had a right to return to the areas they had fled or been displaced from.

It has been said that this position was partly driven by commercial interests in relation to the Arab world. However, there is little evidence to suggest that these concerns had any significant weight in Danish decision-making in the spring of 1949. The Danish statements in the *ad hoc* Committee and the available government documents support the view that both Gustav Rasmussen and Per Federspiel clearly recognized the importance of addressing the refugee issue as a key to a political solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. In particular, they saw the need to keep all political elements in play in order to bring the conflictual relationship between Israel and its Arab neighbours closer to a solution. The Israeli application for membership of the UN was to be dealt with as one of these political elements and should be addressed within this broader political context.

Denmark abstained because it wanted to keep the question of Israeli membership open until it could be part of a broader political solution. UN membership was by no means the most important issue in this respect, but it was part of an overall balancing act.²⁷

In a broader political context, the Danish abstention in May 1949 was a deviation from the very cautious line that generally drove Denmark's almost invisible UN policy. Had it prevailed, Denmark would have joined the majority early on and would have remained fairly quiet – like Norway; the Swedish abstention was primarily driven by the murder of Bernadotte. As things played out, Federspiel was vocal and open in challenging his Israeli counterpart, especially on the issue of refugees. There is no doubt that Federspiel's familiarity with the Palestinian question and his legal approach to the issues of the return and compensation of refugees were important factors behind the position taken, but he did not act alone – his positions were closely coordinated with his foreign minister.

Denmark's vote on the admission of Israel to the United Nations was not among the major foreign policy challenges of the day, not by a long way. Even on the day of the vote, 11 May 1949, the Foreign Policy Committee of

Parliament, meeting at 2 p.m., was more preoccupied with NATO accession and even with the position of the United Nations vis-à-vis Franco's Spain. But it was important as a sign of the potential inherent in a more activist policy, where the contents of the issues were as important as the tactical voting considerations.²⁸

After May 1949, however, the Arab-Israeli conflict faded from Danish foreign policy discussions, only to reappear in the context of the Suez crisis of 1956. The Social Democrats developed close political ties with the Israeli Labor Party during the 1950s and early 1960s, and the kibbutz movement was seen by many leftists as a successful and progressive socialist experiment. It took the Six Day War of June 1967, another armed conflict that reshaped the map of the former British mandate, to bring the Arab-Israeli conflict back into Danish political discourse.

Notes

- 1 Carsten Staur is Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Denmark to the United Nations in Geneva. Among his previous positions he also served as Danish ambassador to Israel from 1996-98. The article is written in his personal capacity and does not reflect official positions.
- 2 The countries which changed their positions before the final vote and voted in favour in the General Assembly were Haiti, Liberia, the Philippines and Ethiopia. Judis (2014): 279; Sachar (1996): 292.
- 3 Olesen 2005: 38; Hansen (2000): 57; Arnheim (2011): 115; Tamm (2005): 201. On the Danish deliberations, see summary of the meeting of the Foreign Policy Committee of Parliament (*Udenrigspolitisk Nævn*) on 12 December 1947 (Files of the Foreign Ministry, 119.K.2.a).
- 4 The five countries represented in the Committee were Bolivia, Czechoslovakia (chair), Denmark, Panama and the Philippines. Federspiel's mandate as formulated by the MFA on 27 January 1948. On the attitude of the private sector, see the Note of 23 January 1948 and letter from AP Møller to trade minister J O Krag on 26 January 1948 and similar letters to prime minister Hedtoft. With regard to the Chairmanship of the Committee, foreign minister Gustav Rasmussen noted the concerns directly in the Foreign Policy Committee of Parliament on 19 December 1947, as this "would give us a greater responsibility than membership alone"; MFA file 119.K.2.a. Author's translation from Danish.
- 5 United Nations Palestine Commission, "First Monthly Progress Report to the Security Council", 29 January 1948 (UN document: A/AC.21/7). This document and others referred to later are available on UNISPAL Document Collection: www.unispal.un.org. Austin's statement: S/PV.271 of 19 March 1948 (unispal.un.org). Arnheim (2011): 126. On the Security Council meeting on 24 February 1948: Judis (2014): 289-91.
- 6 Federspiel's concluding report (no. 6) of 19 May 1948, MFA Files 119.K.2.a.
- 7 Marton (1994).

- 8 A/RES/194 (III) of 11 December 1948 (unispal.un.org).
- 9 UN Conciliation Commission for Palestine, Second Progress Report, A/838 of 19 April 1949 (unispal.un.org).
- 10 Arnheim (2011): 197, 204, 212, 222; Hansen (2000): 75.
- 11 Lidegaard (1996): 362.
- 12 Report to Parliament (*Beretning til Rigsdagen*) on the 4th UN General Assembly in New York, 20 September – 10 December 1949, MFA Files (119.H.3/49/Bilag). On the additional Soviet votes: Plokhly (2010): 184, 289.
- 13 Federspiel to Rasmussen, 13 March 1948; Rasmussen to Federspiel, 20 March 1948, MFA files 119.K.2.a.
- 14 S/PV.385 and S/PV.386 of 17 December 1948 (unispal.un.org).
- 15 On the Truman Administration and Israel: Judis (2014). On the Soviet Union: Sachar (1996): 286.
- 16 S/PV.414 of 4 March 1949 and the Resolution of the Security Council in S/RES/69 (1949) (unispal.un.org). Siniver (2015): 108.
- 17 The proceedings of the Committee as reflected in A/AC.24/SR.45-48, 50, 51 (unispal.un.org).
- 18 Although the UN in 1955 finally admitted the sixteen countries which had been queuing for membership for several years – and after that Japan in 1956 – the organization was still not universal. The People's Republic of China only became a member in 1971, the two Germany's only in 1973 and the two Koreas in 1991. Kosovo and Palestine are still not members.
- 19 A/PV.207 of 11 May 1949 (unispal.un.org). Siniver 2015: 111.
- 20 On Federspiel: Tamm (2005).
- 21 Like the Liberal Party in 1945, the Labour Party in 1947 did not have a clearly designated foreign minister. The historian Tage Kaarsted has indicated that prime minister Hedtoft had expected Gustav Rasmussen to turn down his offer to continue as foreign minister and had then planned to call on the permanent secretary of the MFA, Frants Hvass. Rasmussen, however, accepted; see Kaarsted (1972): 390.
- 22 MFA files, primarily in file no. 119.H.3/1948-49 (*Beretning til Rigsdagen om 3. plenarforsamling 1 og 2. del*).
- 23 Note to the Prime Minister's Office on 22 April 1949, MFA files 119.E.28.
- 24 Summary of the meeting of the Foreign Policy Committee of Parliament on 11 May 1949, MFA file 1949.I.14. There was very little debate on this issue.
- 25 Article 4 of the UN Charter: Membership of the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving states which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations.
- 26 A/AC.24/SR 51 (unispal.un.org).
- 27 Arnheim (2011): 228, 241; Olesen (2005): 38.
- 28 *Referat af det udenrigspolitiske nævns møde onsdag den 11. maj 1949*, MFA Files 1949.I.14.

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Speech on Anti Radicalisation, Washington, D.C., 19 February 2015

Martin Lidegaard, Minister for Foreign Affairs

Let me express my own and my fellow Danes' deep gratitude for the outpouring of support from all over the world following the terror attacks this past weekend in Copenhagen. It is heart-warming and deeply appreciated by all of us. Thank You!

That shows that we are not alone in our grief and we are not alone in our response.

In Copenhagen two men were ruthlessly killed and five policemen wounded defending free speech and religious tolerance. In the atrocious attacks last month in Paris, many innocent people were killed or wounded for standing up in defence of those same values. In Africa, in the Middle East we have almost on a daily basis seen horrific acts of cruelty.

However horrific those acts are, it is vital that our reaction lives up to the very values we are defending. This is a challenge we should not underestimate. For it is difficult for modern man and modern society to deal with merciless cruelty of the Dark Ages by persons devoid of reason and compassion. But we must. Our response must be based on trust, not mistrust. We should react, but not overreact.

A 'one size fits all' mind-set on our part may lead us to wrong assumptions and risk alienating large groups in our own societies and abroad, amplifying the problem. There is no universal remedy and no one-stop solution.

Though the DNA of their backward thinking and actions are bound to lead to failure in the long run, much harm is done in the meantime. We must use the instruments that fit the challenge we face. Sometimes – fortunately very rarely – this means resorting to military means, as many of us,

including Denmark, have done in addressing the threat from ISIL in Iraq.

It is, however, clear that violent extremism must be approached from a holistic point of view and with a broad arsenal of tools, at home and abroad. We need to focus on how we can prevent persons from turning into terrorists in the first place. And how we can get them back on the right path once they have been drawn into a mind-set of violent extremism.

It is, however, obvious that when a cruel ideology and the intent to kill are combined with the capacity to handle and use weapons, you are faced with an imminent threat. This is why we need to address gangs and social marginalisation in all our countries. This is also why we need to address effectively the phenomenon of foreign terrorist fighters.

This is truly an area where we need to do more collectively and urgently. And I would like to use this occasion to urge for even stronger international cooperation for addressing this challenge collectively.

I am honoured to be here today for a discussion of these immensely important topics just days after terror hit my home country. I look forward to hearing the input and advice from everyone. I am happy to announce that today my government is launching a number of initiatives aimed at countering violent extremism at home. To help further an action agenda on countering violent extremism Denmark would also like to offer to host a follow-up conference with a focus on preventive efforts and rehabilitation.

Thank you.

Opening Remarks at NB8 Meeting 'Balanced Russian Language Media', Copenhagen, 27 February 2015

Martin Lidegaard, Minister for Foreign Affairs

A great pleasure for me to open this NB8 and friends meeting entitled “Balanced Russian Language Media”. A privilege to welcome you here – both the NB8 and other close partners. In early autumn last year, we agreed amongst ourselves in the group of eight Nordic and Baltic States that this topic should be a “focus area” in 2015 during the Danish presidency. Look forward to your input today.

Today’s meeting is not about counterpropaganda, but about countering propaganda with objective information. And it is about providing an alternative to the current predominant Russian narrative.

The developments we have seen in Ukraine over the last year have confirmed once again that “The first victim of war is: Truth”. This is the case in Ukraine. We are seeing propaganda and misinformation as an active part of Russian foreign policy – and on a massive scale. According to one of the latest issues of the Economist, Russia Today claims to reach 700 million people worldwide, and 2.7 million hotel rooms. How can we compete with that? One thing is certain: If we remain passive, we can be sure that Russia will dominate the media landscape.

Reaching Russian-speaking audiences with clear and objective facts and providing them with quality media content is a challenge. As chair of the Nordic-Baltic cooperation in 2015 I am very happy that we discuss Russian language media and our strategic communication. It is a complex challenge which we cannot solve alone. I am pleased that the Nordic-Baltic countries are not alone today but joined by partners who are also devising plans to address this issue.

We face two important challenges: Firstly, we need to strengthen the strategic communication from our countries and institutions. The letter on EU Strategic Communication sent from Estonia, Lithuania, UK and Denmark to High Representative Federica Mogherini in early January helped to get this work started within the EU institutions. The Latvian Presidency of the Council of the European Union and others are also helping to push this work forward. I was very satisfied with the Council Conclusions on 29 January. It is important to follow up now, through a dedicated communications team working together across EU institutions.

Secondly, we must strengthen the independence of, and the access to, Russian language media in our own region. We are witnessing a situation where many Russian-speakers in a number of countries – in the EU and in the Eastern neighborhood as well as within Russia – seem to rely on information coming out of basically one single source. Partly because of the lack of readily available and attractive alternatives.

This task lies within the professional free media environment. But what governments can do, without interfering with the free media and freedom of expression, is support the framework conditions for the media. The question is: How can this be done more specifically, and effectively?

Gathering you here in Copenhagen today is one of the many steps we need to take in order to ensure a coordinated approach. We wish to establish a dialogue between our countries and a common understanding of the different initiatives.

When we place Russian language media on the NB8 agenda, we also extend a broad invitation to cooperate and coordinate with us. We started out with a workshop in Riga a month ago gathering media professionals from most of your countries. Their input forms a basis for your discussions today amongst government officials. The conclusions of your discussions today will allow me and colleagues to move forward at the political level when discussions continue within the NB8, the EU, the Nordic Council of Ministers and NATO.

As I hinted at in the beginning, a balanced Russian language media landscape is the main theme of today, and indeed the long term end state that we are trying to achieve. Free information must flow, and all voices must be able to speak freely.

Thank you for being here in Copenhagen today.

Statement by the Government of Denmark at the 28th Session of the United Nations Human Rights Council, Geneva, 3 March 2015

Delivered by, Martin Lidegaard, Minister for Foreign Affairs

(Check against delivery)

Mr. President,
High Commissioner,
Excellencies,
Ladies and Gentlemen,

When the meaningless brutality of terrorism strikes, our values are tested. We feel outraged, bewildered, heartbroken and our first inclination is often to seek revenge, to find someone to direct our anger against. A fundamental difference between us and the terrorists, however, is that we do not let ourselves be guided by our most primitive instincts.

For a moment in January, we were all Charlie in solidarity with the victims of a horrific crime in Paris. A month later the world showed solidarity with the victims of a similar attack in Copenhagen.

In the same spirit, the many hours of hectic work that lie before this Council in the coming weeks must be done in solidarity with – and with a constant focus on – the victims of human rights violations all around the world.

Therefore, today, as I have the honour to address the Council as it starts its 28th session, I am not only Charlie. I am every individual being denied his or her human rights. I am the torture victim in Syrian detention. I am the girl abducted and abused by Boko Haram. I am the Christian woman who has lost her family to the killing frenzy of Daesh in Iraq. I am the child

in Gaza internally displaced by conflict. I am the Crimean Tatar persecuted by Russian authorities.

I am the civilian taking shelter from incoming artillery in Debaltsevo in Ukraine. I am the arbitrarily detained political activist in a Bahraini prison. I am the migrant worker in Qatar risking my life in hazardous working conditions. I am the LGBTI person waiting to be hanged to death in Iran. I am the South Sudanese boy, abducted and forced to fight in a very brutal civil war. I am the Somali girl who has fled my home in search for peace, only to be abused by men of war.

I am the stateless Rohingya being persecuted in Myanmar. I am the slave in the hellish political prison camps in North Korea. I am the civil war victim seeking truth and justice in Sri Lanka. I am the man on death row in Belarus.

I am the Jewish victim of extremist actions. I am the human rights activist who is beaten up for criticising my government. I am the young girl being denied the right to decide over my own body. I am the child who has no access to education. I am the immigrant who is not treated with human dignity.

And I look to the Human Rights Council to raise awareness of my case and request that my perpetrators are held accountable.

It is disheartening that I could have continued the list of victims on whom we need to focus our attention. To complete the list, I would have had to deny everyone else their right to speak. I believe many of us these days wake up with the feeling that the world – as eloquently put by the High Commissioner for Human Rights – is cart-wheeling into a future more uncertain and unpredictable than ever before.

The United Nations represents – for good or worse – our best chance to steer the unruly future into a better place for the world's growing population. And the UN Human Rights Council plays an increasingly vital role.

The Council is doing its job in a changing world where our usual understanding of a human rights violator is challenged as non-state actors become more and more dominant. For the victim, violation and abuse feels the same, whether the perpetrator is part of brutal regime or a murderous gang of terrorists.

The special session last year on Iraq in light of the abuses committed by the so-called Islamic State sent a strong and united message from the international community: no one involved in this conflict is beyond the rule of law and can run away from justice.

Boko Haram is another brutal and unscrupulous non-state actor that without explanation or clear goals murders and kidnaps innocent people.

They too should not go unchecked. These gross violations of international humanitarian law, human rights and human dignity must be stopped. And the perpetrators must be held responsible. The government of Nigeria must resume the full responsibility of protecting its citizens and, if needed, ask for international support to combat these terrorists.

Mr. President,

The Human Rights Council is often criticised for internal disagreements between members, but in my opinion, that criticism is based on the misunderstanding of the very concept of the Human Rights Council.

The strength of this Council is that its composition reflects the global political landscape and, hence, also global disagreements. It is from its composition that the Human Rights Council draws its credibility. It is the scene where the world come together to discuss the issues that are difficult for all of us. And it is the place where we find solutions together.

The 10-year Convention against Torture Initiative – the CTI – which my government launched last year together with the governments of Chile, Ghana, Indonesia and Morocco is designed precisely in this spirit of finding solutions together. Solutions, to promote universal ratification and a better implementation of the UN Convention against Torture. Solutions, to ensure the respect for the absolute prohibition of torture – one of the most fundamental rights of persons. Solutions, in fact, to ensure that government authorities do not misuse their power over individuals, in situations where the individual cannot just walk away.

Mr. President,

We seek strength and guidance in the values which unite us as human beings across the globe and which lie as a foundation of this Council. Instead of anarchy, intolerance and barbarism we insist – even in our darkest hour – on rule of law, mutual understanding and human compassion. We remind ourselves that the effect of terrorism solely depends on our reaction to it.

Our steadfast insistence on our fundamental values is our strongest weapon against terrorism. If we react with security measures infringing on the rule of law and the fundamental freedom of our citizens. Or with rhetoric generalizing and demonizing a minority among us. Or by curbing our freedom of expression in fear. Then the terrorists will have prevailed. It is our collective obligation to ensure that his will never happen.

Thank you, Mr. President

Vision of the Danish Government to Promote Sustainable Global Value Chains, Delivered at the High-level Conference ‘Promoting Sustainable Global Value Chains through Public-Private Dialogue’, Copenhagen, 10 March 2015

Mogens Jensen, Minister for Trade and Development Cooperation

Your Royal Highness, distinguished colleagues, esteemed business leaders and trusted partners. I am thrilled to be able to address this truly global group today.

No matter where I travel in the world one message resonates: developing countries are calling for increased trade, investments and technology to tackle the development challenges. They want growth and higher productivity. They want jobs. They want to put an end to poverty. Aid is not enough.

There is an increasing demand for solutions where not only government but also the private sector can play a crucial role. Companies can bring knowledge, technology, innovation, investment and a new mind set. Today, let's all keep an open mind as to how we as governments can cooperate with the private sector to create sustainable development in the world.

I believe it is possible to combine trade and development. And as minister for both areas, I'm working to generate new initiatives that enhance both development cooperation and trade – not least by engaging the private sector in delivering tangible results.

But ladies and gentlemen, these tangible results must depend on standards. Not least those that have to do with business integrity, human and labour rights and environmental protection. To create sustainable development, standards must be raised, respected and promoted. The Danish government is determined to fight for decent and sustainable working conditions. For me as a Social Democrat and former trade unionist it is in my political DNA.

Our conference today has a two-dimensional agenda: on the one hand, we have the need for compliance with international standards. On the other hand, the potential for creating shared value, meaning value for the company as well as for society. I am very well aware – and I respect – that private companies are in the game for profit. I am not here to change the logic of business.

But better business and better lives go hand in hand.

We will hear some examples from the business leaders and representatives speaking throughout the day [H&M, Anglo-American, Lego, Novo Nordisk]. Their enterprises are among the frontrunners internationally and showcase the win-win potential for shared value by making sustainability an integral part of business strategies. But they also acknowledge the huge challenges in becoming a sustainable enterprise. It is a long journey, but these companies have shown a way forward.

As a government, there are several ways in which we advance this agenda. I have recently launched an action plan with six initiatives to promote corporate social responsibility. Focus is to create more sustainable value chains in countries and across countries. Trade agreements, climate agreements, ILO conventions are all important setting general standards. But we need more. I believe this can be done by building strategic international partnerships and promoting social dialogue and environmental standards in the market.

To really have impact, we must team up. The European Union has a key role to play as the home market for more than 500 million consumers and a key market regulator.

I work to ensure that CSR and sustainability becomes systematically integrated in EU trade agreements and development cooperation.

It is all about pushing this agenda and inspiring more stakeholders – companies, business associations, labour, civil-society organisations and governments – to get on board as partners. I think the follow-up to the Rana Plaza tragedy has already shown what such partnerships can accomplish.

Let me highlight a couple of thorny issues that I would like you to discuss today:

First, when we talk about creating a level playing field for business, what do we actually mean? If we really want to raise social and environmental standards in producer countries, we must also be ready to integrate this area in our development assistance. Private sector and local governments can't do this job alone.

Second, how do we provide the right mix of incentive and regulation – carrot and stick – to ensure a real transformation of markets?

There is no single answer to this question, but we must work actively to make responsibility a market condition within a number of industries. We cannot just sit back and wait for it to happen by itself. And finally, how often do preconceived ideas about the nature of the public sector on the one side and business on the other prevent public-private dialogue in trade and development from working properly? How do we create the mutual trust which will allow us to move forward?

Taking my cue from this last question, let me mention a couple of examples of public-private partnerships which we are involved in that really work and allow us to set seriously ambitious targets.

The Danish government has established the Danish Climate Investment Fund as a new innovative public-private partnership. We have raised private climate financing through a public/private agreement with a total commitment of 230 million dollars. The government's funding is expected to be leveraged by a factor of 15 to 20. The Fund will for instance invest in wind and solar energy, energy efficiency in Africa and in regions with development needs.

This public private partnership contributes to growth and employment in the developing countries, to combat climate change and provide a reasonable return on investments.

We have another platform for public-private dialogue that has succeeded in producing some quite innovative partnerships: the Global Green Growth Forum – 3GF – meeting regularly in Copenhagen. 3GF has provided the platform for an exciting new initiative within the garments and textile industry in Vietnam, which is called a Race to the Top. It involves some major American companies, IDH, IFC and ILO through Better Work, the Vietnamese government, Denmark and the Netherlands.

The essence of Race to the Top is to handle the challenge of responsible business in the industry. The industry is encouraged to modernize management and invest in machinery and infrastructure. This is expected to improve productivity but also to raise the social and environmental standards in this sector. Through this partnership we create more responsible value chains to the benefit of the companies and the worker.

I look forward to hearing many more examples of how we can integrate sustainability in trade and development through public-private cooperation and how we can find answers to some of the challenging questions we are facing.

Thank you all for coming to Denmark today. Thank you for taking part in the fusion of better lives and better business.

Let's race to the top together. Thank you.

Speech at the Baltic Development Forum Conference on Energy Security, Copenhagen, 6 May 2015

Martin Lidegaard, Minister for Foreign Affairs

(Check against delivery)

Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen, colleagues, dear Lene Espersen,

I am delighted you could be here today, and I would like to warmly welcome you all to the Energy Dialogue in the Baltic Sea Region. I'm also happy that it coincides with a meeting I'm hosting for my Nordic and Baltic colleagues and that my Latvian colleague could participate today in this important regional dialogue. In this context, I would like to extend a special thanks to the Latvian EU Presidency for placing the Energy Union and energy security high on the agenda this spring. Furthermore, I am very pleased to welcome the Danish Minister for Climate, Energy and Building, Rasmus Helveg Petersen, who will provide us with some valuable perspectives on the regional energy market during the first panel discussion.

This conference is a partnership between the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Baltic Development Forum. Our aim today is to create a platform for government representatives, the private sector and regional organisations to discuss the challenges related to regional energy security as well as possible solutions.

The global energy landscape is changing fast: importers are becoming exporters; new technologies emerge; global energy demand and competition for resources are intensifying; and due to the conflict in Ukraine and turbulence in parts of the Middle East, energy security is now at the top of our agenda.

Therefore, my main messages for you today are: We must join forces to increase our energy security. We must increase cooperation with the private sector. And we must do it in a sustainable way. This will improve our security, our climate and our competitiveness. First of all, we must improve our regional energy cooperation and interconnectivity. Because, despite all the achievements in strengthening our infrastructure and diversifying supplies, our current energy policies remain unsustainable:

- Our energy system is ageing and fragmented.
- We are over-dependent on imported fossil fuels.
- And still too much energy is wasted every day.

The way ahead is a well-functioning, cross-border energy market with diversified supplies and solidarity in times of crisis. A well-connected energy market is the only realistic tool to maintain a healthy and competitive energy sector in the future.

A recent study by the Commission confirms this. The study estimates the net economic benefits from completion of the internal market to be up to 40 billion Euros per year. This corresponds to about 10 per cent of the EU's external energy bill in 2013.

We should, however, not stop there, but also take the internal energy market to the next level by developing a new, flexible market design. Together with enhanced regional cooperation, this will contribute to increased security of supply as well as improved integration of renewable energy sources.

The political challenges over the last year have shown that diversification of energy sources, suppliers and routes is crucial for our security. This is an issue that concerns every member state, even if some are more vulnerable than others. For the same reason, Denmark and Poland are cooperating on a feasibility study of the so-called Baltic Pipe to clarify the perspectives for a possible integrated Nordic-Baltic gas market. We are looking forward to sharing the results with you in 2016.

This leads me to my second point today: we must continue to engage the private sector. Cooperation with private businesses is absolutely critical for turning words into deeds. Therefore, I welcome all the business representatives here today.

On one hand, the public sector must provide certainty and incentives for businesses and institutional investors. On the other hand, the private sector must ensure the required innovation and sometimes be willing to take risks in new markets.

The recent financial crisis has shifted the focus towards wise, long-term investments. And European businesses have already contributed much to making Europe one of the most energy-efficient regions in the world. Because it's good business.

To put it bluntly, future growth must be driven with less energy and lower costs. To achieve this, we need to fundamentally rethink energy efficiency and treat it as an energy source in its own right. This will provide a solid foundation for a competitive and sustainable economy that is designed to last.

My third message today is that we still need to remind ourselves that green transition goes hand in hand with economic progress. The Danish case shows that.

For the very same reason, the Energy Union is the right initiative at the right time. It constitutes a unique opportunity to break with EU's historic – and very expensive – dependence on imported fossil fuels, promote the transition to a low-carbon economy and improve the interconnectivity between member states.

However, if the project is to succeed, everyone must do their part. We all need to take responsibility and show effective action and we need to do it now! It will affect us all – but the less integrated regions such as the Baltics more than most.

In the global energy transformation, it is no longer an option for any stakeholders to act in isolation. The Energy Dialogue in the Baltic Sea Region brings together governments, private businesses and regional organisations to explore solutions that can enhance our access to secure, competitive and sustainable energy in the future.

This region already cooperates a lot. But we can and should do more. I look forward to your input on how we can extend our already close cooperation in the Baltic Sea Region.

Thank you.

Speech at the Financing for Development Conference, Addis Ababa, 13 July 2015

Kristian Jensen, Minister for Foreign Affairs

(Check against delivery)

Ladies and Gentlemen, Excellencies,

Let me first thank the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia for hosting this important conference. It is an honour to be here as the new Danish Foreign Minister.

In 1949, the American President Harry Truman said in his inaugural address: ‘More than half the people in the world are living in conditions approaching misery. For the first time in history, humanity possesses the knowledge and skill to relieve the suffering of those people’. The agenda of this conference contains the elements to make this dream come true.

The Millennium Development Goals have taken us far: one billion people have been lifted out of extreme poverty. More girls attend school than ever before. And under-five child mortality has been reduced by 50 percent.

Let us celebrate this success. And let us share the success – because the good results have been achieved through our shared efforts. We have proved that progress is possible when we set concrete and measurable goals – and make the investments and the political choices necessary to reach them. The success of the past gives us good reason to be optimists with regard to the future.

Development cooperation has played an important role in our shared success – and will continue to do so, especially for the poorest countries in the world. Denmark is committed to the UN target of providing 0.7 pct. of Gross National Income to official development assistance. Denmark has met

this target since 1978, and we will continue to do so in the years to come as we pursue the eradication of extreme poverty. I strongly urge others to follow suit!

Public funds for development have been crucial. But the success of the Millennium Development Goals is also – in large part – due to better conditions for trade, for investment and for private entrepreneurship. Allowing and encouraging the powerful forces of the market economy in the service of sustainable development. We should learn from what has worked and what hasn't. As an old economist once said: 'Peace, easy taxes and a tolerable administration of justice' are required to carry a state 'to the highest degree of opulence'.

Openness to trade, investment and the market economy will allow people to build a future in their own countries. Trade is the foundation of stable and prosperous societies. It also carries the biggest potential for reducing poverty. And Africa is still cruelly punished by high transaction costs, tariffs and barriers to trade.

I have three key messages at this conference:

Firstly, Denmark strongly emphasises the need to mobilise the private sector.

The Sustainable Development Goals carry a multi-trillion-dollar price tag – far beyond the scope of aid. The money in the private sector is there – and it is needed. But this is not only about money. We need to bring the resources, the technology and the know-how of the private sector to work on the challenges and opportunities of the post-2015 agenda.

Already today, private capital flows are by far the largest source of capital for developing countries. This trend should be strengthened, and we should have the clear goal that all developing countries can profit from it by making sure that the right enabling environment is in place.

Today, the Danish government together with some of the largest Danish pension funds and the Danish Investment Fund for Developing Countries (IFU) will join the Sustainable Development Investment Partnership (SDIP), which has been initiated by the World Economic Forum and the OECD. Our goal is that this global public-private partnership will catalyse investments in key sectors, including infrastructure, in developing countries and emerging markets.

Why have we joined? Because we know it works. Just recently, Denmark established the Danish Climate Investment Fund – an innovative public-private partnership. This fund has already contributed to significant invest-

ments in Africa and other developing regions in wind and solar energy and in energy efficiency. The total climate investments initiated by this fund are expected to be around 1.5-2.0 billion USD – from an initial public investment of less than 100 million USD. It works!

Secondly, for most countries, national resources are the largest sources of development financing.

They are also the basis of a successful social contract. Between governments and their people. Today I will focus on sound tax policies, competent tax administrations and efficient tax collection.

The Danish government pledges to increase Denmark's support to strengthened tax systems in developing countries, including the fight against illicit financial flows. The main purpose of our new contribution is to strengthen the voice of developing countries in international tax matters. The contribution will be additional to the almost half a billion kroner that we currently contribute to tax and development activities in Danish partner countries.

Also, Denmark – together with Belgium, the Netherlands, Poland and Sweden – has stopped asking for tax exemptions on goods and services that we provide as part of ODA projects. We are paying our taxes where they are due.

Tax is an important tool to secure more domestic resources and opportunities for all. But taxation cannot solve all problems. Strengthened tax systems should focus on generating resources and creating incentives – not on hindering investments and job creation. For instance, it would be detrimental to everybody – not least the developing countries – if we were to impose a global tax on financial transactions. It would only add to the costs of investing in fragile economies.

My third and final point is that Official Development Assistance should be targeted even more towards the poorest countries.

I am proud that the EU countries in May agreed on a fast track deadline for the fulfilment of the Istanbul-commitment – to dedicate collectively 0.15 to 0.20% of Gross National Income to least developed countries in the short term. This is a new commitment. We have to give the poorest countries in the world the means to participate and take advantage of all the opportunities that globalization can offer.

We live in a small world, and it is getting smaller and smaller thanks to trade and investment across borders. And we have good reason for optimism.

Especially when we realize that the success and wealth of our neighbour is the foundation of our own success and wealth.

So let's share!

Let's share our markets for the common good of our people

Let's share a pledge to invest and take the political decisions needed for the private sector to do the same.

Let's share a commitment that all countries, especially the poorest, will take advantage of globalization.

Let's share a commitment to new concrete and ambitious development goals.

And let's share the dream of a world without poverty and make that dream a reality.

Speech at the Opening of the UN's General Assembly, 28 September 2015

Lars Løkke Rasmussen, Prime Minister

(Check against delivery)

Mr. President, Mr. Secretary-General, Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,

70 years ago this organization was born in the chaos and ruins of the Second World War. It was born with the hope and vision that the future would be better and more peaceful than the past.

Small and large countries signed the UN Charter. My own country as signatory number 50. It was a commitment to solve common problems through cooperation and dialogue.

How is the world today compared to the one of our grandparents?

Lots of progress have been made.

We live in a world that is wealthier. Millions have been lifted out of poverty. There is a dramatic increase in children—and in particular girls—attending schools. We continue to witness horrible conflicts in many parts of the world, but the number and magnitude of armed conflicts between states have decreased. And our fight against deadly diseases has saved millions.

This is one side of the coin.

We also live in a changing world. Conflicts remain the biggest threat to human development. The number of refugees and displaced persons is growing at alarming speed. Violent extremism is spreading. Human rights are violated. Our planet is under stress due to scarce resources and climate change.

This is the other side of the coin.

The world is complex. As it has always been. There are no simple solutions. There never was. We need to engage actively and cooperate closely to

address the challenges. Today as we did 70 years ago.

From my perspective, there are three overshadowing priorities for the UN in the coming years.

First, peace and security.

As for many others in my generation, my political view of the world was shaped by 1989. The Wall came down. The Iron Curtain disappeared.

Today the world again faces a situation where cooperation and dialogue is all too often replaced by force and violence.

We must ensure that the UN can effectively provide security in the face of ever more complex crises and threats.

In Ukraine, we have seen completely unacceptable violations of international law and principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity.

In Syria, civilians suffer from horrific abuses. Committed by the terror organisation ISIL. And by the Assad regime.

The Danish Government continues to support efforts for a political solution to the conflict. And we are proud to be a member of the International Coalition against ISIL.

We need a strong and unified response to violent extremism and terrorism.

Not just in Syria and Iraq, but also in parts of Africa, where violent extremism and armed conflicts are growing.

Denmark will do its part. We plan to increase our contribution to the UN operation in Mali – MINUSMA.

A very visible consequence of all these conflicts is the massive refugee and migration flows. Almost 60 million people are fleeing their homes.

We have an international responsibility to provide the necessary protection for refugees. Many of these people have no food. No medicine. No schools for their children. They need our support.

Denmark takes this responsibility very seriously. Last year, we were the 2nd largest recipient of Syrian refugees per capita in the EU.

I also welcome the initiative of the Secretary-General to strengthen UN peace operations. But we need more than blue helmets to ensure lasting peace.

We need a UN Security Council that is ready to take the necessary decisions to maintain international peace and security. A Security Council that can effectively address conflicts in a timely manner. And that reflects the world as it is today.

The international community must have the right instruments to adequately address the situation, and we must keep an open mind when we evaluate our instruments at hand.

Many people migrate for economic reasons. In search of a better life. Their hopes are understandable. But mass migration is obviously an immense challenge for our societies. For our international cooperation and our solidarity.

First and foremost, mass migration is a global challenge. We must address the root causes.

People migrate because they have lost hope at home. Inclusive economic growth in developing countries should be our common goal. There are no easy solutions.

The UN is an important part of the answer. Member States have the primary responsibility for development and progress in their own countries. But we must all do our part and provide the necessary financial contributions to ensure that they succeed.

Denmark is ready to do its part, as we have been doing since 1978.

We will remain committed to the UN target of 0.7 percent target of development assistance. Denmark is widely recognized as a leading humanitarian donor. And we will continue to give this area high priority.

My government last week decided to allocate an additional 100 million Euros to humanitarian assistance and to measures that support the European efforts to address the mass migration from Syria and its neighborhood.

I am deeply concerned that the humanitarian needs far outgrow the available financing. I call on all states to increase their humanitarian efforts. The international community must find solutions to this extraordinary situation.

That leads me to the next priority. Human rights and gender equality.

The Charter says it very clearly: The equal and indispensable rights of all people are the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world.

The best way to build a better world is to unleash the power of the individual. For the sake of the common good.

Today, more people live in democracies than ever before. But many people's lives are still threatened because of who they are or what they believe.

Denmark has always pursued an active human rights policy. Based on dialogue as the key tool to progress.

My government is a strong advocate of women's rights. Women are key drivers to ensure sustainable development and to end poverty.

Denmark is honoured to host the Women Deliver conference in Copenhagen in May 2016. I hope that many of you will join us in Copenhagen.

Denmark is also engaged in the global fight against torture. We are proud to be part of the Convention Against Torture Initiative.

Our goal is universal ratification and better implementation of the Convention by 2024. We call on all states to join this goal.

Let me put it very clearly: Denmark is entirely committed to upholding the core values of the United Nations.

That is why Denmark has decided to run for a seat in the UN Human Rights Council in the period from 2019 to 2021. Our candidacy enjoys the support of all the Nordic countries. I hope all of you here today will find us worthy of your vote.

I can assure you: we will aspire to be a strong partner for all. To advance human rights and fundamental freedoms.

The third and final major challenge for the UN is to implement the development agenda and effectively address climate change.

This weekend, I had the privilege and honour to co-chair the Sustainable Development Summit. We adopted the new development agenda. Now we need to act. Through national policies. And by supporting those countries that need the help the most.

The Sustainable Development Goals carry a multi-trillion dollar price tag. It cannot be solved by governments or aid alone. We need the support of all actors: private enterprises, civil society, NGOs, international organisations and many others.

We must find new innovative ways of engaging these actors if we are serious about delivering on the development agenda.

That is particularly true when it comes to addressing climate change.

Let me give you an example.

Denmark has established a climate investment fund to promote private climate investments in developing countries and emerging markets.

Danish pension savings now contribute to financing the largest African wind farm in Lake Turkana, Kenya.

We need more solutions like this to deliver on the development agenda. And to reach an ambitious, binding climate agreement in Paris.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

The need for an effective UN has never been greater. If we fail to deal with the enormous tasks facing us, there is a risk that we will undermine the key values and principles of the UN Charter.

Throughout the UN's history, Denmark has been among the strongest supporters of our world organisation. That will not change.

I am honoured that a Dane has assumed the Presidency of the General Assembly.

My government is fully committed to support Mr. Lykketoft in his important work.

70 years ago our grandparents had a bold vision. They believed it was possible to create a better future for the peoples of the world. The achievements during the last 70 years have been remarkable.

This anniversary is an historic opportunity to set ambitious goals for the future. We have agreed on the new development agenda. Now we must act to show our grandchildren that we are able to deliver on our promises. Today. Tomorrow. And 70 years from now.

Thank you.

Speech at the Danish Chamber of Commerce in Beijing, 27 October 2015

Kristian Jensen, Minister for Foreign Affairs

(Check against delivery)

Dear chairman, distinguished guests – good morning and thank you very much for your warm welcome.

I have only been in Beijing for less than 48 hours but I am impressed with what I have seen and heard so far. It is a vibrant city – with life and activities everywhere. When reading about China in newspapers you sometimes get the impression that the economy has slowed down. But I certainly feel and know that there is a lot to come for.

25 October 2008, exactly 7 years ago, then Prime Minister of Denmark Mr. Anders Fogh Rasmussen signed – here in Beijing – the Danish-Chinese Strategic Partnership. A partnership originally focused on close and intense collaboration within areas like research, food, energy and environment. Today, 7 years later, the partnership has developed and strengthened further and now also encompasses areas like health, education, innovation, culture and anti-corruption.

The Chinese-Danish relationship is currently at an “all time high”. But despite having an “all time high” we, the Danish government, would like to further expand the Chinese-Danish relationship.

First, we would like to upgrade our strategic partnership. Currently we are preparing – in close dialogue with our Chinese counterparts – a thorough joint work programme on 57 specific areas of mutual interest. This work programme goes beyond what we see today. It focuses among other things

on cooperation at the local political level – regions and municipalities. And it has more value based areas like sustainability and trust.

Second is the addition from this summer of three new Growth Counsellors to our Embassy staff in Beijing. The Growth Counsellors will focus on specific sector cooperation in areas where Denmark has a special knowledge and unique know-how from how we have shaped our society. The Growth Counsellors will create awareness about Danish competencies, strengthen our dialogue on the governmental level and improve framework conditions for Danish business life within specific areas.

The Growth Counsellors in China will work within the areas of food and agriculture, environment and the maritime sector. Areas where Denmark certainly stands out and can contribute to the strategic development of China and our government to government dialogue.

Today, I am pleased to present to you our new Growth Counsellors who over the next three years will work on strategic sector cooperation between China and Denmark. The Growth Counsellors will present themselves shortly but please let me introduce them first.

Within food and agriculture Tilde Hellsten will work on a project with the overall aim of modernizing the Chinese farming industry with specific focus on food safety.

Mads Terkelsen will be working on environment with projects focusing on environmental issues related to preventing pollution of water, air and soil.

And finally, within the maritime sector Bjarke Wiehe Bøtcher will develop projects focusing on issues like greener, cleaner and safer shipbuilding and manufacturing of maritime equipment. He will also focus on maritime regulation and framework conditions for shipping as well as maritime infrastructure and connectivity of China's inland regions.

I believe that the strategic cooperation within these three sectors as well as the specific projects will be beneficial and create value for China, for the citizens of China, for Denmark and for you – for Danish business life in China. I and the government will fully support the work of the Growth Counsellors so they can create the best possible value.

With these words I would like to give the floor to the three Growth Counsellors. Once again thank you all for attending this breakfast meeting and to the Danish Chamber of Commerce in China for hosting this event.

Thank you.

Opening Statement at the German-Nordic-Baltic Forum arranged by DIIS and IEP*, Copenhagen, 19 November 2015

Kristian Jensen, Minister for Foreign Affairs

(Check against delivery)

Ladies and Gentlemen, organisers, thank you for inviting me to open this conference together with Minister Roth. In this time of horror and grief it is good to stand here side by side with a close friend and partner. We mourn with France. And we stand by France in our resolute fight against the inhumane terrorist organisation ISIL. Yesterday, we yet again saw how the brutal killing of civilians and civilian hostages, including a Norwegian, is part of how this barbaric organisation works. We will discuss how to step up this fight with our partners inside and outside the European Union.

Now to the topic of the day. 25 years ago I followed intensely as the Wall fell and the Baltic countries courageously fought to shake off decades of dictatorship and communism. After regaining freedom, the Nordic countries stood ready to help on the road to democracy, market economy and progress. We formed a strong bond and partnership among like-minded countries.

This bond is stronger than ever – and it is also more needed than ever. Today our societies and the European Union are under pressure. Internal and external pressure. Need to deal with Russia, the migration and refugee crisis, the still fragile economy – and holding the EU together.

To handle these challenges, we need more Nordic-Baltic cooperation. And we need even closer cooperation with like-minded countries like Germany. We do not agree on everything. But we agree on most and with our

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values and societal model we can influence the EU and the world when we work closely together.

A clear priority for us is security in our Eastern neighbourhood. Russia's behaviour has made many nervous and insecure. We stand by the Baltic countries – through NATO security, through economic cooperation and through increased cooperation to counter Russian propaganda. I am pleased that the Baltic Centre for Media Excellence opened in Riga last week – it is a necessary initiative.

The Eastern neighbours of the EU are a priority for us. Together we must reach out to them, support them and help them make the vital reforms. And we must clearly state that our Eastern neighbours have the right freely to choose their own future – notwithstanding the Russian pressure on the countries. That also means closer cooperation with and relations to the EU.

We also need to stand together to counter the internal pressures. I will not go into detail on the migration and refugee crisis today but focus on the economic situation and challenges.

The Nordic-Baltic Countries – and Germany – have reformed. We have – in different ways of course – competitive, attractive economies and the Nordic welfare model is something that attracts interest around the world. So do our green solutions. And the way we handle our common borders – current problems aside – and national minorities. But we still need to ensure more growth, jobs and possibilities for all our citizens.

Together we can promote free trade with a stronger focus on more and better jobs – and to benefit consumers. Together we can push for the necessary economic reforms inside the EU and for a better single market. Together we can act as a bridge between Eurozone members and countries outside the Eurozone. And we can work to ensure that the UK stays inside the EU.

I am happy that Minister Roth is here today. In the last difficult years Germany has taken responsibility and shown leadership. And in this you have our strong support. We are like-minded on most issues and we need to work closer together to ensure that Europe delivers and that we continue to be a winning region in the global competition.

Europe is struggling to find common answers to the internal and external pressure. I wish you all successful and constructive debates on how to deal with them with Nordic-Baltic-German solutions.

Thank you.

Statement at COP21, Paris, 30 November 2015

Lars Løkke Rasmussen, Prime Minister

(Check against delivery)

Your Excellencies,
Distinguished delegates,
Ladies and Gentlemen,

Last year, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) launched its report in Copenhagen. The conclusions were clear: the atmosphere is warming, and sea levels are rising.

In the Arctic, temperatures are rising twice as fast as in the rest of the world. And the ice cap is melting at an alarming rate.

The world's climate is changing. But fortunately the will to act is changing too.

More than 170 countries have submitted contributions to a Paris agreement. Together they represent more than 90 per cent of global emissions. We have gone from action by a few to action by all.

This is a huge accomplishment. And a decisive step forward.

Still, what is on the table is not enough to reach our two-degree target. We need to do more.

We all feel the impacts of climate change. Some more than others. Those who are affected the most are the poorest and most vulnerable countries.

Denmark will continue its support for this group of countries.

In 2016 we have earmarked 38 mio. USD [270 million DKK] to adaptation and mitigation activities in developing countries. This includes approxi-

mately 22 million USD [156 million DKK] to the Least Developed Countries Fund.

As new technologies develop, so do our opportunities to combat climate change.

Companies, cities and other non-state actors are coming together to address the challenges 'on the ground'.

And every single year, clean energy technologies and investments are becoming more cost-effective and attractive.

Clean energy innovation is a crucial part of an effective, long-term global response to our shared climate challenge.

I am proud that Denmark is part of the American initiative 'Mission Innovation'. Our objective is to accelerate innovation in public and private global clean energy. The goal is to make sure that clean energy is widely affordable.

Never before have we been this close to actually changing the direction of our world and our climate.

The Paris agreement should be truly global and durable. It should include a global long-term goal for emissions reductions. And it should be flexible, so we can increase ambition over time.

The Paris agreement should send a strong signal that our governments are committed to a low-carbon future. And it should promote the necessary shift in global investments to tackle climate change effectively.

COP21 is our generation's best opportunity to take real action.

We must seize this opportunity.

Thank you.

‘A Bigger Denmark in an Ever Smaller World’

Speech to Heads of Diplomatic Missions, Copenhagen, 7 December 2015

Kristian Jensen, Minister for Foreign Affairs

(Check against delivery)

Ladies and gentlemen, thank you for coming today to discuss the Danish government’s foreign policy agenda and our cooperation. We value the cooperation with you and your countries and we constantly strive to improve and enhance that.

Henry Kissinger, the former secretary of state of the US, recently said: ‘The American domestic debate is frequently described as a contest between idealism and realism. It may turn out – for America and the rest of the world – that if America cannot act in both modes, it will be unable to fulfil either.’

Henry Kissinger is right to stress that the world needs idealism as well as realism. A cynical realist has no goal. And a naive idealist has no means of attaining his goals.

Today, only days after the Danish ‘No’ at the referendum, it is clear that a majority of my countrymen are sceptical about further integration in the EU. This could – to some extent – be due to both cynicism and naivety in some parts of the electorate. Cynicism with regard to the political system. Naivety with regard to the Danish ability to act alone. A majority of the Danish electorate wouldn’t trust the Danish politicians with an opt-in solution. They feared what it would be used for in the longer run. But it is also clear that a majority probably values the cooperation for instance within Europol.

The time has come to be realist as well as idealist. We cherish the ideal of national sovereignty. And we realize the need for cooperation and compromises. The Danish government will engage in talks with the parties as well as

our EU partners on the way ahead which will begin this week. More about that later.

Let me first concentrate on our long-term foreign policy agenda. Denmark will not choose idealism over realism – or the other way round. We have ambitious goals. We want to promote liberty, human rights and free trade, and we want to contribute to sustainable growth and the reduction of poverty. We want to promote Danish solutions, experiences, products, services, know-how and values – and at the same time create growth and jobs in Denmark. We want to make a difference and contribute to stability, progress and rule of law around the world.

We are a small country. And we must – so to speak – try to kill more birds with one stone. Just as our ministers must perform more duties. I, for one, have taken over four portfolios. And despite an extremely busy calendar, I think it is good to have a single Foreign Minister in charge of security policy, European policy, development policy and growth, trade and investments. This will guarantee synergy and I have ambitions for all the areas.

My political thinking has been shaped by international events of the 1980s. The Cold War, the situation in the Middle East, the EU Single Market, the fall of the Berlin Wall – and later 9/11. These events taught me the importance of freedom, democracy and the rule of law, the necessity of free trade, and the need for a small country to have strong alliances and international engagement. We value our partners and allies. Both the old and traditional ones close to Denmark and across the Atlantic. And the newer ones from continents and growth regions further away.

We meet four days after a majority of the Danish electorate rejected the Justice and Home Affairs opt-in arrangement and the 22 legal acts. It wasn't sufficient that the package was promoted by the government, a majority of newspapers and an overwhelming part of Danish civil society.

I and this government truly believe in the European project and I campaigned hard for a Yes. Of course I would have preferred another result. It would have made Denmark stronger and more secure.

Now, the duty of the government will be to negotiate the best possible agreement on Europol and we will therefore pursue the objective of getting a parallel agreement on Europol. This will both be in the Danish and – I believe – European interest. Talks with the Danish parties will begin this week, and on Friday the Prime Minister will travel to Brussels. We will work closely with our EU partners.

A large proportion of young people voted No. For them the EU and its benefits have become self-evident and something they take for granted. They do not remember the Cold War, Berlin Wall, closed borders and high prices for mobile phone use and airplane travel.

While the vote will not change the general direction and ambitions of our EU policy, we must address the scepticism that only seems to grow stronger every day. This tendency I think we see in many EU member states. We need to take the scepticism seriously and we need to have this at the forefront in the work of the EU the coming years.

There are many reasons for the scepticism. One is the current challenges the EU face. Another is the public fear that the EU institutions have overreached and that they should have concentrated on their core business.

In order to convince the sceptics, the EU must prove that it is good at doing what it was established to do: secure peace and stability, growth and jobs and guarantee the four freedoms: free movement of goods, services, capital and workers.

The Danish government stands firmly behind the principle of free movement of workers – but it cannot mean free and unconditional access to welfare services. The Danish government is also committed to the Schengen agreement. But Schengen cannot function properly without proper control of our external borders.

I know that Prime Minister Rasmussen briefed you on the recent Danish initiatives to respond to the migration challenge, so I will not go into detail. I will just note that Denmark is showing solidarity with the world around us and that we are also heavily engaged in the neighbouring areas of the EU.

For Denmark the EU is and remains the most important platform to promote our political and economic interests. And the EU makes our global voice bigger. Among our top priorities the coming years are a well-functioning single market, growth and job creation, green transition, free trade agreements with for example the US and Japan and a stronger global presence for the EU. We want closer ties with EU's Eastern neighbours and we actively support EU's Ukraine policy and two-legged policy towards Russia. Denmark wants a strong and efficient EU, a stable Eurozone and a UK within the EU.

Last week I participated in the NATO Foreign Minister's meeting in Brussels. NATO and our transatlantic partnership with the United States is still the cornerstone of Danish security. We contribute solidly to NATO and to NATO reassurance to the east and south.

The horrifying terror attacks in Paris were another sad reminder that the world needs to stand together to fight terror, radicalisation and extremism – because terrorism affects us all. We can face the challenge with our military might. But we also need to fight by showing the strength of our ideas. The fight between the free world and the radicalized extremists is truly an ideological battle. If we don't win this fight, the extremists will be back soon under a new name, a new brand.

We must fight the terrorists, we must finance stabilisation in areas dominated by terrorists, and we must give humanitarian aid in the countries embroiled in or bordering on conflict. We must cut off the terrorist economy. And first and foremost we must work together. Like we do against Daesh and elsewhere in the world.

This government will continue to prioritise contributions to peacekeeping, security and stabilisation in the Middle East and Africa. We will deploy instruments such as F16's, transport planes, radar and military personnel. And instruments such as diplomacy, stabilisation efforts, humanitarian aid and civilian support. A trademark of Danish engagement around the globe is that we incorporate our instruments into a coherent and integrated approach aimed at both the short and long term.

Currently we are heavily engaged in the fight against Daesh as a founding member of the Global Coalition but we also support the moderate anti-Assad coalition politically and economically. In Mali we have increased our contribution and we maintain our level of engagement in Afghanistan. The security of Denmark is closely linked to peace and stability in our neighbouring areas but also in the areas neighbouring the EU. The last few months have shown that the immense flow of refugees and migrants pose a serious challenge to Europe. As Foreign Minister my focus is on the external dimensions. We must stem the tide and fight the causes that make people take the desperate journey to Europe. We must address the needs in the countries people depart from or pass through. We must enhance our financial support in the neighbouring areas. And we must work together – like we decided at the EU-Africa Summit in Valletta and for example with Turkey after the EU-Turkey Summit.

Tomorrow I fly to Paris to participate in COP21. COP21 highlights many of the Danish foreign policy priorities. Let me put a few on your mind:

First, Denmark continues to pursue an ambitious green agenda globally. We have worked hard to ensure a result in Paris and we are ready to share Danish experiences and solutions and contribute financially through the

Danish Climate Investment Fund.

Second, COP21 is a frame where we can highlight Danish solutions. As you know, Denmark has developed solutions to cope with our societal challenges in areas such as energy, waste management, healthcare and water – and high-quality food, IT and quality of life. We hope our experiences and solutions can help countries around the world as they face the strategic choices on how to develop their societies. This is also important for growth in Denmark and in our cooperation with growth economies around the world. That I saw for myself when I visited Indonesia and China in October.

Third, COP21 and the string of high-level multilateral UN meetings I have participated in this year have given me the opportunity to engage in one of Denmark's longest standing global policies and one I'm proud of – our development policy. As you know this government has decided to focus our development assistance and phase out programs and partner countries and reduce others. But we are still among the top donors in the world spending more than 0.7 pct. of our GDP on development assistance. We are known for a top-class development policy and that will continue. Among my priorities are leveraging more private investments for development, for example through public-private partnerships, and engaging more new donors from wealthy countries. The refugee and migration crisis and linking humanitarian aid to long-term development are also on top of my list.

Fourth, it underlines the Danish belief in multilateral cooperation, including in the UN. I will not go into detail on this but just note that Denmark will be seeking a seat in the UN Human Rights Council from 2019. And that next year we will host Women Deliver and the Global Green Growth Summit.

Let me as the last point mention the Arctic. The Arctic is naturally a priority for this government and for the Kingdom. We need to explore the economic potential to the benefit of the Arctic people and elsewhere. But we must do it with a firm view to the fragile environment.

We must also strengthen international cooperation in the Arctic and ensure that the region remains a low-tension area. The Arctic is a place where we cooperate peacefully with for example Russia despite our disagreements elsewhere. It is a priority that we keep doing that and keep the Arctic low tension.

When I took office 6 months ago, I chose a slogan: A bigger Denmark in an ever smaller world. This is still my ambition.

I once wrote a little book: Hooray for Globalization. And while globalisation presents many challenges, it presents even more opportunities for us all. It is a good example of the way that freedom and growth go hand in hand – just like idealism and realism should.

It is in this frame that we will shape Denmark's foreign policy in the right balance between interests and values. And between realism and idealism.

I look very much forward to our discussion, thank you.

‘A Safe and Secure Arctic through Cooperation’

Speech at Matchpoint Seminar, Aarhus University, 12 November 2015

Kristian Jensen, Minister for Foreign Affairs

Ladies and Gentlemen! It is a great pleasure for me to be here today. Let me begin by thanking Aarhus University and the City of Aarhus for hosting this event, as well as the organizers of Matchpoint for bringing together so many guests.

Let me start by saying, that the Arctic is a priority topic in our foreign policy and today I want to focus on three issues related to this:

Firstly, the Arctic and Global Climate Change. Secondly, Security and Governance in the Globalised Arctic. And finally – and this is my main political message today: we need more international cooperation to secure a peaceful Arctic and to facilitate sustainable development and seize the commercial opportunities in the Arctic.

This requires a determined effort across the full range of new commercial opportunities, be they mining, tourism or shipping. The Kingdom of Denmark and its industry and businesses are world leaders in operating in the special Arctic environment. The Danish, Greenlandic and Faroese governments will do their utmost to create the necessary framework for these opportunities to become a reality. The Arctic is a good business case. The world is hereby invited to capitalize on these opportunities. I will also remind everyone that this development needs to be sustainable, eco-friendly, in full consultation of the local communities and in a way that benefits the people of the Arctic.

Enhanced infrastructure, such as communications and satellite capacity in the Arctic, is one concrete deliverable that facilitates sustainable development and commercial activities. I will elaborate on this later in my speech.

The point of departure for all we do in the Arctic is the ‘Kingdom of Denmark’s Strategy for the Arctic 2011-2020’. Our overall priority is to

maintain a peaceful, secure and safe Arctic to the benefit of the people who live there, and to ensure sustainable development of the region.

Contrary to much conventional wisdom, the Arctic is not a legal vacuum. We already have a well-functioning international legal framework and a solid political base for peaceful cooperation. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) applies in just the same way as it does in other parts of the world, and the five Arctic coastal states have agreed in the Ilulissat declaration to solve possible disagreements through international law and by peaceful means.

Combatting global climate change

Let me move on to the first issue: combatting global climate change. In just a few weeks' time the whole world will meet for the COP21 in Paris. The climate talks will have an enormous influence on the future of the Arctic – as well as the rest of the world. During my visits to Greenland this summer, I personally witnessed how dramatically climate change affects this region.

The best thing we can do to address the challenges in the Arctic is to agree on an ambitious climate deal in Paris. We face a challenging task to secure an ambitious and universal climate change agreement in order to contain global warming within the limit of 2°C.

And a lot of things are already happening. Last week the Global Green Climate Fund agreed on the first 8 projects to be implemented. These projects will contribute to climate change mitigation and adaptation in developing countries. Denmark is contributing to the fund. And many more projects will follow in the near future.

I also see a lot of political action. The EU remains committed to an ambitious reduction target of at least 40 per cent by 2030. The US government has clearly taken a lead role by announcing a number of initiatives to significantly reduce greenhouse gas emissions. At the GLACIER conference in Alaska I discussed this important topic with John Kerry and I have no doubt that Kerry and the current American chairmanship of the Arctic Council are very ambitious about this agenda. We are also seeing movement towards more ambitious plans from other parts of the world, notably China. During the last months, I have continuously raised the challenges related to our climate with colleagues from Asia, Africa and other European countries. I am chairing a Climate Diplomacy Action group where I seek to reach out to some of the poor developing countries which also will be key in efforts to reaching an ambitious agreement in Paris.

We will need to work intensively on these issues the coming weeks.

Security and Governance in the Globalised Arctic

Let me move on to my second agenda item on security and governance in the globalised Arctic. The fact is that if the Arctic is to develop its full potential, it must remain a low-tension region. The Arctic Council is the most important forum for cooperation in the Arctic. The Council has proved that it is able to adapt to the changing circumstances in the Arctic. The Council has moved on to being not only a decision-shaping, but also a decision-making forum. As a follow-up from the legally binding Search and Rescue (SAR) and the Oil Spill agreements, the Arctic states agreed as recently as last month to establish an Arctic Coast Guard Forum. This tangible initiative will help the implementation of the Search and Rescue and Oil Spill agreements, and taken together these measures will provide a framework for safer, more secure and environmentally responsible maritime activity in the Arctic.

Things are also happening outside the Arctic Council. The International Maritime Organization's (IMO) agreement on the mandatory Polar Code for ships operating in polar waters is a major step towards better maritime security in the Arctic region. The other one is a declaration signed by the five Arctic coastal states, where they commit to conduct future commercial fishing in the high seas area of the Arctic Ocean only pursuant to regional management arrangements, and to establish joint scientific research in the area. Furthermore, all Nordic states are members of the Arctic Council. The Nordic states see the Nordic cooperation on the Arctic as a supplement to the ongoing work in the Arctic Council.

We also expect the EU to adopt a strategy on the Arctic in 2016. We favour concrete EU projects within science and research on environmental and climate change issues in the Arctic; economic development in the Arctic based on sustainable use of resources as well as stepping up the dialogue with the Arctic States and indigenous people. All this goes along with our priorities for the work of the Arctic Council the following years: improved infrastructure on telecommunications, strengthen scientific cooperation, such as the monitoring of climate change in the Arctic and enhancing the cooperation on the oceans in the Arctic.

International Cooperation as the way to facilitate Sustainable Development in the Arctic

The last issue I wish to touch upon is how to strengthen Arctic cooperation and infrastructure to secure sustainable development while supporting those most affected by the changes – the people living in the Arctic? What is at stake here is not a choice between development and no development. People

living in the Arctic have the same right to enjoy growth and prosperity as everybody else.

One important condition for further economic development is the need for better infrastructure. Let me give you a practical example of the kind of challenges we face in this area, and what we do to deal with them.

In the Arctic Council we have decided to establish a new task force on telecommunications infrastructure, which is chaired by Denmark and Norway. We are looking at ways to enhance our communications and satellite capacity in the Arctic. This seems like pretty straightforward stuff – satellites, mobile phones, internet access, 24/7 surveillance are after all parts of everyday life. Except, in the Arctic this is not the case!

Because of the curvature of the earth, most existing satellites simply do not cover the Arctic. And because of the large distances, low population density and harsh climate it is not possible to compensate with land-based infrastructure. This is not to say that there is no coverage. But the few systems we have in place to cover the Arctic region have limited bandwidth that cannot accommodate the increased activity that we have seen in recent years – and expect to see in the years to come. Currently, we do not have sufficient capacity to monitor the increase in ship and air traffic, share scientific data from our research stations, detect oil spills and to effectively manage search and rescue operations in the Arctic.

Satellites are expensive, so we have to spend our money well. I see at least three good reasons in favour of better telecommunications infrastructure in the Arctic.

Firstly, it will improve our capacity to share data in case of accidents and environmental incidents which can lead to better surveillance capacity of the ocean environment and maritime traffic in the Arctic. Secondly, growth in the Arctic region will benefit from a fast and reliable internet connection, because it stimulates business and education. And finally, we need to ensure that the local Arctic communities are able to take advantage of modern communications and engage fully in the digital economy.

Developing better communications infrastructure in the Arctic requires coordination and cooperation between Arctic states, states interested in the development of the Arctic region and the private sector. In Denmark, the National Air Navigation Service Provider (NAVIAIR) has partnered with a number of companies (from Canada, Ireland, Italy) to develop the first global aircraft tracking system via Satellite. By 2018, the system will provide aircraft surveillance coverage to 70 percent of the earth's surface – including of the Arctic and Polar regions where we currently do

not have coverage. This partnership between the public service provider and private businesses will improve our ability to handle the expected increase in air traffic over the North Pole as airlines seek to shorten distances of their long-haul flights.

In this way, the system will both provide an economic incentive in cutting costs for airlines, an environmental benefit as less CO₂ is emitted from shorter flights. And as an added benefit, the system will also provide authorities with an improved tracking system for flights that can be used in search and rescue operations – both in the Arctic and elsewhere.

Conclusion

The conclusion of today is the following. It is beyond doubt that if the Arctic is to develop its full potential, it must remain a low-tension region. And we must act globally on climate change. The best way to ensure that is to continuously develop and strengthen international cooperative measures which address the real and concrete challenges facing all countries and peoples in the region. In the Arctic we need to use the soft instruments to solve the hard issues.

There has been a lot of focus on increases in military presence in the Arctic, especially from Russia. We follow these developments closely, but we must keep in mind that military and security assets in the Arctic also perform a wide array of civilian tasks in the fields of search and rescue, environmental surveillance and so on.

Because of the increased activity in the Arctic – as for example tourism, shipping or mining – all Arctic states are looking at the need to increase their capabilities. We are doing the same in Denmark, where the Ministry of Defence is currently working on an assessment of our military capabilities in the Arctic. The crucial thing is that any build-up of military capabilities is taking place within a broader agreement among the Arctic states that problems are to be dealt with in a peaceful manner and within the framework of international law.

Pushing for rules, institutions and practical cooperation that deliver real solutions to concrete problems for real people, businesses and states remains the most effective means to maintain the Arctic as a low-tension area. Within this context cooperation in areas such as search and rescue and surveillance can in itself be turned into a powerful driver for international cooperation.

Chapter 3

Danish Foreign Policy in Figures

Danish Official Development Assistance · 138

Danish Official Development Assistance (ODA) 2012-2015

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Danish ODA by category (net)

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Danish Official Development Assistance

Danish Official Development Assistance (ODA) 2012-2015

(Current Prices – million DKK)	2012	2013	2014	2015
ODA net disbursement	15,590	16,443	16,379	17,254

Source: *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark (figures from <http://stats.oecd.org/>)*

Danish Bilateral ODA (by country category)

		2012	2013	2014	2015*
Least developed countries	Million DKK	4,248.22	3,593.30	3,448.09	–
	Per cent	38%	30%	28%	–
Low-income countries	Million DKK	452.36	411.33	468.09	–
	Per cent	4%	3%	4%	–
Other developing countries	Million DKK	1,687.58	1,410.46	1,582.43	–
	Per cent	15%	12%	13%	–
Other	Million DKK	4,737.18	6,624.29	6,806.82	–
	Per cent	43%	55%	55%	–
Total	Million DKK	11,125	12,039	12,306	–
	Per cent	100%	100%	100%	–

* 2015-numbers not yet available

Source: *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark (figures from <http://stats.oecd.org/>)*

Danish ODA by category (net):

		2012	2013	2014	2015
Bilateral Assistance	Million DKK	11,125	11,989	11,972	12,635
	Per cent	71%	73%	71%	73%
Multilateral Assistance	Million DKK	4,464	4,454	4,902	4,620
	Per cent	29%	27%	29%	27%
Total	Million DKK	15,590	16,443	16,874	17,254
	Per cent	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark (figures from <http://stats.oecd.org/>)*

Assistance under the Neighbourhood Programme

Danish Official Development Assistance under the Neighbourhood Programme, 2015 (disbursements, by country, round figures)*

Recipient country	DKK
Albania	1,700,000
Belarus	17,200,000
Bosnia-Herzegovina	12,400,000
Caucasus, the (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan)	17,600,000
Central Asia	28,200,000
Kosovo	21,400,000
Moldova	37,200,000
Neighbourhood countries, regional contributions:	11,700,000
Russia	5,700,000
Serbia	13,300,000
Ukraine	134,500,000

Note

- * The Department for European Neighbourhood also manages limited resources from other sources than the neighbourhood programme to the listed countries. These payments are included in the list.

Source: *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark*

Defence

Defence Expenditures to International Missions

(million DKK)	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Participation in UN, OSCE, NATO and other multilateral missions	1,265.0	1,766.0	1,231.0	1,014.0	893.2 ¹
The Peace and Stabilization Fund ²	42.1	51.7	65.3	80.1	72.1
NATO ³	564.3	581.6	573.7	575.3	293.3

Source: *Danish Ministry of Defence*

Notes:

- 1 The main reason for the smaller costs from 2013 to 2015 is an effect of the reduced Danish engagement in Afghanistan.
- 2 An additional annual amount of DKK 10 million has been earmarked for the Peace and Stabilization Fund under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Peace and Stabilization Fund was established in 2012. Before this, in earlier volumes of the *Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook*, this is referred to as 'international security cooperation/global stabilization efforts'.
- 3 Includes contributions to NATO plus expenditures for NATO staff (net). For 2010-2013, account numbers have been used.

Source: *Danish Ministry of Defence*

Financing of the EU budget¹

Member State	Total own resources Million Euros, round figures	Share in total 'national contributions' (%)
Austria	3,063.6	2.31
Belgium	5,518.8	3.03
Bulgaria	449.0	0.32
Croatia	441.5	0.32
Czech Republic	1,588.8	1.11
Cyprus	170.3	0.12
Denmark	2,818.6	2.00
Estonia	215.8	0.15
Finland	1,982.3	1.51
France	21,829.4	16.35
Germany	30,112.6	21.37
Greece	1,770.5	1.33
Hungary	1,114.2	0.81
Ireland	1,775.8	1.23
Italy	15,939.4	11.59
Latvia	257.0	0.18
Lithuania	413.7	0.28
Luxembourg	311.1	0.24
Malta	88.8	0.06
Netherlands	7,979.5	4.64
Poland	4,487.5	3.22
Portugal	1,745.3	1.30
Romania	1,554.5	1.16
Slovenia	412.6	0.28
Slovakia	777.9	0.55
Spain	11,270.2	8.09
Sweden	4,376.7	3.12
United Kingdom	19,803.3	13.32
Total	142,268.6	100.00

Note

1. The member states' budgeted contributions to the EU budget and the UK discount for 2016

Source: *EU-Oplysningen*

Chapter 4

Opinion Polls

Refugees · 144

Islamic State and the Terror Threat · 148


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Refugees

Question: The Danish government has published announcements in foreign newspapers to send a signal that can reduce the influx of refugees to Denmark. Are such announcements a good or a bad idea?




Description: 1,053 answers from a representative selection of Danes above the age of 18. The poll was carried out online, on 8-10 September 2015.

Source: © TNS Gallup/Berlingske: *Om flygtninge fra Syrien, 10 September 2015*

Danish Border Control


Question: Should the Danish police let refugees and migrants who want to go to Sweden pass through the country?



Description: 1,053 answers from a representative selection of Danes above the age of 18. The poll was carried out online, on 8-10 September 2015.

Source: © TNS Gallup/Berlingske: *Om flygtninge fra Syrien, 10 September 2015*


Question: Should there be control at the Danish borders as long as the influx of refugees and migrants continues?



Description: 1,053 answers from a representative selection of Danes above the age of 18. The poll was carried out online, on 8-10 September 2015.

Source: © TNS Gallup/Berlingske: *Om flygtninge fra Syrien, 10 September 2015*

Question: Should such border control be permanent?




Description: 1,053 answers from a representative selection of Danes above the age of 18. The poll was carried out online, on 8-10 September 2015.

Source: © TNS Gallup/Berlingske: *Om flygtninge fra Syrien, 10 September 2015*

EU refugee policy


Question: Should Denmark join a common EU agreement on the distribution of refugees?



Description: 1,008 answers from a representative selection of Danes above the age of 18. The poll was carried out online, on 15-16 January 2015.

Source: © TNS Gallup/Berlingske: *Om flygtninge fra Syrien, 10 September 2015*


Question: Should the EU secure its outside borders fully, with walls and fences if necessary, to hinder irregular access?



Description: 1,008 answers from a representative selection of Danes above the age of 18. The poll was carried out online, on 15-16 January 2015.

Source: © TNS Gallup/Berlingske: *Om flygtninge fra Syrien, 10 September 2015*


Question: Should the effort to rescue shipwrecked asylum seekers in the Mediterranean be dropped all together?



Description: 1,008 answers from a representative selection of Danes above the age of 18. The poll was carried out online, on 20-21 August 2015.

Source: © TNS Gallup/Berlingske: EU retsforbehold og asyl, 21 August 2015

Question: In Australia the authorities turn refugee boats back towards the sea, so that they do not reach Australia. To what extent do you agree that the EU should turn refugee boats back into the Mediterranean?




Description: 1,008 answers from a representative selection of Danes above the age of 18. The poll was carried out online, on 20-21 August 2015.

Source: © TNS Gallup/Berlingske: EU retsforbehold og asyl, 21 August 2015

Islamic State and the Terror Threat


Question: How likely do you think it is that a terror attack will take place in Denmark within the next few years?



Description: 1,001 answers from a representative selection of Danes above the age of 18. The poll was carried out online, on 20-21 November 2015.

Source: © TNS Gallup/Berlingske: Terror, 15 November 2015


Question: If a terror attack were to take place in Denmark within the next few years, how likely is it that it will be committed by a fundamentalist Islamic group?



Description: 1,001 answers from a representative selection of Danes above the age of 18. The poll was carried out online, on 20-21 November 2015.

Source: © TNS Gallup/Berlingske: Terror, 15 November 2015


Question: Have the terror attacks in Paris changed your view of Muslims?



Description: 1,001 answers from a representative selection of Danes above the age of 18. The poll was carried out online, on 20-21 November 2015.

Source: © TNS Gallup/Berlingske: *Terror*, 15 November 2015


Question: To what extent do you agree with the following: Denmark should limit its immigration of Muslims



Description: 1,456 answers from a representative selection of Danes above the age of 18. The poll was carried out online, on 18-19 February 2015.

Source: © TNS Gallup/Berlingske: *Terror i København*, 19 February 2015


**Question: To what extent do you agree on the following:
We should limit immigration all together**



Description: 1,456 answers from a representative selection of Danes above the age of 18. The poll was carried out online, on 18-19 February 2015.

Source: © TNS Gallup/Berlingske: *Terror i København*, 19 February 2015


**Question: To what extent do you agree on the following:
Immigration is good for Denmark**



Description: 1,456 answers from a representative selection of Danes above the age of 18. The poll was carried out online, on 18-19 February 2015.

Source: © TNS Gallup/Berlingske: *Terror i København*, 19 February 2015


**Question: To what extent do you agree on the following:
Islam and terrorism are closely connected**



Description: 1,456 answers from a representative selection of Danes above the age of 18. The poll was carried out online, on 18-19 February 2015.

Source: © TNS Gallup/Berlingske: *Terror i København*, 19 February 2015


Question: How likely is it that the conflict involving the Danish Cartoon crisis and the magazine Charlie Hebdo will evolve into an actual war between the West and Islamic countries?



Description: 1,157 answers from a representative selection of Danes above the age of 18. The poll was carried out online, on 15-18 January 2015.

Source: © TNS Gallup/Berlingske: *Yringsfrihed*, 19 January 2015


Question: Should Denmark provide soldiers for an international coalition with the purpose of attacking Islamic State in each of the countries mentioned below?



Description: 1,001 answers from a representative selection of Danes above the age of 18. The poll was carried out online, on 20-21 November 2015.

Source: © TNS Gallup/Berlingske: Terror, 15 November 2015

Question: To what extent do you agree that Denmark should provide F16 jets to the coalition in order to support attacks against Islamic State in each of the countries mentioned below?




Description: 1,001 answers from a representative selection of Danes above the age of 18. The poll was carried out online, on 20-21 November 2015.

Source: © TNS Gallup/Berlingske: Terror, 15 November 2015

The EU


Question: Should Denmark abolish its opt-out on defence, in order to be able to participate in more missions with EU allies?



Description: 1,025 answers from a representative selection of Danes above the age of 18. The poll was carried out online, on 20-21 August 2015.

Source: © TNS Gallup/Berlingske: EU retsforbehold og asyl, 21 August 2015


Question: Should Denmark abolish its opt-out on the single currency and join the Euro?



Description: 1,025 answers from a representative selection of Danes above the age of 18. The poll was carried out online, on 20-21 August 2015.

Source: © TNS Gallup/Berlingske: EU retsforbehold og asyl, 21 August 2015

Result of the Danish referendum on the proposed law to change the opt-out on justice and home affairs into a case-by-case opt-in.



Source: <https://www.dr.dk/nyheder/politik/eu15/resultater#l1>, last accessed on 26 May 2016.

Arguments for voting 'yes'

Denmark needs to cooperate with EU countries	73%
We need to be able to fight international crime	59%
Wanting to be a member of the Europol	53%
Wanting more cooperation with the EU	34%
Trust the politicians who recommend a 'yes'	28%
Fear that other countries are going to throw us out of Europol if Danes vote 'no'	19%
My gut feeling told me to vote 'yes'	18%
I trust a person who recommends me to vote 'yes'	6%
None of the above	1%
Don't know	%


Arguments for voting 'no'

Do not want to give up national sovereignty	68%
Do not want any more EU	52%
Do not trust the European bureaucracy	38%
Do not trust politicians in general	32%
Do not want a common refugee/asylum policy	31%
Do not want closer cooperation in the EU	28%
Having studied the case carefully ...	28%
My gut feeling told me to vote 'no'	23%
I trust the politicians who recommend a 'no'	11%
I don't want us to be part of Europol	5%
I trust a person who recommended a 'no'	2%
None of the above	2%
Don't know	1%

Description: 1,475 answers from a representative selection of Danes above the age of 18. The poll was carried out online, on 3-4 December 2015.

Source: © TNS Gallup/Berlingske: *Exitmåling EU retsforbehold*, 4 December 2015


Question: The United Kingdom must have a referendum in 2017 at the latest, on whether they should continue to be a member of the EU. In your opinion, should Denmark have a similar referendum?



Source: Norstat for Altinget, see <http://www.altinget.dk/leu/artikel/to-ud-af-fem-danskere-vil-stemme-om-eu-medlemskab>, last accessed on 23 May 2016.

Development Aid


Question: Do you think development aid makes a difference for the better?



Compared to 2013-2014, Danes have a more positive perception of whether development aid makes a difference for the better. 56% in total believe that development aid makes some difference or a big difference, compared to only 43% in 2013.

Source: @Epinion/Verdens Bedste Nyheder, October 2015, available at <http://verdensbedstenyheder.dk/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/Verdens-Bedste-Nyheder-2015-Hovedrapport.pdf>, last accessed 26 May 2016.


Question: Do you believe that the government spends too much, an appropriate amount or too little on development aid?



In 2015 fewer Danes than in 2013-2014 believed that the government spends far too much or too much on development aid (26%). More Danes think that the government spends too little (25% compared to 11% in 2014). 40% continue to think that the government spends an appropriate amount.


Source: @Epinion/Verdens Bedste Nyheder, October 2015, available at <http://verdensbedstenyheder.dk/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/Verdens-Bedste-Nyheder-2015-Hovedrapport.pdf>, last accessed 26 May 2016.

Question: How important is it to you that Denmark is leading in giving development aid, compared to other countries?



Source: @Epinion/Verdens Bedste Nyheder, October 2015, available at <http://verdensbedstenyheder.dk/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/Verdens-Bedste-Nyheder-2015-Hovedrapport.pdf>, last accessed 26 May 2016.


Question: In the light of the extraordinary influx of refugees and the pressure on the Danish and European asylum system, should Denmark spend more/the same/less than the 0.7% of BNP on development aid?



Description: 1,105 answers from a representative selection of Danes above the age of 18. The poll was carried out online, on 25-28 September 2015.

Source: © TNS Gallup/Berlingske: *Danskernes holdning til u-landsbistanden*, 29 September 2015

Question posed to citizens in all EU countries: In your opinion, is it very important, fairly important, not very important or not at all important to help people in developing Countries. (Comparison between populations in the EU. See the table on page 161.)



Source: http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/sp441-devco-report-final_en.pdf, last accessed 26 may 2016.


Question: In your opinion, is it very important, fairly important, not very important or not at all important to help people in developing countries?

	Total “important”	Total “not important”	Don’t know
EU28	89%	10%	1%
Austria	86%	13%	1%
Belgium	86%	14%	0%
Bulgaria	72%	21%	7%
Croatia	86%	12%	2%
Cyprus	91%	9%	0%
Czech Republic	78%	20%	2%
Denmark	92%	7%	1%
Estonia	75%	21%	4%
Finland	91%	9%	0%
France	86%	13%	1%
Germany	93%	6%	1%
Greece	84%	15%	1%
Hungary	73%	25%	2%
Ireland	91%	7%	2%
Italy	90%	8%	2%
Latvia	67%	28%	5%
Lithuania	74%	25%	1%
Luxembourg	96%	4%	0%
Malta	92%	7%	1%
Netherlands	92%	8%	0%
Poland	87%	9%	4%
Portugal	93%	6%	1%
Romania	88%	9%	3%
Slovakia	79%	19%	2%
Slovenia	80%	19%	1%
Spain	93%	6%	1%
Sweden	98%	2%	0%
United Kingdom	86%	12%	2%

Source: http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/sp441-devco-report-final_en.pdf, last accessed 26 May 2016.


Global Warming

Question: Do you agree with the statement that the average temperature on earth is rising?



Source: Denmark's green think tank CONCITO, *Klimabarometeret 2015*, available at http://concito.dk/files/dokumenter/artikler/klimabarometeret_2015_endelig_0.pdf, last accessed 26 May 2016.

Question: To what extent do you believe that climate change is man-made?



Source: Denmark's green think tank CONCITO, *Klimabarometeret 2015*, available at http://concito.dk/files/dokumenter/artikler/klimabarometeret_2015_endelig_0.pdf, last accessed 26 May 2016.

Question: What consequences will climate change have in your lifetime?

More extreme storms and cloudbursts	73%
Rising water levels	64%
More and bigger areas of drought	46%
More extinct species	45%
More lack of clean drinking water	40%
More famine	32%
More climate refugees	32%
More poverty	29%
More diseases	22%
More wars	19%
None of the above	5%

Source: Denmark's green think tank CONCITO, *Klimabarometeret 2015*, available at http://concito.dk/files/dokumenter/artikler/klimabarometeret_2015_endelig_0.pdf, last accessed 26 May 2016.

Chapter 5

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ISBN (print): 978-87-7605-803-6
ISBN (pdf): 978-87-7605-804-3
ISSN: 1397-2480